Opinion
No. W2000-02974-COA-R3-CV.
Filed October 12, 2001.
A Direct Appeal from the Chancery Court for Shelby County; No. CH-00-0776-3; The Honorable D. J. Alissandratos, Chancellor.
Affirmed and Remanded.
Harold Lee Jackson, Pro Se.
Donnie E. Wilson, Shelby County Attorney; Renee Allen-Walker, Senior Assistant County Attorney, For Appellees.
W. Frank Crawford, P.J., W.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which David R. Farmer, J. and Holly Kirby Lillard, J., joined.
OPINION
Petitioner, Harold Lee Jackson, filed a petition in chancery court pursuant to the Tennessee Public Records Act against Jim Rout, Mayor of Shelby County, A. C. Gilless, Sheriff of Shelby County, and Helen R. Wren, Commander of Records and Identification Department of Shelby County Sheriff's Office. The petition avers that it is filed pursuant to T.C.A. § 10-7-505 to require respondents to show cause why he was denied request for access to public records. The petition alleges that he has reason to believe that while he was incarcerated in the Shelby County jail in 1974 he was subjected to an experiment and described the technology as "nanotechnology." The petition alleges that on February 20, 2000, he wrote the sheriff's office requesting access to public records related to the alleged experiment. He alleges that he was advised by letter from the sheriff's office that a search of the records would be made for $18.00 and that he sent an eighteen dollar money order for the search. He avers that he received a reply April 6, 2000, but that it "had nothing to do with my request, so the sheriff of Shelby County jail public information office's reply was denying my request." He avers that the information sent was his criminal arrest record with no information whatsoever concerning any experiment or anything of that nature. He alleges that the respondents violated the open records act.
On May 26, 2000, respondents filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Tenn.R.Civ.P. 12.02 (6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or in the alternative for summary judgment. The motion states in pertinent part:
1. The Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
2. There is no genuine issue of material fact, and Respondents are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
3. Respondents have no knowledge of "Nanotechnology," no records related to it, nor have Respondents conducted any "Nanotechnology" experiments on Petitioner.
4. The Complaint is frivolous, and is not warranted by existing law or facts.
5. Respondents rely upon their Memorandum submitted to the Court, and upon the Affidavit filed with the Court.
The record does not contain the affidavit referred to in the motion; therefore, the matter is considered as a 12.02 (6) motion. The only issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in dismissing the petition.
A motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. It admits the truth of all relevant and material allegations but asserts that such allegations do not constitute a cause of action as a matter of law. Riggs v. Burson , 941 S.W.2d 44 (Tenn. 1997). Obviously, when considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, we are limited to the examination of the complaint alone. See Wolcotts Fin. Serv., Inc. v. McReynolds , 807 S.W.2d 708 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1990). The basis for the motion is that the allegations in the complaint considered alone and taken as true are insufficient to state a claim as a matter of law. Cornpropst v. Sloan , 528 S.W.2d 188 (Tenn. 1975). In considering such a motion, the court should construe the complaint liberally in favor of the plaintiff, taking all the allegations of fact therein as true. Cook Uithoven v. Spinnaker's of Rivergate, Inc ., 878 S.W.2d 934 (Tenn. 1994).
T.C.A. § 10-7-503 (Supp. 2000), dealing with the opening all public records for inspection by citizens of the state, provides in pertinent part:
(a) Except a provided in § 10-7-504(f), all state, county and municipal records and all records maintained by the Tennessee performing arts center management corporation, except any public documents authorized to be destroyed by the county public records commission in accordance with § 10-7-404, shall at all times, during business hours, be open for personal inspection by any citizen of Tennessee, and those in charge of such records shall not refuse such right of inspection to any citizen, unless otherwise provided by state law.
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The procedure for enforcing the right of inspection is provided for in T.C.A. § 10-7-505 (1999), which states in pertinent part:
(a) Any citizen of Tennessee who shall request the right of personal inspection of any state, county or municipal record as provided in § 10-7-503, and whose request has been in whole or in part denied by the official and/or designee of the official or through any act or regulation of any official or designee of any official, shall be entitled to petition for access to any such record and to obtain judicial review of the actions taken to deny the access.
(b) Such petition shall be filed in the chancery court for the county in which the county or municipal records sought are situated, or in any other court of that county having equity jurisdiction. . . . Upon filing of the petition, the court shall, upon request of the petitioning party, issue an order requiring the defendant or respondent party or parties to immediately appear and show cause, if they have any, why the petition should not be granted. A formal written response to the petition shall not be required, and the generally applicable periods of filing such response shall not apply in the interest of expeditious hearings. The court may direct that the records being sought be submitted under seal for review by the court and no other party. The decision of the court on the petition shall constitute a final judgment on the merits.
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A review of the petition filed in this case reveals that there is no allegation that the petitioner requested the right of personal inspection of the records, nor is there any allegation that those in charge of the records refused any right of inspection requested by the petitioner. In the absence of allegations that the respondent failed to comply with these statutory provisions, the petition fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
We gather from the briefs and pleadings that the sheriff's office attempted to accommodate the petitioner by furnishing copies of his record to him. They found no such records existing for alleged experiments conducted on him.
Accordingly, the order of the trial court dismissing the petition is affirmed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for such further proceeding as may be necessary. Costs of the appeal are assessed against the appellant, Harold Lee Jackson, and his surety.