Opinion
CV 321-050
2023-12-13
Derrell A. JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. LAURENS COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant.
ORDER
Dudley H. Bowen, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
On August 31, 2021, Plaintiff Derrell A. Jackson ("Jackson") filed the captioned matter asserting federal claims against his former employer, Laurens County School District (the "School District"), under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq. ("FLSA"); the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq. ("ADA"); the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701, et seq.; the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, et seq. ("FMLA"); and the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Jackson also asserted various state law claims. By Order of November 2, 2022, the Court dismissed the ADA claim, the § 1981 claim, and all state law claims. (Doc. No. 42.) The following claims remain in the case: Jackson's FLSA claim for unpaid wages; his claim of disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act; his claim of FMLA violations; and his retaliation claims under the Rehabilitation Act, the FMLA, and the FLSA. The School District now moves for summary judgment on these remaining claims. Upon review of the record evidence, the briefs of counsel, and the relevant law, the motion for summary judgment is granted in its entirety for the following reasons. I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The School District hired Jackson as a full-time school bus driver on November 19, 2019, after the school year had started. (Dep. of Derrell A. Jackson, Doc. No. 65, at 15; Dep. of Tim Passmore, Doc. No. 66, at 165-66.) As a school bus driver, Jackson's primary duty was to drive a school bus to pick up and drop off children to and from school. (Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Undisputed Facts, Doc. No. 69, ¶ 4.) He also performed pre- and post-trip bus inspections, served as a substitute bus driver occasionally, and drove a bus for the occasional field trip. (Id. ¶ 5.)
Contrary to his deposition testimony, Jackson filed a Declaration in opposing summary judgment that avers he started his employment prior to November 19, 2019. (Pl.'s Decl., Doc. No. 69-2, ¶ 12.) Jackson claims he had another employee input his time using her credentials because his information had not been entered into the timekeeping system. (Id.) Jackson claims he started to work for the School District in late September or early October, exact date not provided. (Id.)
The Court concludes that this aspect of Jackson's Declaration is a "sham affidavit" under Eleventh Circuit precedent — Van T. Junkins & Assocs. v. U.S. Indus., 736 F.2d 656 (11th Cir. 1984). At deposition, Jackson gave a clear answer to an unambiguous question which negates the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, and thereafter he has attempted to create an issue with an affidavit that "contradicts, without explanation, previously given clear testimony." See id. at 657. Moreover, the November start date is supported by Jackson's testimony that there were "[m]aybe a couple of months, give or take," between ending his employment with the Dublin City School District in September and his employment with Laurens County School District. (Pl.'s Dep. at 15.) Accordingly, Jackson's start date of November 19, 2019, is undisputed.
According to Jackson, the only issue he had with his employment during the 2019-2020 school year was his pay. Jackson testified that he had been told he would receive between $1400 to $1800 a month in compensation. (Pl.'s Dep. at 30.) When his first full paycheck was not as expected, Jackson claims he raised the pay issue several times with Mr. Greg Pauldo, his immediate supervisor. (Id. at 33-34.) Mr. Pauldo allegedly told Jackson that he would fix it. (Id. at 35, 38.)
The School District shut down for the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020; Jackson's last time driving a school bus for the School District was on Friday, March 6, 2020. (Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Undisputed Facts ¶¶ 6, 8.) The School District reopened for the 2020-21 school year on September 8, 2020, but Jackson would not drive a school bus upon reopening. (Id. ¶ 30.) He was terminated on October 1, 2020. (Id.)
As it turns out, Jackson was at the hospital on March 8th and 9th because of an atrial fibrillation issue. (Pl.'s Dep. at 54-55.) He was cleared to return to work on March 16, 2020, but the school district had closed down because of COVID-19. ( See id. at 55; see also Timecards, Ex. 7 to Pl.'s Decl. (noting that Jackson was on sick leave from March 9-13, 2020).)
The facts leading up to Jackson's termination are as follows. On Tuesday, September 8, 2020, Jackson was treated and released at the emergency department of the local hospital for a heart condition. (Pl.'s Dep. at 65-66; Pl.'s Decl., Ex. 8.) Jackson called Mr. Pauldo to inform him of his condition. (Pl.'s Decl. ¶ 20.) Jackson obtained a Doctor's Note from this emergency visit that excused him from work for two days. (Pl.'s Decl., Ex. 8.)
