Even if we were to assume that Caratini was court-appointed (something that is not clear from Carrasquillo's complaint), the First Circuit has stated that a court-appointed attorney does not act under color of state law within the meaning of ยง 1983 when representing a defendant. Budnick v. Barnstable Cty. Bar Advocates, Inc., 989 F.2d 484 (1st Cir. 1993);Jackson v. Salon, 614 F.2d 15, 16-17 (1st Cir. 1980) (listing numerous other circuits that take the same position). "The reason for this position is that court appointed counsel works primarily for the benefit of his indigent client and only indirectly for the benefit of the state and society in general." Jackson, 614 F.2d at 17.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), made applicable by Fed. R. Bankr.P. 7015. Notwithstanding this liberal amendment policy, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (the "First Circuit") has squarely held that after a complaint is dismissed, it is too late for a plaintiff to amend a complaint as a matter of right. Jackson v. Salon, 614 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir.1980). Likewise, the First Circuit has held that a final, appealable judgment results whenever a district court dismisses a complaint without expressly granting the plaintiff leave to amend the complaint.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that "[a] party may amend the party's pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served. . . . Otherwise a party may amend the party's pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires." Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), made applicable by F.R.Bankr.P. 7015. Notwithstanding this liberal amendment policy, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (the "First Circuit") has squarely held that after a complaint is dismissed, it is too late for a plaintiff to amend a complaint as a matter of right. Jackson v. Salon. 614 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 1980). Likewise, the First Circuit has held that a final, appealable judgment results whenever a district court dismisses a complaint without expressly granting the plaintiff leave to amend the complaint.
With regard to motions to amend, we have stated that "[w]hile motions to amend are liberally granted, see Johnston v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 595 F.2d 890, 896 (1st Cir. 1979), a court has the discretion to deny them if it believes that, as a matter of law, amendment would be futile. See Jackson v. Salon, 614 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 1980); Crews v. Memorex Corp., 588 F. Supp. 27, 28 (D.Mass. 1984); 6 C. Wright A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil ยง 1487 at 432-33 (1971) (citing cases). We will generally defer to a district court's decision to deny leave to amend where the reason is 'apparent or declared.
In sum, the motion for leave to amend, proffered at the eleventh hour to fend off summary judgment, proposed four patently futile affirmative defenses fully meriting summary rejection. Jackson v. Salon, 614 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 1980); see also Neves, 837 F.2d at 536 ("Federal courts need not tiptoe through empty formalities to reach foreordained results."). Summary Judgment
First, consistent with the Second and Eighth Circuits, a plaintiff's time to amend his or her complaint as a matter of right within the First Circuit terminates upon a district court's dismissal of the complaint. See Jackson v. Salon, 614 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 1980). Second, the dismissal of the complaint in the present case was set forth in a separate document, as required for final judgments under Fed.R.Civ.P. 58.
The district court, therefore, properly dismissed plaintiff's fraud claim and denied plaintiff's second motion to amend the complaint. See Jackson v. Salon, 614 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 1980) (a district court may deny leave to amend if the proposed amendment would be futile). The district court's grant of summary judgment to Honda is affirmed.
In our case, the physician is the decision-maker and has the authority to commit the person for a specified period of time without any further judicial approvals. The case cited in Hall are also distinguishable. For instance, in Jackson v. Salon, 614 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1980), the First Circuit held that a court-appointed attorney was not a state actor. This situation of course is quite different from the situation presented in our case.
While motions to amend are liberally granted, see Johnston v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 595 F.2d 890, 896 (1st Cir. 1979), a court has the discretion to deny them if it believes that, as a matter of law, amendment would be futile. See Jackson v. Salon, 614 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 1980); Crews v. Memorex Corp., 588 F. Supp. 27, 28 (D.Mass. 1984); 6 C. Wright A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil ยง 1487 at 432-33 (1971) (citing cases). We will generally defer to a district court's decision to deny leave to amend where the reason is "apparent or declared."
Appellant's right to amend as a matter of course ended with the entry of the judgment of dismissal. Jackson v. Salon, 614 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 1980); Feddersen Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 180 F.2d 519, 523 (10th Cir. 1950). However, there is some indication in the record that appellant may have informed the magistrate of his desire to amend prior to the entry of judgment.