Opinion
3:19-cv-00427-YY
03-01-2022
BRYCE JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. CATHY GORTON, GREG MANSOFF, and MULTNOMAH COUNTY, Defendants.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Youlee Yim You, United States Magistrate Judge
FINDINGS
Pro se plaintiff Bryce Jackson brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments stemming from his previous incarceration in the Multnomah County Jail. See Am. Compl. 1, ECF 135. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. Id. The defendants are Multnomah County and Multnomah County Sheriff's Office deputies Cathy Gorton (“Gorton”) and Greg Mansoff (“Mansoff”). The court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as it raises questions of federal law.
Plaintiff is no longer in custody at the Multnomah County Jail and is currently incarcerated on other charges at the Monroe Correctional Complex in Washington.
Plaintiff and defendants have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. For the reasons discussed below, plaintiff's motion (ECF 137) should be DENIED, defendants' motion (ECF 146) should be GRANTED, and this case should be dismissed with prejudice.
I. Summary Judgment Standard
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(A). THE PARTY MOVING FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEARS THE INITIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF INFORMING THE COURT OF THE BASIS FOR THE MOTION AND IDENTIFYING PORTIONS OF THE PLEADINGS, DEPOSITIONS, ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES, ADMISSIONS, OR AFFIDAVITS THAT DEMONSTRATE THE ABSENCE OF A TRIABLE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party does so, the nonmoving party must “go beyond the pleadings' and designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'” Id. at 324 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)).
The court “does not weigh the evidence or determine the truth of the matter, but only determines whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Balint v. Carson City, Nev., 180 F.3d 1047,1054 (9th Cir. 1999). “Reasonable doubts as to the existence of material factual issue are resolved against the moving parties and inferences are drawn in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130,1134 (9th Cir. 2014).
II. Background
The parties agree on all but a handful of facts. Most importantly, plaintiff admits that he punched Mansoff in the face, giving rise to the actions that are the subject of his Eighth Amendment claim. Pl. Mot. Summ. J. 1, ECF 137. The parties dispute what happened afterwards; however, as discussed below, that does not alter the outcome as to whether plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights were violated.
Preliminarily, it is also important to note that plaintiff has offered no testimony, either in support of his motion for summary judgment or in response to defendants' motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is unverified and therefore cannot be considered as evidence in response to a motion for summary judgment. See Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 (9th Cir. 1995) (“A verified complaint may be used as an opposing affidavit under Rule 56.”).
Nevertheless, the Amended Complaint does shed light on plaintiff's theory of the case. Plaintiff alleges that Gorton and Mansoff entered his cell and tried to handcuff him. Am. Compl. 1, ECF 135. Plaintiff claims the deputies had no reason to enter his cell. Id. Gorton threatened him by saying, “I'm going to back your ass up,” and held the handcuffs at chest level. Id. After 30 seconds, plaintiff turned to the right, and Mansoff aggressively reached for his face. Id. Plaintiff “felt threatened and instinctively reacted by throwing a punch.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that Gorton and Mansoff then severely beat him for what felt like one to two minutes. Id.
A Multnomah County Sheriff's Office report describes that Mansoff, Gorton, and another deputy were attempting to move plaintiff to a mental health module due to his unstable behavior. Pl. Mot. Summ. J., ECF 137, at 11, 16, 19, 22. Deputies made the decision to handcuff plaintiff because of his “previous custodial assault history.” Id. at 22. Gorton told plaintiff to place his hands through the cell's food port to be handcuffed, and plaintiff did not comply. Id. at 16. Gorton repeated the request several times, but plaintiff refused and stated, “What are you going to do if I don't?” Id. Plaintiff made this statement in a non-threatening, questioning manner and did not appear agitated. Id.
Plaintiff offers this report as an attachment to his motion for summary judgment, and defendants have not objected.
The deputies entered plaintiff's cell, and Gorton handcuffed plaintiff's left wrist without incident. Id. at 16. Plaintiff told Gorton, “You're a girl, you're a girl[.] [W]hy are you in front,” and began to pull away. Id. at 12, 16. A slight tug of war ensued, id. at 16, and then, without warning, plaintiff punched Mansoff in the eye with his right hand. Id. at 12. Gorton recounted that, “in twenty years working in the jail she has never heard a punch hitting a person so loud.” Id. Gorton then “instantly punched [plaintiff] on the left side of the head to stop the threat,” and plaintiff dropped to the ground, striking the right side of his head on the concrete corner of the bed. Id. at 10. The deputies handcuffed plaintiff and restrained him with a leg hobble because he was kicking at them. Id. at 14.
According to plaintiff's medical records, Gorton described to a jail nurse that when plaintiff's head hit the floor, it sounded like “a melon hitting [the] ground.” Pl. Suppl. Arg. 3, ECF 140 (chart note). Plaintiff had a five-inch cut on his head and there was a “large pool of blood” at the base of the bed. Pl. Mot. Summ. J., ECF 127, at 10, 14. Plaintiff was taken to a hospital, where he received a CAT scan, but refused treatment. Id. at 16. Later, when a deputy attempted to take plaintiff's statement, he would not stop “rambling about females being in corrections.” Id. at 11.