On September 9, 2020, Jackson obtained another note from his cardiologist, advising the School District that he had been treated for "CDC recognized risk factors and/or diagnoses putting [him] at higher risk for COVID-19." (Pl.'s Decl., Ex. 9.) This second note did not identify the risk
factors or diagnoses for which Jackson was treated, though it was on the cardiologist's letterhead. ( See id. )
On Thursday, September 10, 2020, Jackson met with Mr. Pauldo and the School District's Associate Superintendent, Mr. Tim Passmore. (Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Undisputed Facts ¶ 10.) At the meeting, Jackson explained his health problems (to include atrial fibrillation and asthma) and his reluctance to drive a school bus because of the risk of exposure to COVID-19. (Pl.'s Dep. at 81-82.) Jackson requested to be placed in another position within the transportation department until COVID-19 "cleared up." (Id. at 81-82; Pl.'s Decl. ¶ 24.) Mr. Passmore told Jackson that he would look into it, but he never got back to Jackson about it. (Pl.'s Decl. ¶ 24.) Jackson testified that the issue of taking FMLA leave was discussed. (Pl.'s Dep. at 78-81, 86.) Jackson also brought up the pay issue again. (Id. at 74.) Finally, Jackson averred that Mr. Passmore told him to take personal time off to consider resigning and to consult an attorney about getting disability. (See Pl.'s Dep. at 85-86; Pl.'s Decl. ¶ 25.) Mr. Passmore testified that he explained to Jackson that his doctors' notes did not excuse him from future absences from work as a school bus driver. (Passmore Decl. ¶ 6; Pl.'s Dep. at 92.)
Mr. Passmore averred that Jackson did not ask the School District for a specific accommodation for any increased risk of contracting COVID-19. (Decl. of Tim Passmore, Doc. No. 67-1, ¶ 16.)
Jackson would not return to work after the meeting of September 10, 2020, because of his health problems. (Pl.'s Dep. at 89.) According to Jackson, he was hospitalized after the September 10, 2020 meeting because of his "serious heart and lung conditions." (Pl.'s Decl. ¶ 26.) Jackson twice advised Mr. Pauldo of his medical issues and advised that he would submit medical records as requested. (Id. ¶¶ 27, 28.) Jackson then told Messrs. Passmore and Pauldo that he would be delayed in submitting medical documentation because of his health issues. (Id. ¶¶ 29, 30.) Specifically, Jackson sent an e-mail to Mr. Passmore on September 28, 2020, explaining that he was "in AFIB and having asthma problems" and was waiting for his doctor's to "get back" to him. (Pl.'s Decl., Ex. 10.) Ultimately, the School District terminated Jackson for "Abandonment of Job" on October 1, 2020. (Pl.'s Dep., Ex. 4.) Jackson did not provide any medical documentation to the School District between September 10, 2020, and his termination on October 1st, (Pl.'s Dep. at 88-89, 92.)
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
The Court should grant summary judgment only if "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The purpose of the summary judgment rule is to dispose of unsupported claims or defenses, which, as a matter of law, raise no genuine issues of material fact suitable for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Facts are "material" if they could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute of those material facts "is 'genuine' ... [only] if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-movant's] position will be insufficient" for a jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505; accord Gilliard v. Ga. Dep't of Corrs., 500 F.
App'x 860, 863 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). Additionally, the party opposing summary judgment "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials in its pleadings. Rather, [his] responses ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1576-77 (11th Cir. 1990). As required, this Court will view the record evidence "in the light most favorable to the [nonmovant]," Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986), and will "draw all justifiable inferences in [Plaintiff's] favor." United States v. Four Parcels of Real Prop., 941 F.2d 1428, 1437 (11th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Clerk gave Plaintiff notice of the summary judgment motion and the summary judgment rules, of the right to file affidavits or other materials in opposition, and of the consequences of default. (Doc. No. 68.) Therefore, the notice requirements of Griffith v. Wainwright, 772 F.2d 822, 825 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam), are satisfied.
