Opinion
Civil Action No.: 8:02-1756-12.
March 9, 2004
ORDER
On June 21, 2002, Eddie Thomas Jackson ("plaintiff") commenced this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On January 7, 2003, the defendants moved for summary judgment. On January 9, 2003, aRoseboro order was issued explaining summary judgment dismissal procedure to the plaintiff. On March 10, 2003, the plaintiff responded to the motion for summary judgment.
This action arises from the investigation of the plaintiff for illegal drug activity by the defendant Parrish ("Parrish"), an officer with the Marlboro County Sheriff's Department. On four occasions from March through May 2000, a confidential informant purchased a rock like substance from the plaintiff which the plaintiff reported to be crack cocaine. The substances purchased from the plaintiff were sent to the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division ("SLED") for analysis.
After the drug buys, Parrish applied for and obtained a search warrant for the plaintiff's home, based on suspicion of possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine. On August 17, 2000, Parrish searched the plaintiff's home and found firearms. The plaintiff was a convicted felon at the time of the search.
Upon execution of the search warrant, the defendants seized a 1996 Lexus automobile and $300 in cash from the plaintiff's home. This property was forfeited to the state. On August 22, 2000, the plaintiff signed two consent orders in the state court forfeiture action.
The SLED reports indicated that the substances were not controlled substances. Although the SLED reports had been sent to Parrish in the early part of the summer, he had not viewed them prior to obtaining a warrant and searching the plaintiff's house. Once the SLED reports were reviewed, the state drug charges were dropped, and the plaintiff pled guilty to the federal charge of felon in possession of a firearm.
The plaintiff alleges that the defendants violated his constitutional rights by arresting him without probable cause. He alleges claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution. In addition, he asserts that the seizure of his property without probable cause amounted to an unreasonable search and seizure. He seeks $2 million in damages.
On March 18, 2003, Magistrate Judge Bruce H. Hendricks issued a report analyzing the issues and recommending that the Court (1) grant the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's deprivation of personal property claim, (2) grant the defendant Sheriff William C. Simmon's motion for summary judgment on immunity grounds, and (3) deny the defendant Parrish's motion for summary judgment. On March 28, 2003, the defendants objected to the report and recommendation. On March 31, 2003, the plaintiff filed objections to the report and recommendation.
This matter is now before the Court for disposition. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the report and recommendation, or recommit the matter with instructions. After a full review of the record and pertinent case law, the Court adopts the report and recommendation in part.
First, the Magistrate Judge correctly found that deprivations of personal property by states do not support actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if state law provides the plaintiff with a viable remedy for the loss. See Yates v. Jamison, 782 F.2d 1182, 1183-84 (4th Cir. 1986). Here, the plaintiff had a valid remedy under the forfeiture statute to challenge the forfeiture proceeding.
Second, the Magistrate Judge properly found that the defendant Sheriff William C. Simmon's motion for summary judgment on immunity grounds should be granted because there is no evidence that he had any direct involvement in the case. The plaintiff's false arrest and malicious prosecutions claims, therefore, must be analyzed with respect to Parrish.
Next, the Magistrate Judge properly determined that a claim for false arrest may be considered only when no arrest warrant has been obtained. See Porterfield v. Lott, 156 F.3d 563, 568 (4th Cir. 1998). Here, there is no dispute that the plaintiff was arrested under a facially valid warrant.
Accordingly, the plaintiff's claim must be analyzed as one for malicious prosecution. To state such a claim, a plaintiff must show (1) the initiation or maintenance of a proceeding against the plaintiff by the defendant; (2) termination of that proceeding favorable to the plaintiff; (3) lack of probable cause to support that proceeding; and (4) the defendant's malice. See Lambert v. Williams, 223 F.3d 257, 260 (4th Cir. 2000). In establishing the elements of malicious prosecution, malice may be inferred from the lack of probable cause. See Parrott v. Plowden Motor Co., 246 S.C. 318, 322 (1965). This inquiry turns on the issue of probable cause.
The Fourth Circuit has addressed the probable cause issue with regard to Fourth Amendment claims:
Probable cause to justify an arrest arises when "facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge . . . are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense." Probable cause requires more than "bare suspicion" but requires less than evidence necessary to convict.Porterfield, 156 F.3d at 568 (internal citations omitted).
In his affidavit, Parrish states that he did not have knowledge of the SLED test results when he obtained the warrant. He says that had he been aware that the substance was not crack cocaine, he would have charged the plaintiff with selling an imitation controlled substance in violation of South Carolina law. See S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-390(a)(6). Parrish also states that state charges are often dropped when a defendant is transferred to federal court, which is why a charge on the sale of imitation controlled substances was not pursued. Defendant Simmon states in his affidavit that it is common for charges to be brought against a suspect even though the SLED test results have not been received.
Although the SLED test results indicated that the plaintiff was not selling crack cocaine, the plaintiff was in fact breaking the law by selling imitation controlled substances. As such, Parrish had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff because he had committed an offense. As a result, there is no malicious prosecution on this record.
The Court therefore grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismisses this action. All remaining outstanding motions are hereby rendered moot.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.