Plaintiff offers these medical records with his briefing and, again, defendants have not objected.
Mansoff also went to the hospital and received three stitches for a laceration to the upper left side of his cheek. Id. at 11. He had additional smaller cuts to his face, including one above his left eye that required superglue to hold shut, as well as bruising and swelling. Id.
On August 22, 2018, plaintiff was indicted for assaulting a public safety officer pursuant to O.R.S. 163.208(1) for his actions against Mansoff. Decl. Nathan Sramek ¶ 3, ECF 49; id., Ex. 2 (indictment, State v. Bryce Jackson, Multnomah County Case No. 18-CR-54512). In January 2019, a Multnomah County Circuit Court judge found plaintiff unable to aid and assist in his defense and transferred him to the Oregon State Hospital. Id., Ex. 3 (court order). On November 15, 2019, plaintiff pleaded guilty to the assault charge and was sentenced.
III. Discussion
Plaintiff alleges that Gorton and Mansoff's conduct violated his Eighth Amendment rights. Am. Compl., ECF 135. He also claims his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated because he “did not have any motion hearings for 7 months before going to [Oregon State Hospital],” his attorney visited him one time, and he was coerced into accepting a plea offer. Id.
Gorton and Mansoff counter that they are entitled to qualified immunity on the Eighth Amendment claim and were not personally involved with any aspect of plaintiff's rights related to the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Defendants also contend that punitive damages are not an available remedy against Multnomah County. Defs. Mot. Summ. J. 3, ECF 146; Defs. Reply 2, ECF 157.
A. Defendants Gorton and Mansoff
1. Qualified Immunity
“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (internal citation and quotation omitted). The doctrine is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Id. (internal citation and quotation omitted).
“The purpose of qualified immunity is to strike a balance between the competing ‘need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.'” Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 440 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231). “Qualified immunity shields an officer from liability even if his or her action resulted from ‘a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact.'” Id. (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231). “Qualified immunity gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal questions. When properly applied, it protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.'” Rodriguez v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 891 F.3d 776, 794 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011)).
A defendant is “entitled to qualified immunity if (1) the alleged conduct did not violate a constitutional right or (2) that right was not clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” Melnik v. Dzurenda, 14 F.4th 981, 985 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744, 757 (2014)). The “‘clearly established' inquiry is a question of law that only a judge can decide.” Morales v. Fry, 873 F.3d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 2017). “For a right to be ‘clearly established,' existing ‘precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate,' such that ‘every' reasonable official, not just ‘a' reasonable official, would have understood that he was violating a clearly established right.” Thompson v. Rahr, 885 F.3d 582, 587 (9th Cir. 2018) (emphasis in original) (quoting Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741). “‘[I]t is not necessary that the alleged acts have been previously held unconstitutional, as long as the unlawfulness [of the defendants' actions] was apparent in light of preexisting law.'” Sorrels v. McKee, 290 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2002) (alterations in original) (quoting Malik v. Brown, 71 F.3d 724, 727 (9th Cir. 1995)). The Supreme Court “has repeatedly told courts . . . not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality.” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S.Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “This inquiry must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (quotations marks and citation omitted).
This claim is not precluded by the Heck doctrine because judgment for plaintiff on this claim would not “necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction” for assaulting a public safety officer. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). Although plaintiff was convicted of assaulting a public safety officer in violation under O.R.S. 163.208(1), it is hypothetically possible that Gorton and Mansoff could have responded to this assault with excessive use of force. See Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 696 (9th Cir. 2005); Underwood v. Northcutt, No. 1:08-cv-00986-GSA-PC, 2015 WL 1404941, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2015) (collecting cases and finding no Heck bar under similar circumstances).
The Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C § 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (simplified). Section 1983 liability “arises only upon a showing of personal participation by the defendant,” acting under color of state law, that deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional or federal statutory right. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Here, plaintiff appears to claim that Gorton and Mansoff violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by using excessive force during the altercation in his cell.
Generally, “[t]he status of the detainee determines the appropriate constitutional standard for evaluating conditions of confinement.” Vazquez v. Cty. of Kern, 949 F.3d 1153, 1163 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation and quotation omitted). “Due process requires that a pretrial detainee not be punished. A sentenced inmate, on the other hand, may be punished, although that punishment may not be ‘cruel and unusual' under the Eighth Amendment.” Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 n.16 (1979) (quotation marks omitted). Because plaintiff has raised an Eighth Amendment claim, and the defense does not contend that plaintiff was a pretrial detainee, the court assumes that plaintiff was serving a sentence when the incident that gave rise to his claims occurred and applies the Eighth Amendment analysis.
The “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” on prisoners “constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992) (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)). While prison officials are given “wide-ranging deference” in preserving discipline, they may not use “excessive physical force” against prisoners. Id. at 6-7 (citations omitted). To prevail on an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim, a plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) the defendant acted maliciously and sadistically for the purpose of causing harm, and not in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline; (2) the defendant used excessive and unnecessary force under all of the circumstances; and (3) the acts of the defendant caused harm to the plaintiff. See Hoardv. Hartman, 904 F.3d 780, 788, 788 n.9 (9th Cir. 2018). The Supreme Court has “consistently emphasized that the ‘core judicial inquiry' in excessive force cases is ‘whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Id. at 788 (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7) (emphasis in original). “ [A]n officer who harms an inmate as part of a good-faith effort to maintain security has acted constitutionally.” Id.