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Jackson's FLSA Claim
In Count I of his complaint, Jackson claims that the School District failed to pay him minimum wage of $7.25 an hour in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1)(C). "Compliance with the FLSA is measured by the workweek." Arriaga v. Fl. Pac. Farms, LLC, 305 F.3d 1228, 1237 (11th Cir. 2002). The School District shows as follows. Its pay schedule for school bus drivers during the relevant time period was $9450 for 180 workdays spread out over an entire year. Thus, Jackson had a daily rate of pay of $52.50 ($9450/180). With this daily rate of pay, Jackson's weekly rate (five-day work week) was $262.50. At a weekly rate of $262.50, Jackson would only fall below minimum wage if he worked more than 36 hours per week ($262.50/$7.25 = 36.21). Because the evidence shows that Jackson averaged 26 hours per week — and never more than 36 hours — he was paid minimum wage. (See Pl.'s Decl., Ex. 7.)
Jackson was paid monthly. Had he started at the beginning of the school year, he would have been paid $787.50 per month. However, Jackson began in November with only 108 workdays and 8 months remaining in the school year. Thus, his monthly payment was reduced to $708.75.
The School District has submitted Jackson's timecards (Time and Attendance Employee Timecards) to show the hours he worked per week. (See Pl.'s Decl., Ex. 7.)
Jackson proposes a different weekly rate of pay. He suggests that his weekly rate of pay is determined by dividing his monthly salary of $708.75 by 4 weeks — or $177.19 per week. Thus, according to Jackson, any time he surpassed 24.44 hours per week, he was not being properly compensated. For example, from January 13 to 17, 2020, he worked 26 hours according to the timecards. With a weekly rate of $177.19, he was only paid $6.82 per hour that week.
Jackson's calculations are improperly premised on a full annual work schedule. That is, while their pay was spread out over twelve months, school bus drivers did not work twelve months. Rather, drivers worked 180 days during the school year, and in Jackson's case with a hire date of November 19, 2020, he only worked 108 days in the 2019-2020 school year. The School District's method of calculating compensation is supported by the United States Department of Labor's Field Operations
Handbook ("FOH"), which provides as follows in assessing minimum wage for an annual salary earned in a shorter period of time:
The FOH is "an operations manual that provides Wage and Hour Division (WHD) investigators and staff with interpretations of statutory provisions, procedures for conducting investigations, and general administrative guidance." The Eleventh Circuit has found the FOH to be persuasive authority. See Abel v. Southern Shuttle Servs., Inc., 301 F. App'x 856, 859 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Klinedinst v. Swift Invs., Inc., 260 F.3d 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2001)).
Certain employment, such as that in schools, does not normally constitute 12 months of actual work each year. For the convenience of the employee, the annual salary earned during the duty months is often paid in equal monthly installments through the entire year. In determining whether the statutory minimum wage has been paid in such cases, the annual salary is considered in relation to the duty months rather than in relation to the entire year. Thus, for example, a school bus driver may receive an annual salary of $6,000 for 10 months' duty but be paid 12 equal monthly installments of $500 each. In such case, the employee is considered as being paid a salary rate of $600 per month or $138.46 per week. Compliance with the statutory minimum wage is determined in the usual manner based on the weekly salary.
FOH § 30b12, available at https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/WHD/legacy/files/FOH_Ch30.pdf. Upon this guidance, the Court concludes that the School District properly calculated Jackson's pay to be over minimum wage for the hours he worked as reflected on his timecards.
In light of this definitive calculation demonstrating that Jackson was paid minimum wage, Jackson challenges the evidence underlying the calculation, i.e., the timecards. He claims that the timecards do not reflect the number of hours he actually worked. In particular, he claims that the timecards do not reflect the three hours a day he performed the pre- and post-bus inspections in addition to driving his bus routes. (Pl.'s Decl. ¶ 15.)
Peculiarly, while Jackson says he was not credited with pre-route bus inspections, he clocked in between 5:45 and 6:00 a.m. each day. (See Timecards, Pl.'s Decl., Ex. 7.) Jackson's claim incredibly implies that he worked an hour and a half prior to the time he clocked in and then began driving his bus route as early as 5:45 a.m. On the other end, Jackson claims that he began his afternoon bus duties at 1:30 p.m. (though he typically clocked in closer to 2:00 p.m.) and worked for 4.25 hours despite clocking out at approximately 4:45 p.m. each day. (See Pl.'s Decl. ¶ 14.)
