Plaintiff cites cases to show that it is reversible error for a trial court to give instructions setting forth ordinances and statutes when they do not relate to an issue in the case, or to give an instruction containing an entire ordinance or statute when a portion of the ordinance or statute does not relate to the issues in the case. (Jackson v. Hursey, 1 Ill. App.2d 598, 604, 605, 118 N.E.2d 348 (1954); Lobstein v. Sajatovich, 111 Ill. App. 654, 660 (1904); Soibel v. Oconto Co., 299 Ill. App. 518, 524, 20 N.E.2d 309 (1939).) Also, as to the contention, "it is error to instruct on an ordinance without further instructing that a violation of the ordinance bars recovery only if it is the proximate cause of the occurrence," plaintiff cites Star Brewery Co. v. Hauck, 222 Ill. 348, 352, 78 NE 827 (1906); Penwitt v. City of Chicago, 315 Ill. App. 444, 447, 43 N.E.2d 159 (1942); and Hartnett v. Boston Store of Chicago, 185 Ill. App. 332, 334 (1914).

The construction and interpretation of a statute or regulation is a matter for the trial court and should not be made the subject of a jury instruction. (See Jackson v. Hursey (1954), 1 Ill. App.2d 598, 604, 118 N.E.2d 348; Pennsylvania Co. v. Frana (1883), 13 Ill. App. 91, 97.) If paragraph 2 is construed in conformity with defendant's contentions (a construction we have rejected, see above), then Rule 606 is inapplicable and should not be included in the instruction to the jury. In no event should both paragraphs 2 and Rule 606 be included in an instruction.

" (See also Hall v. Gillins, 13 Ill.2d 26, 31 (1958); McClure v. Lence, 349 Ill. App. 341, 344-46 (1953); cf. Haupt v. Golick, 57 Ill. App.2d 481, 484-85 (1965), and Jackson v. Hursey, 1 Ill. App.2d 598, 607 (1954), stating a different rule as to covenants not to sue.) Slone v. Morton, 39 Ill. App.2d 495 (1963) and Hyba v. C.A. Horneman, Inc., 302 Ill. App. 143 (1939), cited by plaintiff, involve covenants not to sue rather than releases and are therefore inapplicable here.

There are numerous cases which hold that the giving of instructions not based on evidence is reversible error. (See i.e., Jackson v. Hursey (1954), 1 Ill. App.2d 598, 118 N.E.2d 348.) In determining whether to invoke the above presumption, a reviewing court must take into consideration the closeness of the evidence, the likelihood of the jury being confused and the possibility of prejudicial effect in submitting the unsupported issues to the jury.

His injury was not otherwise sustained. Proof that Lowery was present when plaintiff was shot; that he owned and produced the gun used by Larry; that he was in the restaurant when Herbert Loveall slapped Gary; that he was in the parking lot and was near Gary when he slapped the plaintiff, falls far short of establishing, as plaintiff contends, that the shot wounding him was fired jointly by Lowery and the Lowe brothers. Cited in support of plaintiff's argument are Manthei v. Heimerdinger, 332 Ill. App. 335, 75 N.E.2d 132 and Jackson v. Hursey, 1 Ill. App.2d 598, 118 N.E.2d 348. In neither of these cases did the Court pass upon the question presented here, namely, whether a tavern keeper may be held liable for the acts of an intoxicated person to whom he did not give or sell intoxicants.

Under this rule the information of prior settlements made by joint tort-feasors, not on trial, is kept from the jury. At the conclusion of the trial, if there is a verdict in favor of plaintiff, the trial court deducts the amount of such settlements from the award ( De Lude v. Rimek, 351 Ill. App. 466; Jackson v. Hursey, 1 Ill. App.2d 598; Ryan v. Monson, 33 Ill. App.2d 406). The same practice prevails in a number of other jurisdictions ( Ramsey v. Camp, 254 N.C. 443; Steger v. Egyud, 219 Md. 331; Skyline Cab Co. v. Bradley, 325 S.W.2d 176, 181-182 [Tex. Civ. App.]; Cudd v. Great Amer. Ins. Co., 202 F. Supp. 237 [W.D., La.]; cf. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Bourne, 220 F.2d 921 [5th Cir., per HUTCHESON, J.]).

In Hapenny v. Huffman, 184 Ill. App. 351, the instruction would have allowed a recovery for all damages while under the law the plaintiff was limited only to damages for loss of means of support. In Jackson v. Hursey, 1 Ill. App.2d 598, 118 N.E.2d 348, an instruction set out in haec verba the entire section relating to the Dramshop Act and the court stated that more than one half of the instruction had no possible application to the issues in the case and would tend to confuse the jury. We find no such reversible error in the giving of plaintiffs' instruction No. 4. There is nothing contained therein that would not apply to the issues in this case.