Opinion
4:03-CV-0080 SEB-WGH.
July 18, 2003
ENTRY DENYING DEFENDANT BOARD OF TRUSTEES' MOTION TO DISMISS AND GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE PLAINTIFFS' FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
These matters come before the Court on Defendant New Albany-Floyd County Public Library Board of Trustees' Motion to Dismiss the Board of Trustees as a defendant in this case and Plaintiff April L. Jackson's and Plaintiff Debra M. Brandenburg's collective Motion for Leave to File Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint to add the New Albany-Floyd County Public Library, an interested party, as a defendant in this case. For the reasons stated below, we DENY Defendant Board of Trustees' motion to dismiss and GRANT Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend the complaint.
Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiffs April L. Jackson and Debra M. Brandenburg (hereinafter "Plaintiffs") began their employment as custodial workers at the New Albany-Floyd County Public Library ("the Library") in October 2001 and April 2002, respectively. Compl. ¶¶ 10-11. In July 2002, Plaintiffs complained to the Director of the Library of sexual harassment by their supervisor, Dan Bennett. Mr. Bennett is not a party to this action. On July 12, 2002, Plaintiffs filed charges of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), and on February 3, 2003, each Plaintiff received a right to sue notice from the EEOC. Id. ¶ T 6-7. In Plaintiffs' EEOC charges they listed as their employer the New Albany/Floyd County Library, 180 West Spring Street, New Albany, Indiana, 47150. Id. Exh. 1-2. The Library is a Class 1 public library, defined by Indiana Code § 20-14-2-2 to be a municipal corporation able "to contract and be contracted with and sue and be sued in court."
On September 22, 2002, Plaintiffs sent notice of their claims against Bennett and the Library, as required under the Indiana Tort Claims Act, Indiana Code § 34-13-3-8, not to the Library, but to Defendant New Albany-Floyd County Public Library Board of Trustees ("the Board"). Compl. ¶ 8. The Board is a "library board," defined by Indiana Code § 20-14-1-2 to be "the fiscal and administrative body of a public library." The Board received this notice at 180 West Spring Street, New Albany, Indiana, 47150, an address it shares with the Library. Id. Exh. 5. On April 24, 2003, Plaintiffs filed a complaint in this Court against the Board, but not the Library, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq., and state common law.
On May 15, 2003, the Board moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, arguing that the Board, as a group of qualified directors of a political subdivision under Indiana Code §§ 34-6-2-127 and 34-30-4-1, is immune from civil liability. On June 2, 2003, Plaintiffs filed a response to the Board's motion to dismiss as well as a motion for leave to amend the complaint to add the Library as an additional defendant in the case. On June 17, 2003, the Library filed a cross motion to deny Plaintiffs' attempt to amend their complaint.
Legal Analysis Defendant Board's Motion to Dismiss
A party moving to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) bears a weighty burden. It must show that the pleadings themselves fail to provide a basis for any claim for relief under any set of facts. Ed Miniat, Inc. v. Globe Life Ins. Group Inc., 805 F.2d 732, 733 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 915 (1987). As a practical matter, a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is likely to be granted only in the unusual case in which a plaintiff includes allegations that show on the face of the complaint that there is some insuperable bar to relief.Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass'n v. Mayflower Transit Inc., 161 F. Supp.2d 948, 950-51 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (quoting 5A Charles A. Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice Procedure: Civil § 1357). On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, we treat all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and we construe all inferences that reasonably may be drawn from those facts in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Szumny v. Am. Gen. Fin., 246 F.3d 1065, 1067 (7th Cir. 2001); Latuszkin v. City of Chicago, 250 F.3d 502, 504 (7th Cir. 2001).
The Board moves to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims against it, arguing that its trustees are immune from civil liability as "qualified directors" under Indiana Code §§ 34-6-2-127, 34-30-4-1. The immunity of qualified directors, however, does not affect the civil liability of the entity a qualified director serves. Ind. Code § 34-30-4-3. Plaintiffs do not state a claim against the Board trustees as individuals, but only against the entities the trustees serve, the Board and the Library. Thus, qualified director immunity is not an "insuperable bar to relief" in this case.
