Opinion
# 2015-041-503 Claim No. 114809
01-16-2015
TRUE JACKSON v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK
TRUE JACKSON Pro Se HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN New York State Attorney General By: Michael C. Rizzo, Esq. Assistant Attorney General
Synopsis
Claim alleging that defendant failed to adequately protect inmate from assault by fellow inmate is dismissed after trial where claimant's testimony showed that defendant could not reasonably have foreseen sudden assault by allegedly unidentified assailant and documentary evidence further revealed that on date in question claimant was an active participant in a physical altercation with another, identified inmate, that claimant refused orders to stop fighting and had to be physically restrained by correction officers to end the altercation.
Case information
UID: | 2015-041-503 |
Claimant(s): | TRUE JACKSON |
Claimant short name: | JACKSON |
Footnote (claimant name) : | |
Defendant(s): | THE STATE OF NEW YORK |
Footnote (defendant name) : | |
Third-party claimant(s): | |
Third-party defendant(s): | |
Claim number(s): | 114809 |
Motion number(s): | |
Cross-motion number(s): | |
Judge: | FRANK P. MILANO |
Claimant's attorney: | TRUE JACKSON Pro Se |
Defendant's attorney: | HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN New York State Attorney General By: Michael C. Rizzo, Esq. Assistant Attorney General |
Third-party defendant's attorney: | |
Signature date: | January 16, 2015 |
City: | Albany |
Comments: | |
Official citation: | |
Appellate results: | |
See also (multicaptioned case) |
Decision
True Jackson (claimant), an inmate, was injured during an altercation in the north yard of Clinton Correctional Facility (CCF) on September 15, 2007. Claimant received a facial laceration which required the application of butterfly bandages. The claim alleges that defendant provided claimant inadequate security. Trial of the claim was conducted December 18, 2014, and claimant was the only trial witness.
"Having assumed physical custody of inmates, who cannot protect and defend themselves in the same way as those at liberty can, the State owes a duty of care to safeguard inmates, even from attacks by fellow inmates" (Sanchez v State of New York, 99 NY2d 247, 252 [2002]). "This duty, however, is limited to providing reasonable care to protect inmates from risks of harm that defendant knew or should have known were foreseeable" (Di Donato v State of New York, 25 AD3d 944 [3d Dept 2006]). "The State . . . is not an insurer of inmate safety, and negligence cannot be inferred solely from the happening of an incident" (Colon v State of New York, 209 AD2d 842, 843 [3d Dept 1994]).
In determining if the State provided reasonable care to protect an inmate from assault the court may consider whether the claimant had previous known encounters with his assailant or had listed his assailant on an " 'enemies list' with the institution" (Elnandes v State of New York, 11 AD3d 828, 829 [3d Dept 2004]). The court may also consider whether the assailant was "a known dangerous prisoner" (Auger v State of New York, 263 AD2d 929, 930 [3d Dept 1999]; see Wilson v State of New York, 36 AD2d 559 [3d Dept 1971]). Further, the court may consider whether "claimant was a known assault risk" (Stanley v State of New York, 239 AD2d 700, 701 [3d Dept 1997]).
The State's potential liability for negligent supervision with respect to an inmate-on-inmate assault is not limited, however, to situations in which actual notice of a particular claimant's vulnerability or a particular assailant's violent propensities can be shown. The State is also charged with the duty of protecting an inmate from reasonably foreseeable risks of harm based upon "what the State reasonably should have known--for example, from its knowledge of risks to a class of inmates based on the institution's expertise or prior experience, or from its own policies and practices designed to address such risks" (Sanchez, 99 NY2d at 254 [emphasis in original]).
The fact that a correction officer is not present at the exact time and place of an assault does not rise to an inference of negligence absent a showing that facility officials had notice of a foreseeable dangerous situation (Colon v State of New York, 209 AD2d 842 [3d Dept 1994]; Padgett v State of New York, 163 AD2d 914 [4th Dept 1990], lv denied 76 NY2d 711 [1990]).
A correctional facility superintendent has discretion to "provide for such measures as he may deem necessary or appropriate for the safety, security and control of correctional facilities" (see Correction Law § 137 [2] and § 18 [2]; see Matter of Shabazz v Portuondo, 260 AD2d 733 [3d Dept 1999], lv denied 94 NY2d 756). In general, courts should defer to prison authorities in matters of internal prison security (Matter of Blake v Selsky, 10 AD3d 774, 775 [3d Dept 2004]). At trial, claimant testified that he was suddenly, without warning and unexpectedly, attacked from behind by an unknown assailant, and cut with an unknown weapon. He further testified that no assailant was prosecuted, that prior to the incident he had never previously expressed any concern for his safety to the defendant, and that he refused protective custody after the incident.
Taking claimant's trial testimony at face value, the claim must fail. Under the circumstances described by claimant, defendant could not have reasonably foreseen claimant's assault. Moreover, to require that defendant have sufficient personnel on the ground in the north yard to prevent each and every such apparently random act of violence, as claimant suggested, would not only be impractical, it would render defendant an insurer of the safety of each and every inmate in a maximum security prison. Such a level of security is not required of defendant, and a failure to provide that level of security is not negligence.
But beyond claimant's testimony, defendant's Exhibit A, contemporaneously created documents chronicling the events of September 15, 2007, directly contradicts and discredits claimant's trial testimony. Exhibit A describes claimant as an active participant in a physical altercation with another, identified inmate, states that claimant refused orders to stop fighting and had to be physically restrained by correction officers to end the altercation, and further records that claimant was cut with a sharpened weapon that was recovered at the scene of the altercation.
Claimant presented no evidence at trial, expert or otherwise, in support of the causes of action set forth in his claim founded in medical malpractice. Accordingly, those causes of action fail.
For all of the reasons set forth above, the claimant has failed to prove his claim by a preponderance of the credible evidence. The claim, in all respects, is dismissed.
All motions not previously decided are hereby denied.
Let judgment be entered accordingly.
January 16, 2015
Albany, New York
FRANK P. MILANO
Judge of the Court of Claims