Jackson v. Seattle

19 Citing cases

  1. Shipp v. Curtis

    318 F.2d 797 (9th Cir. 1963)   Cited 4 times

    The rule appears to be well established in the State of Washington that contributory negligence, being an affirmative defense on which the defendant has the burden of proof, the defendant must produce substantial evidence of the plaintiff's own negligence before the trial court is required to instruct the jury on contributory negligence. Jackson v. City of Seattle, 15 Wn.2d 505, 131 P.2d 172 (1942); Schneider v. Midwest Coast Transport Inc., 51 Wn.2d 673, 321 P.2d 260 (1953). It is reversible error in the State of Washington to instruct the jury on an issue which is not supported by substantial evidence.

  2. Boyd v. Edmonds

    390 P.2d 706 (Wash. 1964)   Cited 8 times
    In Boyd, an elderly passenger fell when the bus driver, who was unable for some reason to pull up to the curb, allowed her to disembark onto the roadway.

    Appellant argues, however, that in view of respondent's testimony that there was nothing to impair her vision and that she looked as she stepped down, the only permissible conclusion is that the sole proximate cause of the accident was the respondent's misjudgment of the height of the last step and that, therefore, the appellant had no duty toward her. This argument simply ignores the common carrier's obligation toward its passengers. It is the duty of a carrier to select a safe place for its passengers to alight and a passenger has the right to assume that such a selection was made unless the danger was obvious. Jackson v. Seattle, 15 Wn.2d 505 131 P.2d 172. A duty to exercise the highest degree of care is certainly breached by a failure to exercise some care. True, the quantum of care to be exercised must be proportionate to the degree of danger inherent in the particular circumstances. Peterson v. Seattle, supra.

  3. Cooper v. Pay-N-Save Drugs, Inc.

    371 P.2d 43 (Wash. 1962)   Cited 19 times
    In Cooper v. Pay-N-Save Drugs, Inc., 59 Wn.2d 829, 835, 371 P.2d 43, 47 (1962), this court stated that "it would appear better practice to omit... [giving an unavoidable accident instruction] except in those instances in which, quite plainly, it is peculiarly appropriate."

    In the following cases, the trial court gave the unavoidable-accident instruction to the jury, which returned a verdict for defendant; this court approved the instruction, but reversed the cases on other grounds. Jackson v. Seattle, 15 Wn.2d 505, 131 P.2d 172 (1942). (Reversed: it was error to submit the issue of contributory negligence in the absence of evidence.)

  4. Greyhound Corporation v. Blakley

    262 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1958)   Cited 9 times

    Ziomko v. Puget Sound Electric Ry., 1920, 112 Wn. 426, 192 P. 1009; Evans v. Yakima Valley Transportation Co., 1952, 39 Wn.2d 841, 239 P.2d 336; Neel v. Henne, 1948, 30 Wn.2d 24, 190 P.2d 775. Contributory negligence, being an affirmative defense on which the defendant has the burden of proof, the defendant must produce substantial evidence of the plaintiff's own negligence before the trial court is required to instruct the jury on contributory negligence. Jackson v. City of Seattle, 15 Wn.2d 505, 131 P.2d 172; Schneider v. Midwest Coast Transport, Inc., 51 Wn.2d 673, 321 P.2d 260. It is reversible error in the State of Washington to instruct the jury on an issue which is not supported by substantial evidence. Leavitt v. De Young, 43 Wn.2d 701, 263 P.2d 592, and cases cited therein.

  5. Steffen v. Schwan's Sales Enterprises

    2006 S.D. 41 (S.D. 2006)   Cited 18 times
    Finding insufficient evidence to submit contributory negligence to the jury where plaintiff had pulled car to the side of the road to make way for an emergency vehicle and was struck from the rear by defendant's vehicle when defendant expected traffic to be moving forward

    On the other hand, the rule of the remaining cases would warrant a contributory negligence instruction here. Washington follows the rule that: "There must be substantial evidence that plaintiff's own negligence proximately contributed to the injury or evidence from which such negligence can be reasonably inferred." Bonica v. Gracias, 84 Wash.2d 99, 100, 524 P.2d 232, 233 (Wash 1974) (involving a case where "no evidence" of contributory negligence was elicited) (citing Jackson v. Seattle, 15 Wash.2d 505, 131 P.2d 172 (1942)) (emphasis added). Thus, if there is evidence from which contributory negligence may be reasonably inferred; e.g., Steffen's admission that she remained stopped after the emergency vehicle had passed and Koch's testimony that the traffic started moving, the contributory negligence dispute should have been submitted to the jury.