An employee who brings suit under the FLSA for unpaid compensation has the initial burden of proving that he performed work for which he was not properly compensated. See Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687, 66 S.Ct. 1187, 90 L.Ed. 1515 (1946), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Bonilla v. Baker Concrete Constr., Inc., 487 F.3d 1340, 1344 n.6 (11th Cir. 2007). In Anderson, the United States Supreme Court announced a burden-shifting framework for cases in which the employer's records are inaccurate or inadequate to show the precise amount of the employee's work. See id. at 687, 66 S.Ct. 1187. The burden of proof does not shift in this case, however, because Jackson has not presented any evidence to raise a reasonable inference that the timecards are inaccurate. Jackson admitted at deposition that he clocked in and out for his shifts, but he asserted that the timecards were
"edited." (Id. at 100, 102, 124.) Yet, while Jackson claimed to have written down his hours worked outside of the timekeeping system, he never produced this documentation. In fact, when pressed about it, Jackson claimed he kept track of his time "mental[ly]." (Id. at 128.) In other words, the record is devoid of any evidence, aside from Jackson's bald assertion, that the School District's timekeeping system was inaccurate or altered in some way. The Court therefore concludes that Jackson has not established a genuine dispute of fact as to the accuracy of the School District's timecards. See Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 n.6 (11th Cir. 1997) (stating that conclusory assertions without supporting evidence are insufficient to withstand summary judgment).
In conclusion, the undisputed evidence of record demonstrates that Jackson was paid at least minimum wage during the time that he worked as a school bus driver for the School District. Thus, his FLSA claim does not survive summary judgment.
B. Jackson's Disability Claim
In Count II of his complaint, Jackson claims that the School District discriminated against him because of his disability, specifically his "severe heart and lung conditions." (Compl. ¶ 84.) Jackson contends that he requested reasonable accommodation and medical leave due to his high-risk of contracting COVID-19 as a school bus driver. (Id. ¶ 87.) Jackson brings this claim under the Rehabilitation Act, which may be brought against a recipient of federal funding.
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must show that he "(1) is disabled, (2) is a qualified individual, and (3) was subjected to unlawful discrimination because of [his] disability." Cash v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2000).
The legal standards of stating a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act are the same as those brought under the Rehabilitation Act. Cash, 231 F.3d at 1305 n.2 ("Cases decided under the Rehabilitation Act are precedent for cases under the ADA, and vice versa.").
The School District moves for summary judgment on this claim because Jackson never put it on notice that he had a disability. He therefore cannot show that the School District discriminated against him because of a disability. See Howard v. Steris Corp., 886 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1294 (M.D. Ala. 2012) (stating that employers need only account for known disabilities when making employment decisions (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (4))). "A person has a disability if he 'has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more ... major life activities.'" Id. at 1291 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A)). "[M]ajor life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (A).
In this case, it is undisputed that the School District was aware of Jackson's heart and lung conditions throughout his employment. Jackson identified these medical conditions on a hiring questionnaire. (Pl.'s Decl., Ex. 12.) He also provided documentation throughout his employment when he missed work because of his heart and lung conditions including his hospitalization in March 2020. (Pl.'s Dep. at 45, 54-56.) Nevertheless, Jackson had been medically cleared to drive a bus and did so for several months. (Id. at 51-52; Pl.'s Decl. ¶ 7.) Thus, it is undisputed that prior to
COVID, Jackson was able to perform his primary job duty of driving a bus even with his medical conditions; in other words, Jackson was not disabled.
To be sure, there is no evidence that his heart and lung conditions substantially limited any major life activity prior to COVID. Any insistence that he had a "disability" prior to COVID is a conflation of impairment with disability.
