Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 9:19-2402-JMC-BM
05-26-2020
De'lonte Jackson Plaintiff, v. Patricia Ray and Corporal Gibson, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This action has been filed by the Plaintiff, pro se, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee at the Darlington County Detention Center (DCDC), alleges violations of his constitutional rights by the named Defendants.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 allows "a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief." City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
The Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P. on February 28, 2020. As the Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, a Roseboro order was filed by the Court on March 2, 2020, advising Plaintiff of the importance of a dispositive motion and of the need for him to file an adequate response. Plaintiff was specifically advised that if he failed to adequately respond, the Defendants' motion may be granted, thereby ending his case. After receiving an extension of time to file his response, Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition on May 21, 2020.
The Defendants' motion is now before the Court for disposition.
This case was automatically referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for all pretrial proceedings pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C. The Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment. As this is a dispositive motion, this Report and Recommendation is entered for review by the Court.
Background and Evidence
Plaintiff alleges in his verified Complaint that on or about June 10, 2019 he was handcuffed while in a visitation booth at the Detention Center, when the Defendant Corporal Gibson placed another inmate, Sean James, in the visitation booth. Plaintiff alleges that one of Sean James' hands was uncuffed, and that when another officer (Officer Addison) came to get James, once he [James] was unchained from the booth, he attacked the Plaintiff who was handcuffed and chained to the visitation booth. Plaintiff further alleges that Gibson was aware that he and James were "keepaways", who were not supposed to be around each other, but that despite this knowledge they were still placed together in the visitation area. Plaintiff alleges that Gibson was deliberately indifferent to his security and safety by exposing him to James, thereby allowing him to be assaulted. Plaintiff alleges he suffered various "knots/contusions" in his head and face area as a result of this assault, as well as a black eye and busted blood vessel in his eye, but "received no medical attention". Plaintiff seeks injunctive and/or declaratory relief, as well as monetary damages. See generally, Plaintiff's Complaint.
In this Circuit, verified complaints by pro se litigants are to be considered as affidavits to the extent the allegations contained therein are based on personal knowledge. Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. 1991).
Although Plaintiff acknowledges in his Complaint that he never filed a grievance concerning this incident and the Defendant Ray states in her affidavit that Plaintiff never filed a grievance, the Defendants have not moved for summary judgment on the basis of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See Anderson v. XYZ Correctional Health Services, Inc., 407 F.3d 674, 683 (4th Cir. 2005) [inmate's failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense to be both pled and proven by the Defendant].
In support of summary judgment in the case, the Defendant James Gibson has submitted an affidavit wherein he attests that he is a correctional officer at the DCDC, and that he led inmate Sean James to the visitation room for visitation and appropriately chained him to a table. Gibson further attests that, per medical restrictions, James' right hand cannot be handcuffed. Finally, Gibson attests that he was not present when any altercation occured between James and the Plaintiff. See generally, Gibson Affidavit.
The Defendant Patricia Ray has also submitted an affidavit wherein she attests that she is the Director of the DCDC, and that an investigation of the incident at issue in this lawsuit revealed as follows: Officer Gibson brought inmate Sean James to the visitation room for a visit. Ray attests that the visitation room is located in the housing unit, has a glass front, and several booths which have bars to chain the inmates to the table. Ray attests that Gibson chained James to a table in a booth that was separated from any other inmates by an empty booth and was not placed near any other inmate. Ray further attests that James has a medical condition (he had been shot on the right side half of his body) which prevented handcuffing his right hand per direction of medical staff, and that therefore he was not chained with his hands cuffed in front of him, but to the side. Ray attests that after bringing James to the visitation room, Officer Gibson went on break.
