Opinion
NO. 2013-CA-002126-MR
01-09-2015
TRAVIS L. JACKSON APPELLANT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Travis L. Jackson, pro se Owensboro, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Jack Conway Attorney General Courtney J. Hightower Frankfort, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM BARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PHILLIP R. PATTON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CR-00236
OPINION
AFFIRMING
BEFORE: MAZE, THOMPSON, AND VANMETER, JUDGES. MAZE, JUDGE: Appellant, Travis Jackson, appeals from the denial of his motion to vacate his conviction on fifty counts of Possession of Matter Portraying a Sexual Performance by a Minor. Jackson asserts that his conviction must be vacated due to various errors committed by his trial counsel, as well as evidence that was allegedly available, but unknown, to him prior to his plea and which he claims demonstrated his innocence. However, we hold that the trial court properly denied Jackson's CR 60.02 motion. We therefore affirm.
Background
On November 25, 2008, a Barren County grand jury indicted Jackson after witnesses reported seeing Jackson viewing pornographic images of children on a communal computer and after Jackson admitted in interrogation to viewing and possessing the pictures. On May 22, 2009, following the exchange of extensive discovery which included the results of a forensic investigation conducted on a computer and discs containing the offending images, Jackson entered a plea of guilty. This plea was conditioned on Jackson's ability to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress statements he made to authorities during interrogation. The trial court accepted Jackson's conditional plea and entered a Judgment of Conviction and Sentence on July 28, 2009, sentencing Jackson to five years' imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently. On direct appeal of the suppression issue, this Court remanded to the trial court for further findings; however, we ultimately affirmed Jackson's conviction and sentence in an unpublished opinion rendered in November of 2012. See Jackson v. Commonwealth, 2011-CA-001228-MR (Ky. App. 2012).
On December 20, 2011, Jackson filed a motion pursuant to CR 60.02, asserting a litany issues surrounding his case, including his plea and his trial counsel's alleged errors or omissions throughout. The motion attacked the statements of investigators, the conduct of the prosecutor and trial court, his trial counsel's efforts, and the actions of those with whom Jackson lived and whom he believed framed him. Throughout Jackson's motion, he maintained that an unknown individual accessed his computer account and committed the acts to which he eventually pleaded guilty.
Following several additional pro se motions from Jackson, and after this Court's affirmation of the trial court's decision on the suppression issue, on October 9, 2013, the trial court denied all of Jackson's pending motions, including his request for CR 60.02 relief. This appeal follows.
We review the denial of a CR 60.02 motion for an abuse of discretion. See Parrish v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 675, 677 (Ky. 2009) (citing Barnett v. Commonwealth, 979 S.W.2d 98, 102 (Ky. 1998)). Hence, we will reverse such a denial only if it was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles. See Clark v. Commonwealth, 223 S.W.3d 90, 95 (Ky. 2007) (citing Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999)).
Jackson's CR 60.02 motion raises several alleged grounds for relief. He expressly brought his motion under subsections (e) and (f) of that rule which permits a court to relieve a party from a final judgment if,
(e) the judgment is void, or has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (f) any other reason of an extraordinary nature justifying relief.
"The structure provided in Kentucky for attacking the final judgment of a trial court in a criminal case is not haphazard and overlapping, but is organized and complete. That structure is set out in the rules related to direct appeals, in RCr 11.42, and thereafter in CR 60.02." Sanders v. Commonwealth, 339 S.W.3d 427, 437 (Ky. 2011) (quoting Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Ky. 1983)) (emphasis in original). The rule is not intended as merely an additional opportunity to raise claims which could and should have been raised in prior proceedings, but, rather, "is for relief that is not available by direct appeal and not available under RCr 11.42." Id. "In order to be eligible for CR 60.02 relief, the movant must demonstrate why he is entitled to this special, extraordinary relief." Id. (quoting Barnett, 979 S.W.2d at 101) (emphasis in original).
Jackson's request for extraordinary relief from his conviction is based almost exclusively on the conduct and decisions of his trial counsel. Jackson attempts to argue that he only pleaded guilty because of his counsel's various errors and omissions, including counsel's alleged failure to disclose to him what he now characterizes as evidence of an alibi. These arguments are unavailable to Jackson for purposes of a collateral attack on his conviction and sentence because they could and should have been raised under RCr 11.42.
The remainder of Jackson's motion merely rehashes factual and evidentiary issues that were resolved either with his plea or on direct appeal of the suppression issue. As we stated above, CR 60.02 is not merely an additional opportunity to attack issues which could and should have been previously raised. Rather, it is intended for extraordinary situations that demand extraordinary relief. This is no such situation. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's denial of CR 60.02 relief.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Travis L. Jackson, pro se
Owensboro, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Jack Conway
Attorney General
Courtney J. Hightower
Frankfort, Kentucky