Jackson's claim of disability arises from his inability to drive a school bus in light of COVID. Jackson claims he informed the School District of this disability at the meeting of September 10, 2020, when he provided two doctor's notes and requested an accommodation. The School District points out that the doctor's notes did not state Jackson was unable to work. Rather, one note cleared him for work on September 10th, and the other note only advised that Jackson had been treated for "CDC recognized risk factors and/or diagnoses putting [him] at higher risk for COVID-19." Neither note stated that Jackson's health condition substantially limited one or more major life activity. As a sister court aptly stated: "[J]ust because an employer knows an employee has some sort of impairment doesn't mean that the employer automatically knows the impairment substantially limits a major life activity of that employee." Howard, 886 F. Supp. 2d at 1294. Thus, it would be a stretch to conclude that the School District knew Jackson had a disability because it was aware throughout his employment of his serious health conditions, particularly when he was not disabled prior to the advent of COVID.
Yet, on September 10, 2020, Jackson asked to be placed in another position that did not require driving a school bus. Giving Jackson the benefit of the doubt, perhaps an inference may be drawn that the School District became aware of his disability when he asked for other job duties. If this request placed the School District on notice of a disability, Jackson's professed inability to drive a school bus creates another problem for his discrimination claim. If Jackson was unable to perform the essential functions of his employment with or without accommodation, he cannot be considered a qualified individual under the Rehabilitation Act. See Holly v. Clairson Indus., LLC, 492 F.3d 1247, 1256 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)). That is, a plaintiff under the Rehabilitation Act must be able to show "either that he can perform the essential functions of his job without accommodation, or, failing that, ... that he can perform the essential functions of his job with a reasonable accommodation." Id. (quoted source omitted). "An accommodation is 'reasonable' and necessary under [the Rehabilitation Act], in turn, only if it enables the employee to perform the essential functions of the job." Id. (citing Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1259-60 (11th Cir. 2001); LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832, 835 (11th Cir. 1998)). "Essential functions" are the "fundamental duties" of a position, not its "marginal functions." Boone v. Rumsfeld, 172 F. App'x 268, 272 (11th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). "The employee bears the burden of identifying reasonable accommodations which, if provided, would allow him to perform the essential functions of the job." Id.
Jackson concedes, as he must, that driving a school bus is a "primary duty." (Pl.'s Dep. at 25-26; Pl.'s Decl. ¶ 9; see Pl.'s Dep. at 28 ("My duty was a full-time bus driver.").) Yet, because he was at a higher risk of serious effect from COVID, he became unable (or perhaps unwilling) to drive a bus in September 2020. (Pl.'s Dep. at 84-85.) So, assuming this to
be a disability for which he provided notice to the School District, the only accommodation that Jackson sought is a position that would not require him to drive a school bus. ( See id. at 81-83.) "[A]n employer is not required ... to reallocate job duties in order to change the essential functions of a job." Earl v. Mervyns, Inc., 207 F.3d 1361, 1367 (11th Cir. 2000). In essence, Jackson cannot establish as a matter of law that he was a qualified individual with a disability or that he was discriminated against because of his disability since, by his own admission, he was unable to perform the essential function of his job as a school bus driver, i.e., driving a bus. Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate on Jackson's disability discrimination claim.
C. Jackson's FMLA Claim
Jackson claims that the School District violated the FMLA by denying his request for FMLA leave and by not providing notice of his rights under the FMLA. The School District is entitled to summary judgment on this claim because Jackson was not employed by the School District for at least 12 months. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A)(1) (defining an eligible employee under the FMLA as one who has been employed by the employer for at least 12 months). It is undisputed that Jackson became employed by the School District on November 19, 2019. Thus, Jackson was not eligible for FMLA benefits in September and October of 2020. His FMLA claim fails as a matter of law.
D. Jackson's Retaliation Claims
Count V of Jackson's complaint states a claim for retaliation under the FLSA and the Rehabilitation Act. That is, Jackson claims he was terminated because of his opposing or reporting interference with his rights under these protective statutes.
Jackson also claims retaliation under the FMLA, but as previously explained Jackson is not a protected employee under the FMLA because he was not employed by the School District for at least 12 months.
Because Jackson has no direct evidence of retaliatory motive for his termination, his claims must be analyzed using the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, applied to retaliation claims under Title VII. Wolf v. Coca-Cola Co., 200 F.3d 1337, 1342-43 (11th Cir. 2000) (FLSA); Todd v. Fayette Cnty. Sch. Dist., 998 F.3d 1203, 1219 (11th Cir. 2021) (Rehabilitation Act/ADA). This framework starts with Jackson's demonstration of a prima facie case of retaliation. Once Jackson makes this showing, the School District has an opportunity to submit legitimate reasons for the adverse action. Jackson must then establish that any proffered reason is pretextual.