  6. Bonica v. Gracias

    84 Wn. 2d 99 (Wash. 1974)   Cited 10 times
    Noting freeway entrance ramp as classic example of where abrupt stops should be anticipated

    There must be substantial evidence that plaintiff's own negligence proximately contributed to the injury or evidence from which such negligence can be reasonably inferred. Jackson v. Seattle, 15 Wn.2d 505, 131 P.2d 172 (1942). The only contention by defendant is that the plaintiff's stop was unreasonably abrupt because plaintiff struck the car ahead of him. It does not follow that such abrupt stop was a proximate cause of the collision between plaintiff and defendant. It is apparent that if plaintiff had stopped just short of the car ahead, the defendant would have still struck plaintiff's car.

  7. Benjamin v. Seattle

    74 Wn. 2d 832 (Wash. 1968)   Cited 16 times

    [3] In considering the question of contributory negligence on the part of Mrs. Benjamin, it must be remembered that, as a passenger, she had the right to assume that the driver of the carrier had exercised the highest degree of care commensurate with the practical operation of the vehicle in selecting a safe place for her to alight, unless the danger was obvious. Boyd v. Edmonds, supra; Jackson v. Seattle, 15 Wn.2d 505, 131 P.2d 172 (1942). Whether the situation here presented an obvious danger to the plaintiff is a question of fact.

  8. Dietrich v. Community Traction Co.

    1 Ohio St. 2d 38 (Ohio 1964)   Cited 26 times

    However, since the passenger has no control over where the bus will stop, he has the right to assume that it is a reasonably safe place to alight, and he may proceed accordingly until he realizes, or in the exercise of reasonable care should realize, otherwise. Jackson v. City of Seattle, 15 Wn.2d 505, 131 P.2d 172; O'Shea v. Chicago Motor Coach Co., 328 Ill. App. 457, 462, 66 N.E.2d 482. We find that a motorbus common carrier may be liable for injuries proximately resulting from its negligence in failing to afford a passenger an opportunity to alight in a reasonably safe place even though the passenger had alighted and taken two or three steps before he was injured.

  9. Hughey v. Winthrop Motor Co.

    61 Wn. 2d 227 (Wash. 1963)   Cited 16 times

    If there is no evidence of contributory negligence, it is error to submit the issue to the jury. Schneider v. Midwest Coast Transport, Inc., 51 Wn.2d 673, 675, 321 P.2d 260 (1958); Jackson v. Seattle, 15 Wn.2d 505, 512, 131 P.2d 172 (1942); Farrow v. Ostrom, 10 Wn.2d 666, 667, 117 P.2d 963 (1941). In this respect, it is analogous to the "unavoidable accident" instruction.

  10. Smith v. Portland Traction Co.

    226 Or. 221 (Or. 1961)   Cited 14 times
    In Smith, the plaintiff was discharged from the bus on a sloping street which was "wrinkled" in waves of one-quarter to one-half inch high. There was no proof that the defendant knew of the "wrinkles."

    A public carrier must discharge its passengers at a reasonably safe place. Lewis v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, Inc., 147 Or. 588, 34 P.2d 616, 96 ALR 718; Corrigan v. Portland Traction Co., 157 Or. 496, 73 P.2d 378; Jackson v. City of Seattle, 15 Wn.2d 505, 131 P.2d 172; Trzecki v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 258 S.W.2d 676; Allen v. Dillman, 249 S.W.2d 23; Houston Transit Co. v. McQuade, 223 S.W.2d 64; Thomas v. Jamaica Buses, 5 N.Y.2d 862, 182 NYS2d 15; Sims v. Chicago Transit Authority, 4 Ill.2d 60, 122 N.E.2d 221. A common carrier which operates lines of buses, unlike a railroad that operates its own railroad depot, stops its vehicles upon the public streets. It has no more control over the streets and their state of repair than any other member of society.