Ray attests that officers are notified when an inmate's visitation time is up and they then go to the visitation room to retrieve the inmate, and that when Officer Addison received the phone call that James' visitation was over, he went to retrieve James. Ray attests that it is her understanding that, upon unhooking James from the table, James lunged at the Plaintiff. Ray attests that Officer Addison immediately called for backup and drew his taser, which caused James to cease fighting and return to his cell. Ray attests that Plaintiff was thereafter seen by medical as soon as possible, that he told medical that he had no complaints, and that medical noted no visible swelling, bruising, or discolorations to the Plaintiff and instructed him to return should any problems arise. Ray further attests that there was no warning that James had made any threats against the Plaintiff, nor had the Plaintiff ever asked for protective custody from James, and that Officers Gibson and Addison both acted appropriately under the circumstances. Finally, Ray attests that she was not present when the incident occurred. See generally, Ray Affidavit.
Ray has attached various jail records to her affidavit as exhibits, which she attests were created contemporaneously with the events detailed therein. One of these exhibits is a Jail Incident Report dated June 10, 2019, which states that Officer Addison went to get inmate James because his visit time was up, and that when he "took inmate Sean James off of the restraints thats hook to the table [ ] Sean James proceeded towards inmate Jackson [and] started attacking Jackson with his right hand". The report further states that Addison then called for backup and pulled his taser and pointed it at James, at which time he stopped and walked down the stairs. See Defendants' Exhibit D [Jail Incident Report]. Ray has also submitted a copy of the medical progress notes for the Plaintiff, which read: "Inmate was assaulted 6/10/19 by another inmate. Inmate stated he was fine. No visible markings [ ] discoloration or swelling to head. [illegible]. C/O headaches [due] to assault. Advised to notify medical if concern/problems arise". See Defendants' Exhibit E [Medical Progress Notes].
As attachments to his response in opposition to summary judgment, Plaintiff has submitted two (2) declarations, neither of which address Plaintiff's claims in this case. First, Plaintiff has submitted a declaration (which actually appears to be a copy of a declaration he submitted in a different lawsuit brought by a different inmate) in which he attests that an "Officer Demarcus Cooks" (who is not a named Defendant in this case) let three inmates into his cell on February 4, 2018, who then proceeded to attack him while Cooks did nothing to help him. See Plaintiff's Declaration (Court Docket No. 36-1, p. 1). The second declaration Plaintiff has submitted is from inmate Rodney Cotton (who is apparently the Plaintiff in that other case), wherein he complains about an incident involving Officer Cooks from January 10, 2018, and that the Defendant Ray failed to take proper corrective actions following this incident. See Cotton Declaration (Court Docket No. 36-1, pp. 2-3).
Discussion
Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P. The moving party has the burden of proving that judgment on the pleadings is appropriate. Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 718 (4th Cir. 1991). Once the moving party makes this showing, however, the opposing party must respond to the motion with specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Baber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 874-75 (4th Cir. 1992). Further, while the Federal Court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow for the development of a potentially meritorious case, see Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts which set forth a Federal claim, nor can the Court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact where none exists. Weller v. Dep't of Social Services, 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
Here, after careful review and consideration of the arguments and evidence submitted, the undersigned finds and concludes that the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment in this case.
Defendant Patricia Ray
First, Plaintiff has presented no evidence to establish an issue of fact as to whether Ray has any liability for what happened to him. It is readily apparently that the only reason she has been named as a party Defendant is because she is the director of the DCDC. She was not present that day, and played no role whatsoever in the events at issue in this lawsuit.
In order for Ray to be liable to the Plaintiff for a violation of his constitutional rights, Plaintiff must have evidence sufficient to establish an issue of fact (to survive a motion for summary judgment) that Ray was personally involved in conduct which denied him his constitutional rights. See Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1999) ["Liability . . . must be based on the personal involvement of the Defendant"], cert denied, 522 U.S. 1154 (1999); Wilson v. Cooper, 922 F.Supp. 1286, 1293 (N.D.Ill. 1996). Plaintiff has provided no such evidence. See also Horton v. Marovich, 925 F.Supp. 540, 543 (N.D.Ill. 1996) ["Thus, a plaintiff suing a government official in his individual capacity and therefore seeking to hold the official personally liable must show that the official personally caused or played a role in causing the deprivation of a federal right"]. Ray cannot be held liable simply because she was Gibson's supervisor (even assuming the evidence showed that Gibson violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights), as the doctrines of vicarious liability and respondeat superior are not applicable in § 1983 cases. See Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 927-929 & nn. 1-2 (4th Cir. 1977).