In addition, the distinction that the Board attempts to draw between the Board, as an entity, and the Library appears to us to be a distinction without a difference. A Class 1 public library, like the Library in this case, is a municipal corporation, which may contract and be contracted with as well as sue and be sued in court. Ind. Code § 20-14-2-2(a). By contrast, the Indiana Code defines a library board simply as "the fiscal and administrative body of a public library." Ind. Code § 20-14-1-2. It does not specify whether a library board, like the Board in this case, may sue and be sued, either as an independent entity or as a representative of a public library. More generally, however, the Indiana Code does make clear that the powers and duties of Class 1 public libraries, enumerated in Title 20, Article 14, Chapter 3, are to be exercised by library boards. See Ind. Code §§ 20-14-3-1 to 20-14-3-15.
After an examination of the statutes, we conclude that the Board is part and parcel of the Library and that the interests of the Board and the Library are in all ways coincident. It is the duty of the library board to "govern and set policy for all of the affairs of the public library." Ind. Code § 20-14-3-2. One of the policies for which the Board may be responsible is the Library's employment policy, in which case the Board and the Library together would represent Plaintiffs' "employer" for purposes of this suit. A lawsuit against the board of directors of a public library has recently been maintained in the Indiana state courts, although the library board in that case did not raise its incapacity to be sued as a defense. See Burke v. Bd. of Directors of the Monroe County Public Library, 711 N.E.2d 1288 (Ind.App. 1999).
Because Plaintiffs do not state a claim against the Board trustees in their individual capacities, and because, as this litigation progresses, Plaintiffs may adduce facts that implicate the Board, as an entity, as well as the Library, we DENY the Board's Motion to Dismiss it from this suit.
The parties do not raise, and hence we do not decide, the issue of what effect, if any, Plaintiffs' failure to include the Board in their EEOC charges may have on their ability to maintain this action against the Board. Because we conclude in the next section, however, that the Board and the Library share an identity of interest, we do not, upon a cursory examination, think this omission fatal.
Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint
Although Plaintiffs named the Library in their EEOC charges, their complaint named the Board as the only defendant in this case. Sensing a need to correct a possible technical pleading deficiency in response to the Board's Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs now seek to name the Library as an additional defendant. The Library objects, arguing that, under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), Plaintiffs had ninety days in which to file a civil action against it after Plaintiffs received right to sue notices from the EEOC. Because Plaintiffs did not move to add the Library as a defendant in this case until after the 90-day statute of limitations deadline had passed, the Library contends that we should deny Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend their complaint.Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, leave to amend the complaint "shall be freely given when justice so requires." As more than ninety days have passed since Plaintiffs received their right to sue letters, they could not initiate a suit against the Library at this time. They may, however, add the Library as a party if the amended complaint relates back to the date of the original complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(3). In order for an amended pleading to relate back to the original pleading under Rule 15(c)(3), the amended pleading must satisfy the following conditions: (1) the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading must arise out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth in the original pleading; and within 120 days after the filing of the complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment (2) must have received "such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits," and (3) must have known or should have known that, "but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party." We find that Plaintiffs' proposed amended complaint satisfies each of these requirements.
With regard to the first requirement under Rule 15(c), the claims asserted in the proposed amended complaint are identical to the original complaint. Thus, they arise out of the same conduct or occurrence set forth in the original pleading. The only difference between the original complaint and the proposed amended complaint is the addition of the Library as a defendant in the case.
Turning to the second requirement under Rule 15(c), the Library had timely notice of this action so as not to be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits. Plaintiffs filed their motion for leave to amend the complaint to include the Library as a defendant in this case 118 days after the filing of their complaint, on or about June 2, 2003. Thus, the Library had actual notice of the institution of Plaintiffs' action against the Board as well as Plaintiffs' intent to add to Library as a defendant in that action within the 120-day notice period for relation back under Rule 15(c). The Library also had informal, constructive notice of Plaintiffs' suit against the Board well before June 2, 2003, however, as explained below.