Five factors bear on the excessive force analysis in a typical Eighth Amendment claim: “(1) the extent of injury suffered by an inmate; (2) the need for application of force; (3) the relationship between that need and the amount of force used; (4) the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials; and (5) any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.” Bearchildv. Cobban, 947 F.3d 1130, 1141 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1028 (9th Cir. 2013)).
With respect to the first factor, the extent of the injury, plaintiff suffered a five-inch cut from hitting his head and was taken to the hospital where he received a CAT scan but otherwise refused treatment. Despite the extent of plaintiff's injury, the need for the force used by the deputies is abundantly clear: plaintiff admits he threw the first punch to Mansoff's face, which according to Gorton, was the loudest punch she had heard in the 20 years she worked at the jail. Pl. Mot. Summ.. J., ECF 137, at 12. Because Gorton perceived am immediate threat to her and Mansoff's safety, she “instantly” hit plaintiff in the head after which deputies helped restrain him. This was a proportional response to plaintiff's real and immediate threat to the deputies' physical safety.
Considering these factors, the use of force was not excessive or unnecessary. Even construing all the evidence in plaintiff's favor, no reasonable jury could find that Gorton or Mansoff acted maliciously and sadistically for the purpose of causing harm. The only reasonable conclusion from the evidence is that Gorton and Mansoff acted in a good-faith effort to restore discipline and maintain security.
Plaintiff invokes Multnomah County Detention Center's internal use of force policy to argue Gorton and Mansoff “made an illegal entry” into his cell and should have pursued and exhausted other remedies before entering his cell. See Pl. Mot. Summ. J. 1-2, ECF 137; Pl. Second Mem. 5, ECF 160. Indeed, after reviewing the incident report, Gorton's supervisor wrote that, for future reference, he would tell Gorton “to use a member of the mental health team to assist in dealing with a non-compliant mental health inmate.” Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. 23, ECF 137. Even so, plaintiff created the need for the force by first punching Mansoff in the face. Prison policies that encourage the deployment of risk reduction techniques do not hamstring officers confronted with a violent assault.
This policy provides:
3.6 When managing confrontations, members must pursue the goal of resolving a confrontation safely and effectively based on available resources with as minimal reliance on physical force as practical by employing the following tactics:
3.6.1. When feasible, consider and attempt de-escalation to reduce risk and increase the options available;
3.6.2. When feasible, use available time to marshal helpful, available resources and develop additional response options.Pl. Mot. Summ. J., ECF 137 at 8 (510.00 - Use of Force).
Because there is no constitutional violation, it is unnecessary to reach the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the Eighth Amendment claim.
3. Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment Claims
It appears plaintiff filed a memorandum withdrawing his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment claims (ECF 155), but in a subsequent memorandum, accused defendants of impersonating him to get those claims dismissed (ECF 159). In later memoranda (ECF 162, 163), plaintiff concedes these claims fail but then subsequently retracts that concession (ECF 166). In any event, plaintiff's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment claims fail on the merits.
The Sixth Amendment creates rights in criminal prosecutions, including a right to counsel that is “fundamental.” Luis v. United States, 578 U.S. 5, 11 (2016) (quoting Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963)); see also Gideon, 372 U.S. at 343 (incorporating Sixth Amendment right to counsel into the Fourteenth Amendment). Plaintiff alleges he was denied his Sixth Amendment rights during his prosecution for assault. However, plaintiff does not offer any evidence that either of the named individual defendants is responsible for any of this alleged misconduct. And even if he did, claims premised on that misconduct would cast doubt on the validity of his criminal conviction in violation of the Heck doctrine. Because plaintiff's conviction has not been “reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by issuance of a writ of habeas corpus,” plaintiff is precluded from pursuing such claims through a § 1983 action. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994); see Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 927-28 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
Therefore, Gorton and Mansoff are entitled to summary judgment on the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment claims as well.
B. Defendant Multnomah County
Any claim against Multnomah County also fails because there is no cognizable constitutional violation. There are three possible theories to hold a local government liable for an injury under § 1983, Rodriguez, 891 F.3d at 802, but they all require violation of a constitutional right. As discussed, the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment claims are Heck barred and there is no Eighth Amendment violation.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (ECF 137) should be DENIED, defendants' motion (ECF 146) should be GRANTED, and this case should be dismissed with prejudice.
SCHEDULING ORDER
These Findings and Recommendations will be referred to a district judge. Objections, if any, are due Monday, March 28, 2022. If no objections are filed, then the Findings and Recommendations will go under advisement on that date.
If objections are filed, then a response is due within 14 days after being served with a copy of the objections. When the response is due or filed, whichever date is earlier, the Findings and Recommendations will go under advisement.
NOTICE
These Findings and Recommendations are not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any Notice of Appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of a judgment.