Rather, since there is no evidence Ray played any part in the incident at issue, she may be held liable in this case only if Plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated as a result of an official policy or custom for which Ray was responsible. See generally, Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs.; 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Wetherington v. Phillips, 380 F.Supp. 426, 428-429 (E.D.N.C. 1974), aff'd, 526 F.2d 591 (4th Cir. 1975); Stubb v. Hunter, 806 F.Supp. 81, 82-83 (D.S.C. 1992); see Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 375-376 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, Reed v. Slakan, 470 U.S. 1035 (1985); Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 67 (1994); Fisher v. Washington Metro Area Transit Authority, 690 F.2d 1133, 1142-1143 (4th Cir. 1982) (citing Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1980)). Again, there is no such evidence. While Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that Ray is "liable for policy decisions and customs that created [an] unconstitutional condition", he has provided no evidence of any policy or custom for which Ray was responsible that resulted in this unprovoked attack. Nor has Plaintiff provided any evidence to show that a policy or custom of Ray resulted in him being denied medical treatment (again, even assuming the evidence showed that Plaintiff was denied medical treatment). Plaintiff's mere conclusory allegation in his Complaint that "decisions and customs" of Ray resulted in his being injured by an attack from another inmate or denied medical treatment is simply not sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether Ray has any liability in this case. Cf. Irvin v. Owens, No. 10-1336, 2012 WL 1534787 at * 4 (D.S.C. Apr. 30, 2012) [General statement that Plaintiff believed conditions at Institution placed him in danger not sufficient]; House v. New Castle County, 824 F.Supp. 477, 485 (D.Md. 1993) [Plaintiff's conclusory allegations insufficient to maintain claim]; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) [Allegations that are "no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth"] [motion to dismiss standard].
Indeed, Plaintiff specifically alleges in his Complaint that Gibson's placement of James in the visitation booth was in violation of DCDC's established policy.
While Cotton, in his declaration from his lawsuit, complains that Ray failed to take any disciplinary action against Cooks, that is not evidence of any policy of Ray's that caused, or resulted in, the inmate attack in this case.
Therefore, Ray is entitled to dismissal as a party Defendant in this case even if the case is otherwise allowed to proceed against the Defendant Gibson
Defendant James Gibson
As a correctional officer, the Defendant Gibson is subject to suit for damages in his individual capacity under § 1983 for a violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. at 71; Hafer v. Melo, 112 S.Ct. 358, 365 (1991); Goodmon v. Rockefeller, 947 F.2d 1186 (4th Cir. 1991); Inmates v. Owens, 561 F.2d 560 (4th Cir. 1977). Since Plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee during the time period set forth in the Complaint, his claims are evaluated under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Eighth Amendment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). Even so, the standard is essentially the same as that for convicted prisoners, whose claims are evaluated under the Eighth Amendment. See Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 870 (4th Cir. 1988)[Holding that the 14th Amendment guarantees at least 8th Amendment protections].
Failure to Protect. In order to survive summary judgment on his failure to protect claim, Plaintiff must have evidence sufficient to give rise a genuine issue of fact as to whether Gibson was deliberately indifferent to a specific known risk of harm to him. See Pruitt v. Moore, No. 02-395, 2003 WL 23851094, at * 9 (D.S.C. Jul. 7, 2003)[Deliberate or callous indifference on the part of prison officials to a specific known risk of harm states a constitutional claim], cert. denied, 2004 WL 232748 (4th Cir. 2004); Levy v. State of Ill. Dept. of Corrections, No. 96-4705, 1997 WL 112833 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 11, 1997)["A defendant acts with deliberate indifference . . . if he or she 'knows of and disregards' an excessive risk to inmate health or safety]. This "deliberate indifference" standard is a "very high standard - a showing of mere negligence will not meet it". Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir. 1999). Pursuant to this standard, the official "must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exits, and he must also draw the inference". Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). There is no such evidence in this case.
The Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff can make a prima facie case of deliberate indifference by showing "that a substantial risk of [serious harm] was long standing, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in the past, and the circumstances suggest that the defendant-official being sued had been exposed to information concerning the risk and thus 'must have known' about it". Farmer, 511 U. S. at 842. Here, however, Plaintiff has presented no evidence to show that Gibson (or Ray) knew that James posed a danger to him, that they had any personal knowledge or information that James was a risk to the Plaintiff, or was going to assault the Plaintiff. Although Plaintiff conclusorily alleges in his Complaint that Gibson was aware that he and James were "keepaways" who were not supposed to be around each other, he has provided no evidence whatsoever to support this allegation. House, 824 F.Supp. at 485 [Plaintiff's conclusory allegations insufficient to maintain claim]; Pruitt, 2003 WL 23851094, at * 9 [Only deliberate or callous indifference on the part of prison officials to a specific known risk of harm states an Eighth Amendment claim]; Irvin v. Owens, No. 10-1336, 2012 WL 1534787, at * 4 (D.S.C. Apr. 30, 2012) [General statement that Plaintiff believed conditions placed him in danger not sufficient]. Gibson is not subject to liability just because he placed James in the visitation booth, and James subsequently assaulted the Plaintiff. Cf. Fuller v. County of Charleston, 444 F.Supp.2d 494, 498 (D.S.C. 2006) [Finding that the "fact that plaintiff was put in contact with other inmates, some of whom were incarcerated for violent crimes, is not evidence of any actual knowledge on the part of the prison officials that plaintiff was in danger", and that "[o]ccasional, isolated attacks by one prisoner on another may not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, absent some evidence that the prison officials actually were aware of the risk of harm"]; Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008); see also Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir. 1999).
To the extent Plaintiff asserts his constitutional rights were violated because the way he and James were placed in the visitation booths (even though they were separated) somehow violated DCDC policy, any such policy violation is not in and of itself a violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Johnson v. S.C. Dep't of Corrections, No. 06-2062, 2007 WL 904826 at *12 (D.S.C. Mar. 21, 2007) ["Plaintiff's allegation that defendants did not follow their own policies or procedures, standing alone, does not amount to a constitutional violation."] (citing Riccio v. County of Fairfax, Virginia, 907 F.2d 1459, 1469 (4th Cir. 1990)) [if state law grants more procedural rights than the Constitution requires, a state's failure to abide by that law is not a federal due process issue]). Therefore, Plaintiff's assertion that he was injured as a result of Gibson's failure to comply with a jail policy does not make this a claim assertable under § 1983.
Therefore, Plaintiff's constitutional failure to protect claim is without merit, and should be dismissed. Miller v. Turner, 26 F.Appx. 560, 563 (7th Cir. 2001) [A mere possibility that something could happen, or the occurrence of a random act, is not sufficient to impose liability on prison officials for a constitutional violation].
Plaintiff also asserts that Gibson was negligent in placing James so close to him. However, the Supreme Court made clear in Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986), that a mere "lack of due care" will not support a claim for a violation of a constitutional right. See also DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200-203 (1989) [§ 1983 does not impose liability for violations of duties of care arising under state law]. To the extent Plaintiff is instead trying to assert a separate state law claim against Gibson (or Ray), neither Gibson or Ray is a proper party Defendant for a state law tort claim. See Kinard v. Greenville Police Dep't, No. 10-3246, 2011 WL 3439292 at * 6 (D.S.C. Aug. 5, 2011) ["Governmental entities generally operate through their employees. Therefore, when an entity is sued because of the alleged tort of an employee acting within the scope of his or her employment, the [South Carolina] Tort Claims Act provides that only the agency shall be named as a party."]; see also S.C.Code Ann. §15-78-70(c) [providing that a person bringing a tort claim under the SCTCA is required to name as the party defendant only the agency or the political subdivision for which the employee was acting, and that where an employee is individually named, the agency or political subdivision for which the employee was acting "must" be substituted as the party defendant].
