A triable issue of fact exists, and therefore precludes summary judgment, where the material facts are disputed or where, although the material facts are undisputed, reasonable minds could differ in drawing inferences from those uncontested facts. Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Illinois, Inc., 188 Ill.2d 17, 31 (1999); see Pielet v. Pielet, 2012 IL 112064, ¶ 53 (stating "[i]f the undisputed material facts could lead reasonable observers to divergent inferences, or where there is a dispute as to a material fact, summary judgment should be denied and the issue decided by the trier of fact"). " '[W]here doubt exists, the wiser judicial policy is to permit resolution of the dispute by a trial.'" Jackson v. Graham, 323 Ill.App.3d 766, 779 (2001) (quoting Meck v. Paramedic Services of Illinois, 296 Ill.App.3d 720, 725 (1998)). ¶ 34" 'Summary judgment is a drastic means of resolving litigation and should be allowed only when the right of the moving party is clear and free from doubt.'"

¶ 44 I. Standard of Review ¶ 45 De novo is the proper standard of review on a circuit court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment ( Jackson v. Graham , 323 Ill. App. 3d 766, 779, 257 Ill.Dec. 330, 753 N.E.2d 525 (2001) ) as well as on the resolution of the construction of a deed, which is a question of law ( Timothy Christian Schools v. Village of Western Springs , 285 Ill. App. 3d 949, 954, 221 Ill.Dec. 261, 675 N.E.2d 168 (1996) ). "Accordingly, we afford no deference to the trial court's decision and instead, we consider anew the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and exhibits on file to determine whether the trial court's decision was correct." Jackson , 323 Ill. App. 3d at 779, 257 Ill.Dec. 330, 753 N.E.2d 525.

¶ 17 When examining a grant of summary judgment, this court considers anew the facts and law related to the case to discern whether the trial court's disposition of the matter was appropriate. Jackson v. Graham , 323 Ill. App. 3d 766, 779, 257 Ill.Dec. 330, 753 N.E.2d 525 (2001). This court reviews the trial court's judgment, not its reasoning, and may affirm that judgment on any grounds called for in the record.

¶ 101 Generally, a trial court's evidentiary rulings are reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Jackson v. Graham, 323 Ill. App. 3d 766, 773, 753 N.E.2d 525, 531 (2001). "However, in this case, we are reviewing the trial court's ruling on a motion to strike an affidavit, which motion was made in conjunction with the court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment.

On appeal, our review of a summary judgment order is de novo , and "we afford no deference to the trial court's decision and instead, we consider anew the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and exhibits on file to determine whether the trial court's decision was correct." Jackson v. Graham , 323 Ill. App. 3d 766, 779, 257 Ill.Dec. 330, 753 N.E.2d 525 (2001). ¶ 18 Hirt argues a question of fact remains as to whether she timely rescinded.

On appeal, our review of a summary judgment order is de novo and "we afford no deference to the trial court's decision and instead, we consider anew the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and exhibits on file to determine whether the trial court's decision was correct." Jackson v. Graham, 323 Ill. App. 3d 766, 779 (2001). ¶ 18 Hirt argues a question of fact remains as to whether she timely rescinded. "[W]hen a loan made in a consumer credit transaction is secured by the borrower's principal dwelling," TILA permits the borrower to "rescind the loan agreement," (Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 411 (1998)) up to three business days after the transaction. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (2012).

Id. Because our review is de novo, "we afford no deference to the trial court's decision and instead, we consider anew the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and exhibits on file to determine whether the trial court's decision was correct." Jackson v. Graham, 323 Ill. App. 3d 766, 779 (2001).¶ 22 "To establish a breach of contract claim, a plaintiff must prove the existence of a valid and enforceable contract, performance by the plaintiff, breach of the contract by the defendant, and damages or injury to the plaintiff resulting from the breach."

We reject this argument because, although “[i]n general, this court reviews a circuit court's decision on a motion to strike an affidavit for an abuse of discretion, * * * when the motion ‘was made in conjunction with the court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment,’ we employ a de novo standard of review with respect to the motion to strike.” US Bank, National Ass'n v. Avdic, 2014 IL App (1st) 121759, ¶ 18, 381 Ill.Dec. 254, 10 N.E.3d 339 (quoting Jackson v. Graham, 323 Ill.App.3d 766, 773, 257 Ill.Dec. 330, 753 N.E.2d 525 (2001) ). Here, there was no specific motion to strike the affidavit, but in substance the argument was that the affidavit could not support summary judgment because it failed to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 191 (eff. Jan. 4, 2013) and thus should not be considered.

Id. "Rule 191(a) is satisfied if 'from the document as a whole, it appears the affidavit is based on the personal knowledge of the affiant and there is a reasonable inference that the affiant could competently testify to its contents at trial.' " Jackson v. Graham, 323 Ill. App. 3d 766, 777 (2001) (quoting Kugler v. Southmark Realty Partners III, 309 Ill. App. 3d 790, 795 (1999)). ¶78 Defendants' argument that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Dr. Caulfield breached the Agreement is premised entirely on Dr. Packer's affidavit.

We reject this argument because although "[i]n general, the court reviews a circuit court's decision on a motion to strike an affidavit for an abuse of discretion, *** when the motion 'was made in conjunction with the court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment,' we employ a de novo standard of review with respect to the motion to strike." US Bank, NA v. Avdic, 2014 IL App (1st) 121759, ¶ 18 (quoting Jackson v. Graham, 323 Ill. App. 3d 766, 773 (2001)). Here, there was no specific motion to strike the affidavit, but in substance the argument is that the affidavit could not support summary judgment because it failed to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 191 (eff. Aug 1, 1992) and thus should not have been considered.