The doctrine of constructive notice applies when actual notice is provided to an agent of a party or to a party who shares an identity of interest with the proper party. Hill v. Shelander, 924 F.2d 1370, 1376-78 (7th Cir. 1991); Woods v. Ind. Univ.-Purdue Univ., 996 F.2d 880, 888-89 (7th Cir. 1993). Courts often apply the identity of interest doctrine in a corporate context; corporations are "related" when they have substantially identical officers, directors, or shareholders and have similar names or share office space. Norton v. Int'l Harvester Co., 627 F.2d 18, 21 (7th Cir. 1980) (citing Hernandez Jimenez v. Calero Toledo, 604 F.2d 99, 102-03 (1st Cir. 1979)); see also Hensley v. Soo-Line R. Co., 777 F. Supp. 1421, 1424 (N.D. 11. 1991). Analogizing the circumstances of this case to the corporate form, we conclude that the Board and the Library share an identity of interest because: (1) the Board, as "the fiscal and administrative body" of the Library, acts as the Library's officers and directors; (2) the Board and Library have similar names; and (3) the Board and the Library have the same address.
See discussion supra pp. 4-5.
We also note that the Board and the Library share counsel, The Law Office of John R. Garry, Jr., and that they have shared the same counsel since September, 2002, which is well before April 24, 2003, the date of the filing of the complaint and the date from which the 120-day notice period for relation back under Rule 15(c) is measured. See Appearance of John R. Garry, Jr., and Mary Ann Prestigiacomo on behalf of New Albany-Floyd County Public Library Board of Trustees on May 15, 2003, and Appearance of same on behalf of the New Albany-Floyd County Public Library on June 17, 2003; Compl. Exh. 7. Contrast Woods, 996 F.2d at 889 n. 14. In a letter dated September 25, 2002, defense counsel, in response to plaintiff counsel's Indiana Tort Claims Act notice, wrote: "Our office represents the Board of Trustees of the New Albany-Floyd County Public Library. . . . The NAFC Library denies liability for any claimed sexually harassing act on the part of Mr. Dan Bennett toward your clients. . . . The NAFC Library also intends to defend itself against any federal discrimination complaints under Title VII." Compl. Exh. 7 (emphasis added). Therefore, it appears that even defense counsel has treated the Board and the Library as interchangeable entities, and that the Library, through its counsel who is also counsel to the Board, had notice of Plaintiffs' suit against the Board as well as of Plaintiffs' possible suit against the Library.
The Board, the original defendant in this case, had actual notice of Plaintiffs' suit on or about April 24, 2003, the date the complaint was filed. Therefore, because the Board and the Library share an identity of interest, the Library had informal or constructive notice of the suit as of that date, which began the 120-day notice period for relation back under Rule 15(c).
The Library does not assert that it will be prejudiced in other ways in maintaining a defense against Plaintiffs' suit. The discovery period has not yet closed and no motion for summary judgment has yet been filed.Contrast Serio v. Jojo's Bakery Restaurant, 102 F. Supp.2d 1044, 1053-54 (S.D. Ind. 2000). As discussed above, the Library argues only that Plaintiffs' pleading was deficient. We note, however, that the Seventh Circuit is wary of such arguments: "the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are to be liberally construed to effectuate the general purpose of seeing that cases are tried on the merits. . . . To this end, amendments pursuant to Rule 15(c) should be freely allowed." Hill v. Shelander, 924 F.2d 1370, 1375-76 (7th Cir. 1991) (quoting Staren v. Am. Nat'l Bank Trust Co., 529 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1976)).
Turning to the third requirement under Rule 15(c), because Plaintiffs named the Library as the employer in their EEOC charges, the Library should have known that, but for Plaintiffs' mistake, the Library would have been named as a defendant in this action. In Maxe v. Thompson, 680 F.2d 524 (7th Cir. 1982), the Seventh Circuit held that a defendant named in an EEOC charge had notice as required by Rule 15 even if that defendant was not named in the initial complaint. Id. at 526; see also Wilke v. Bob's Route 53 Shell Station, 36 F. Supp.2d 1068, 1073 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
As we have determined that Plaintiffs' proposed amended complaint satisfies the requirements of Rule 15(c)(3), and therefore that it relates back to their original pleading, we GRANT Plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint to add the Library as a defendant.
Conclusion
Because we conclude that a set of facts may exist under which Plaintiffs can recover against the Board, as an entity, we DENY the Board's motion to dismiss. In addition, we find that Plaintiffs' proposed amended complaint relates back to their original complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c). Therefore, we GRANT Plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint to add the Library as a defendant to this action.
It is so ORDERED.