Jackson contends that Mr. Passmore's remark at the September 10th meeting that Jackson should resign and get disability insurance is direct evidence of discrimination. The Court concludes that this remark does not reflect a discriminatory or retaliatory attitude necessary to be considered direct evidence, particularly when Jackson was not terminated until October 1st. See Kilpatrick v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 268 F. App'x 860, 862 (11th Cir. 2008) ("Only the most blatant remarks, whose intent could be nothing other than to discriminate on the basis of a protected classification, constitute direct evidence."); Jones v. BE&K Eng. Co., 146 F. App'x 356, 358-359 (11th Cir. 2005) (stating that statements not made during the decision-making process are not direct evidence of discrimination).
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).
To state a prima facie case of retaliation under FLSA, a plaintiff must show that (1) he engaged in FLSA-protected activity; (2) he suffered an adverse
employment action; and (3) the employer's adverse action was causally connected to the plaintiff's protected activity. Wolf, 200 F.3d at 1342-43. FLSA-protected activity includes filing a complaint or instituting or causing to be instituted any proceeding under the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 215(a) (3) (the FLSA's anti-retaliatory provision). The Eleventh Circuit has held that "unofficial complaints expressed to the employer" about pay violations are protected by the FLSA's anti-retaliatory provision. EEOC v. White & Son Enters., 881 F.2d 1006, 1011 (11th Cir. 1989). That said, "a complaint must be sufficiently clear and detailed for a reasonable employer to understand it, in light of both content and context, as an assertion of rights protected by the statute and a call for their protection." Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 1, 131 S.Ct. 1325, 179 L.Ed.2d 379 (2011).
The problem with Jackson's FLSA retaliation claim is that he did not complain to the School District about the failure to pay a minimum wage. Instead, he complained that he had been promised upon hire that he would be paid between $1400 to $1800 a month. (See Pl.'s Dep. at 109-21.) In fact, when asked whether he told anyone in the School District that he was not getting minimum wage, he replied: "No, sir. That's just common sense." (Id. at 115.) In follow-up to that comment, Jackson was asked whether he relayed this common sense calculation to his employer. He responded: "They should know that." (Id. at 116.) Because Jackson never put the School District on notice of his FLSA complaint, he did not engage in FLSA-protected activity. His retaliation claim under the FLSA therefore fails.
The Court dismissed Jackson's breach of contract claim for failure to pay promised compensation in its Order of November 2, 2022. (Doc. No. 42, at 5.)
Jackson cannot make a prima facie case of retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act either. In order to do so, a plaintiff must show that (1) he engaged in statutorily protected expression, (2) he suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) the employer's adverse action was causally connected to the plaintiff's protected activity. Todd, 998 F.3d at 1219. Here, Jackson claims he was terminated because he sought reasonable accommodation for his disability. As has been established, however, Jackson's request to be assigned duties other than driving a bus was not a reasonable accommodation; thus, he did not engage in a statutorily protected activity.
Even if Jackson could establish a prima facie case of retaliation under with the FLSA or the Rehabilitation Act, the School District proffers a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for his termination, i.e., Jackson abandoned his position when he failed to show up for work from September 10 to October 1 and provided no medical documentation for missing work. The burden thus shifts to Jackson to show that this proffered reason is pretext for discriminatory animus. To show pretext, the evidence produced "must reveal such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its actions that a reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy of credence." Vessels v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 408 F.3d 763, 771 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoted source omitted). Here, Jackson has provided no evidence that would suggest to a reasonable factfinder that the School District did not terminate him for job abandonment.
Upon the foregoing, Jackson cannot establish a claim for retaliatory discharge
under the FLSA or the Rehabilitation Act as a matter of law. Thus, the School District is entitled to summary judgment on these retaliation claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, Defendant Laurens County School District's motion for summary judgment (doc. no. 67) is GRANTED. Costs are assessed against Plaintiff.
ORDER ENTERED at Augusta, Georgia, this 13th day of December, 2023.