Jackson v. Southern Pan Shoring Co.

6 Citing cases

  1. Jackson v. Southern Pan Shoring Company

    390 S.E.2d 393 (Ga. 1990)   Cited 5 times

    WELTNER, Justice. This is the third appearance, in as many years, of this case before our court. For prior decisions, see Jackson v. Southern Pan c. Co., 258 Ga. 401 ( 369 S.E.2d 239) (1988); and Southern Pan c. Co. v. Jackson, 259 Ga. 260 ( 378 S.E.2d 854) (1989). This time, Mrs. Jackson appeals from the trial court's holding that she became a shareholder of the company only on the date of September 14, 1988, which was the date on which the trial court entered the order directing that the principals of the company issue shares to Mrs. Jackson. She contends that she must be considered as a shareholder on the date that she attempted to exercise her warrant, which was on May 8, 1987. That warrant has been declared to be enforceable by prior decision of this court, and the only question now before us is whether Mrs. Jackson's conduct on May 8, 1987 was a valid exercise of that warrant.

  2. Southern Pan Shoring Company v. Jackson

    378 S.E.2d 854 (Ga. 1989)   Cited 1 times

    WELTNER, Justice. The facts of this case are set forth fully in Jackson v. Southern Pan Shoring Co., 258 Ga. 401 ( 369 S.E.2d 239) (1988). Jackson attempted to exercise a stock purchase warrant in May 1987. Southern Pan initiated a declaratory judgment action challenging the validity of the warrant.

  3. Ward v. Ward

    747 S.E.2d 95 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013)

    We disagree. The appellant cites Jackson v. Southern Pan and Shoring Co., 258 Ga. 401, 369 S.E.2d 239 (1988), to support his argument. In that case, Jackson guaranteed a loan for Southern Pan in exchange for receiving a stock warrant giving her the option to purchase 80 percent of Southern Pan's stock.

  4. Service Corp. v. H. M. Patterson c

    263 Ga. 412 (Ga. 1993)   Cited 3 times

    While the appellate courts of Georgia have quoted with approval the Comment to the GBCC and its predecessor statutes and have found its analyses helpful in ascertaining the intent of the legislature, e.g., Jackson v. Southern Pan c. Co., 258 Ga. 401 (2) (b) ( 369 S.E.2d 239) (1988); Shoffner v. Woodward, 195 Ga. App. 778 (1) (a) ( 394 S.E.2d 921) (1990), we do not agree with SCI that the Comment controls the interpretation to be given the provisions of the GBCC or otherwise precludes our application of the rules of statutory construction. The Comment to OCGA § 14-2-861 specifies only OCGA §§ 14-2-851; 14-2-852 (indemnification arrangements); OCGA § 14-2-858 (directors-and-officers liability insurance); and OCGA § 14-2-744 (termination of derivative proceedings by board action), as the statutes that are "not covered by, addressed under, or affected by Part 6."

  5. Code Revision Comm'n ex rel. Gen. Assembly of Ga. v. Public.Resource.org, Inc.

    906 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2018)   Cited 6 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Listing various formulations of the ordinary meaning of the word "merge"

    In particular, the state courts frequently have characterized OCGA comments as conclusive statements about statutory meaning and legislative intent. See, e.g., Jackson v. S. Pan & Shoring Co., 258 Ga. 401, 369 S.E.2d 239 (1988) (explaining that "[t]he express intent of [the statutory provision] ... is set out in the Comment to O.C.G.A. § 14-2-86"); Cox v. Fowler, 279 Ga. 501, 614 S.E.2d 59 (2005) (citing OCGA comments as showing the "legal effect" of and "the General Assembly’s intention" with respect to a statutory provision); Prodigy Centers/Atlanta No. 1 L.P. v. T-C Assocs., Ltd., 269 Ga. 522, 501 S.E.2d 209 (1998) (citing OCGA comment as establishing the scope of a statutory definition); Quinn v. Cardiovascular Physicians, P.C., 254 Ga. 216, 326 S.E.2d 460 (1985) (citing OCGA comment as stating "the purpose" of a statutory provision); Chaney v. Burdett, 274 Ga. 805, 560 S.E.2d 21 (2002) (citing OCGA comment as stating the purpose behind a revision to a statutory provision); Grace Bros. v. Farley Indus., Inc., 264 Ga. 817, 450 S.E.2d 814 (1994) (citing OCGA comment as defining the nature of a statutory remedy); Magner v. One Sec. Corp., 258 Ga. App. 520, 574 S.E.2d 555 (2002) (citing OCGA comment as givin

  6. Stephens v. Trust for Public Land

    475 F. Supp. 2d 1299 (N.D. Ga. 2007)   Cited 9 times
    Rejecting plaintiff's argument that documents were privileged because expert was operating as consultant, and not in his capacity as an expert witness, where the documents arguably related to the subject of his proffered opinion

    Defendant does not, however, clearly state the legal basis for its estoppel argument. That said, the cases cited by Defendant — specifically, Green v. Ford Motor Company, 246 S.E.2d 721 (Ga.Ct.App. 1978), Wright v. Newsome, 467 S.E.2d 533 (Ga. 1996), and Jackson v. Southern Pan and Shoring Co., 369 S.E.2d 239 (Ga. 1988) — do not support its position that Plaintiff is estopped from raising a challenge to the Agreement.Green is a parol evidence case, and the passage cited merely stands for the proposition that one may not vary the written terms of an agreement under which the party has performed by parol evidence.