Medical Care. Finally, to the extent Plaintiff is asserting a separate medical claim, in order to survive summary judgment on this claim Plaintiff must have evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether any named Defendant was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Farmer v. Brennen, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); Sosebee v. Murphy, 797 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1986); Wester v. Jones, 554 F.2d 1285 (4th Cir. 1977); Russell v. Sheffer, 528 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1975); Belcher v. Oliver, 898 F.2d 32 (4th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff has again failed to submit any such evidence.
First, and significantly, there is no evidence that Gibson (or Ray) was even involved in providing (or failing to provide) Plaintiff medical care. Neither one of these Defendants were even on the scene when Plaintiff was attacked by James, nor is there any evidence that either of these two Defendants made any decisions about what medical care was to be provided (or not provided) to the Plaintiff following this attack. Rather, the evidence shows that, following this attack, Plaintiff was seen and evaluated by the medical office at the jail. As such, there is no basis for liability for either named Defendant with respect to this claim. Horton, 925 F.Supp. at 543 ["Thus, a plaintiff suing a government official in his individual capacity and therefore seeking to hold the official personally liable must show that the official personally caused or played a role in causing the deprivation of a federal right"]; Levy, 1997 WL 112833 at * 2 ["A defendant acts with deliberate indifference only if he or she 'knows of and disregards' an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.'"]; see also Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 167 (4th Cir. 1995) [officials entitled to rely on judgment of medical personnel]; Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 854 (4th Cir. 1990) [officials entitled to rely on expertise of medical personnel].
Moreover, even if Plaintiff had submitted evidence to show that either named Defendant was responsible for the medical care and treatment he received after this inmate attack, there is no evidence to show any deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's serious medical needs. Indeed, and contrary to the allegation in Plaintiff's Complaint that following this attack he "received no medical attention", the actual evidence presented to the Court shows that Plaintiff was seen by medical personnel following this incident, and that he did not have any significant injuries. See Defendants' Exhibit E [Medical Progress Notes]. Plaintiff's mere lay disagreement with the opinions or diagnoses of medical professionals, without any contrary medical evidence to show that any medical professional (none of whom are even named as Defendants in this case) violated the requisite standard of care, is not sufficient to defeat the Defendants' motion for summary judgment on his § 1983 deliberate indifference claim. See Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 849 (4th Cir. 1985)[Disagreements between an inmate and a physician over the inmate's proper medical care do not state a § 1983 claim absent exceptional circumstances]; Scheckells v. Goord, 423 F.Supp. 2d 342, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing O'Connor v. Pierson, 426 F.3d 187, 202 (2d Cir. 2005) ["Lay people are not qualified to determine...medical fitness, whether physical or mental; that is what independent medical experts are for."]); Green v. Senkowski, 100 Fed.Appx. 45 (2d Cir. 2004) (unpublished opinion) [finding that plaintiff's self-diagnosis without any medical evidence insufficient to defeat summary judgment on deliberate indifference claim]; Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 1987) ["Even though pro se litigants are held to less stringent pleading standards than attorneys the court is not required to 'accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences.'"].
Plaintiff may, of course, pursue a claim in state court if he believes that the medical care provided to him constitutes malpractice. However, that is not the issue before this Court. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)["medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner."]. Since the evidence before the Court is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether any named Defendant was "deliberately indifferent" to Plaintiff's serious medical needs, the standard for a constitutional claim, Plaintiff's federal § 1983 medical claim should be dismissed. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200-203 [§ 1983 does not impose liability for violations of duties of care arising under state law]; Baker v. McClellan, 443 U.S. 137, 146 (1976) [§ 1983 claim does not lie for violation of state law duty of care].
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted, and that this case be dismissed.
The parties are referred to the Notice Page attached hereto.
/s/_________
Bristow Marchant
United States Magistrate Judge May 26, 2020
Charleston, South Carolina
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).