Jackson v. Johnson

42 Citing cases

  1. Cheung v. Daley

    35 Cal.App.4th 1673 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)   Cited 31 times
    Reversing punitive damages award where jury awarded zero dollars in compensatory damages for fraudulent transfer, implying jury could have awarded compensatory damages

    In the ensuing years, however, the Courts of Appeal began upholding exemplary damage awards even if no compensatory damages were made, so long as the record showed the defendant tortiously harmed the plaintiff. (See decisions discussed in Jackson v. Johnson (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1364-1369 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 482] (dis. opn. of Johnson, J.).)(1) Pointing to the jury's express determination that plaintiffs suffered "0.00" compensatory damages, Daley argues that the requisite foundation for awarding exemplary damages is absent.

  2. Wolk v. Green

    516 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (N.D. Cal. 2007)   Cited 22 times
    Concluding that the plaintiff had not established the "care or custody" element of the elder abuse claim where there was an attorney-client relationship between the parties

    At this stage, plaintiff's request for punitive damages is permissible. Defendant's citation to Jackson v. Johnson, 5 Cal. App. 4th 1350 (1992), is misplaced. In Jackson, the court held that punitive damages were not allowed in a legal malpractice verdict when no actual damages were found. 5 Cal. App. 4th at 1351.

  3. Yates v. Nimeh

    486 F. Supp. 2d 1084 (N.D. Cal. 2007)   Cited 5 times
    Noting that a plaintiff could still recover punitive damages even though his compensatory damage claim had been offset

    Here, plaintiff has already demonstrated the commission of a tortious act, and may yet prove defendants' liability for some part of the damages arising therefrom. It does not follow that because plaintiff's compensatory damage claim may be completely offset, he is automatically precluded from recovering punitive damages against defendants. Neither Kluge v. O'Gara, 227 Cal. App. 2d 207 (1964) norJackson v. Johnson, 5 Cal. App. 4th 1350 (1992) mandate dismissal of plaintiff's claim. After receiving full satisfaction on a judgment in malpractice, the Kluge plaintiff sued the former defendant and others alleging a conspiracy to undermine the earlier malpractice litigation.

  4. Shopoff & Cavallo LLP v. Hyon

    167 Cal.App.4th 1489 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008)   Cited 126 times
    Holding that a plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of a fiduciary relationship, breach of that duty and damages

    Hyon's theories of recovery for legal malpractice in the cross-complaint suffer from a critical infirmity: they pled speculative damages that might occur in the future, but had not yet occurred. Our high court has repeatedly stressed, "`The mere breach of a professional duty, causing only nominal damages, speculative harm, or the threat of future harm — not yet realized — does not suffice to create a cause of action for negligence. . . .' [Citation.]" ( Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger Harrison (1998) 18 Cal.4th 739, 749-750 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 749, 958 P.2d 1062], italics added; see also Budd v. Nixen, supra, 6 Cal.3d 195, 200; Fritz v. Ehrmann (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1374, 1381 [ 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 670]; Jackson v. Johnson (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1355 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 482].) "`Hence, until the client suffers appreciable harm as a consequence of his attorney's negligence, the client cannot establish a cause of action for malpractice.

  5. Berkley v. Dowds

    152 Cal.App.4th 518 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007)   Cited 207 times
    Holding that the statute "does not create a cause of action as such, but provides for attorney fees, costs and punitive damages under certain conditions"

    As another division of this district observed, "[t]his `liberal construction' is a euphemism for nullification." ( Jackson v. Johnson (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1358 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 482].) We agree, and decline to follow James or its progeny.

  6. Sole Energy Co. v. Petrominerals Corp.

    128 Cal.App.4th 212 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)   Cited 231 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that "[t]he measure of damages for intentional interference with contractual relations or prospective economic advantage is an amount that will reasonably compensate plaintiff for all loss or harm...caused by the defendant's conduct," including the plaintiff's financial loss of the benefits a prospective economic relationship

    An award of actual damages, even if nominal, is required to recover punitive damages. (Civ. Code, § 3294; Kizer v. County of San Mateo (1991) 53 Cal.3d 139, 147 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 318, 806 P.2d 1353] ["actual damages are an absolute predicate for an award of exemplary or punitive damages"]; Mother Cobb's Chicken T., Inc. v. Fox (1937) 10 Cal.2d 203, 205 [ 73 P.2d 1185]; Jackson v. Johnson (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1358 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 482].) Neither Borghese nor Swaney can recover actual damages from Petrominerals or Silverman and, therefore, neither Borghese nor Swaney can recover punitive damages.

  7. Caira v. Offner

    126 Cal.App.4th 12 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)   Cited 132 times   2 Legal Analyses
    In Caira, the appellate court concluded there was no abuse of discretion in excluding an email sent during settlement negotiations where one party "sought admission of the e-mail to prove a claim that was specifically discussed in the e-mail."

    To the extent Laurens claims he was entitled to a jury trial solely on the issue of punitive damages, we reject this claim as well. Such a bifurcated procedure would be inconsistent both with the fact that there is no separate cause of action for punitive damages — they "are only ancillary to a valid cause of action" ( Jackson v. Johnson (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1355 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 482]) — and with the statutory command that evidence of a defendant's financial condition necessary to support a punitive damages award be presented to the " same trier of fact" that found the defendant liable. (Civ. Code, § 3295, subd. (d), italics added.)

  8. Romo v. Ford Motor Co.

    113 Cal.App.4th 738 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)   Cited 38 times
    Upholding a punitive-to-compensatory damage award ratio of 5-to-1

    (2) In the case of punitive damages, the exaction arises from a "private" wrong: if there is no wrong resulting in compensable injury to this plaintiff, there can be no exaction of punitive damages. (See, e.g., Jackson v. Johnson (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1355 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 482].) By contrast, in the case of "public" wrongs, the law seeks to enforce compliance with norms of conduct through the infliction of punishment regardless of the existence of an identifiable victim in a particular case; no one needs to be waiting for the parking space in order to justify the issuance of a parking ticket.

  9. Mosier v. Southern California Physicians Ins. Exchange

    63 Cal.App.4th 1022 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)   Cited 103 times
    In Mosier, a California appellate court held that, when an insurer provides a defense to an uninsured individual, the insurer "owe[s] the same duties to defend [the plaintiff] as it would have had [the plaintiff] in fact been its insured."

    (9) For causation to be established, there must be a nexus between the compensatory damages assessed and the breaches of fiduciary duty. ( Stanley v. Richmond, supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at p. 1086; DiPalma v. Seldman (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1499, 1506 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 219] ; Jackson v. Johnson (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1355 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 482].) (3h) In this instance the compensatory damages are a purely a mathematical result of measuring the difference between two quantities: subtraction of the result of multiplication of 40 percent times the damages assessed in the personal injury action from multiplication of 70 percent times the same damages.

  10. Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young Co.

    52 Cal.App.4th 820 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 232 times
    Holding "trial-within-a-trial" standard of proof is also applicable to claims of accountant malpractice

    (7) It would appear BAJI No. 6.37.5 most closely approximates a usable instruction which the abundant case law contemplates in professional negligence cases and has been used for that purpose. (E.g., Jackson v. Johnson (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1356 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 482]; cf. DiPalma v. Seldman, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 1507.) However, it requires some modification to eliminate the "but for" language and to substitute the substantial factor test.