Opinion
C.A. No. 00A-09-002-JEB
Submitted: March 12, 2001
Decided: June 15, 2001
Appeal from a Decision of Court of Common Pleas — AFFIRMED
Lillie Jackson, Pro Se Appellant.
Richard W. Pell, Esquire. Attorney for — Appellee.
ORDER
Having reviewed the parties' submissions, as well as the record below, the Court concludes as follows:
1. Background. In 1993, Lillie Jackson (Plaintiff-Appellant) hired Robert Lobue (Defendant-Appellee) to pursue a workers' compensation claim stemming from an accident that occurred in 1991 during the course of her employment with Ametak, Inc. In July 1993, Lobue filed a Petition to Determine Compensation Due with the Industrial Accident Board (Board). Following a hearing, the Board denied the Petition, and Lobue filed an appeal on Jackson's behalf to the Superior Court. In January 1996, the Court remanded the case to the Board for clarification of its decision.
2. Before the Board took any further action, the parties filed with the Board a Petition to Commute Benefits. In the Stipulation, Jackson agreed to full commutation of all worker's compensation benefits for the amount of $30,000, other than reasonable medical expenses. At the hearing on the Petition to Commute Benefits, Jackson was represented by Lobue, who reiterated to her on the record that the commutation would mean that she would be precluded from seeking any further benefits other than medical expenses. Jackson acknowledged that she and Lobue had discussed this and stated that she understood the terms of the commutation. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board granted the Petition to Commute Benefits, and a check was issued for $30,000 was issued to Jackson.
Transcript of IAB Hearing #1002536 at 5-6 (hereinafter referred to as "Tr. Bd. Hrg. at page no.").
3. In March or April 1999, Jackson filed a Petition for Permanent Impairment with the Board. The Board denied the Petition based on the commutation agreement.
4. Posture. In July 1999, Jackson filed a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas, alleging malpractice on the part of Lobue and seeking $50,000 in damages. Following a trial on August 18, 2000, the trial judge entered judgment in favor of Lobue. Jackson filed a timely appeal in Superior Court. Briefing is complete, and the issues are ripe for decision.
5. Issues. Jackson's Opening Brief reflects her genuine dissatisfaction with the outcome of the worker's compensation suit but does not raise any cognizable legal issues. However, the Court will accord her the leeway typically extended to pro se litigants and construe her appeal as a challenge to the trial court's factual findings and legal conclusions. Lobue argues that the trial court's factual findings are supported by the evidence and that the decision is free from legal error.
See, e.g., Vick v. Haller, Del. Supr., No. 149, 1986, Christie, C.J., (March 2, 1987).
6. Standard of review. Appeals to the Superior Court from the Court of Common Pleas are on the record and are not tried de novo. The scope of this Court's review is to determine if the lower court's factual findings are supported by the record and the legal conclusions are free from error.
Title 10 Del. C. § 1318; Super. Ct. Civ. R. 72(g); Wilmington Trust Co. v. Conner, Del. Supr., 415 A.2d 773 (1980).
Levitt v. Bouvier, Del. Supr., 287 A.2d 671 (1972).
7. Trial evidence. Jackson testified on her own behalf but did not present any other witnesses. She stated that Lobue had encouraged her to sign the commutation agreement without explaining that it precluded her from seeking any further compensation for her industrial accident. She also claimed that the $30,000 settlement money was gone and that she had to apply for social security benefits.
8. Lobue testified on his own behalf, stating that he had practiced workers' compensation law in Delaware for more than 20 years and had also served as a Deputy Attorney General who represented the Board. Lobue stated that both he and his paralegal had repeatedly explained the terms of the commutation agreement to Jackson. He reviewed with her the risks of entering into the agreement, as well as the risks of going forward with a rehearing before the Board.
9. Lobue also presented the testimony of James T. Perry, Esquire, who appeared as an expert witness in the area of workers' compensation. Perry stated that in his expert opinion Lobue had conducted Jackson's suit in a professional manner that met the appropriate standard of care and had obtained an excellent settlement for his client in light of the difficulties of the case.
10. Discussion. In its written decision, the trial court correctly stated the standard for assessing legal malpractice claims. To prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must prove the following elements: (1) employment of an attorney; (2) the attorney's neglect of a reasonable professional responsibility; and (3) a resultant loss. The first prong of this test being uncontested, the trial court focused on the second prong, finding that Jackson had failed to present any expert opinion testimony that Lobue had failed to meet the standard of care in his representation of her workman's compensation claim. As a general rule, the standard of care applicable to a professional can be established only through expert testimony. The trial judge recognized this rule and correctly applied it to the facts of this case.
Weaver v. Lukoff, Del. Supr., No. 15, 1986, McNeilly, J. (July 1, 1986) (ORDER) (citations omitted).
Id.
11. The trial judge also noted that, as a limited exception to the general rule regarding legal malpractice, a plaintiff may prevail if the attorney's negligence is so obvious that it would be apparent to any layman exercising ordinary common sense. Based on Jackson's testimony, the trial judge found that Jackson had failed to show any deficiency in Lobue's representation. Having reviewed the record of the trial as well as the available record from the worker's compensation suit, this Court concludes that the trial judge's finding is supported by the evidence. Lobue made the appropriate filings, raised relevant issues, and successfully negotiated a settlement.
Id.; see also Aiston v. Hudson, Del. Supr., No. 1 60, 1997, Veasey, C.J. (Aug. 22, 1997) (ORDER).
12. As far as Jackson's repeated assertion that she did not understand that the commutation divested her of any further compensation for the accident, the transcript of the Board hearing shows otherwise. Jackson acknowledged her understanding of this fact, in answer to both Lobue and one of the Board members. The record also reflects that the Board member observed that Jackson was somewhat reluctant to agree to the commutation, but her reluctance does not negate her understanding of the agreement.
Tr. Bd. Hrg. at 5-6.
Id. at 7.
For all these reasons, the decision of the Court of Common Pleas is hereby Affirmed.
It Is So ORDERED.