Opinion
Civil Action 23 - 1353
10-03-2023
WILLIAM P. JACKSON, Petitioner, v. ORLANDO HARPER, Respondent.
J. NICHOLAS RANJAN, DISTRICT JUDGE.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
LISA PUPO LENIHAN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
I. RECOMMENDATION
For the following reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 5) filed by Petitioner William P. Jackson (“Petitioner”) be summarily dismissed because the claims for relief that Petitioner asserts in it are not cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding.
The Court has a pre-service duty to screen and dismiss a habeas petition when it plainly appears that the petitioner is not entitled to relief. See Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (which also applies to habeas petitions filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 cases).
II. REPORT
A. Background
Petitioner is an inmate housed in the Allegheny County Jail (“ACJ”). In his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Petitioner is challenging his conditions of confinement at the ACJ. Specifically, he states that he was placed in a “hard cell” without due process, his legal work was taken from him and thrown away, and his law library privileges were restricted. He seeks an order releasing him back to his general population cell and restoring all of his privileges.
It appears that this occurred sometime in June 2023.
B. Discussion
The purpose of a writ of habeas corpus is to challenge the legal authority under which a prisoner is held in custody. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973) (noting that “the essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and that the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.”) Petitioner does not state whether he is being held at the ACJ as a pretrial detainee or under a state court judgment of sentence. The federal habeas statute 28 U.S.C. § 2254 applies to persons who are “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). See, e.g., Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 662 (1996); Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 484-85 (3d Cir. 2001). This statute permits a federal court to entertain an application for habeas corpus relief from a state prisoner “only on the ground that he or she is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). In contrast, when an individual is in state or local custody for reasons other than a judgment of a state court, such as in pretrial detention, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is properly brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 441-43 (3d Cir. 1975); Duran v. Thomas, 393 Fed.Appx. 3 (3d Cir. 2010). Section 2241 provides in relevant part: “The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless . . . [h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (emphasis added).
There are important differences between § 2241 and § 2254 cases,but those differences are not relevant to this case. It has long been the rule in the Third Circuit that a state or local prisoner cannot challenge the conditions of his or her confinement in a habeas action and thus Petitioner's claims for habeas relief are not cognizable under either § 2241 or § 2254. See, e.g., Williams v. Sec'y Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 459 Fed.Appx. 87, 88-89 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 540 (3d Cir. 2002)); Lopez v. Wetzel, No. 12-cv-96, 2012 WL 345215, at *4-5 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2012). See also Brian R. Means, Federal Habeas Manual § 1.35 Westlaw (database updated May 2021).
For example, a prisoner in a habeas action under § 2241 is not subject to the amendments the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) made applicable to habeas actions filed under § 2254, including the one-year limitations at § 2244(d)(1), the deferential review standards at § 2254(d)(1) and (2), and the limitation on second or successive petitions at § 2244(b)(2).
Based on all of the foregoing, it is recommended that the Court summarily dismiss the Petition. The dismissal should be without prejudice to Petitioner's ability to assert his claims in a properly supported § 1983 action if he so chooses, or in a state habeas action.
C. Certificate of Appealability
AEDPA provides that “[u]nless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from . . . the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). It also provides that “[a] certificate of appealability may issue . . . only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Id. § 2253(c)(2). See also Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Here, Petitioner failed to allege the denial of a constitutional right that would entitle him to habeas relief, let alone demonstrate a substantial showing of the denial of such a right. Accordingly, the Court should not grant him a certificate of appealability on his claims.
III. CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 5) filed by Petitioner William P. Jackson (“Petitioner”) be summarily dismissed because the claims for relief that Petitioner asserts in it are not cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding.
In accordance with the applicable provisions of the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)&(C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Rules of Court, Petitioner shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of the service of this report and recommendation to file written objections thereto. Petitioner's failure to file timely objections will constitute a waiver of his appellate rights.