Opinion
Civ. File No. 02-1222 (PAM/RLE)
November 3, 2003
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons that follow, the Court denies Defendant's Motion.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Rhea Jackson ("Jackson") brought this lawsuit after being fired from her job at the Family Service Center (the "Center") in Maplewood, Minnesota. The Center is a homeless shelter and resource center operated by Defendant Catholic Charities. Jackson began working at the Center in October 2000 as a Shelter Worker. Less than a month later she was promoted to the position of Housing Advocate and given a raise in pay. She held the position of Housing Advocate until her employment was terminated on January 23, 2001.
Jackson's supervisor at the Center was Stedford Nelson ("Nelson"). Nelson was supervised by Sylvia Herndon ("Herndon"), and Herndon reported to Allison Boisvert ("Boisvert"). Jackson, Nelson, and Herndon are all African-Americans. Boisvert is a Native American. Jackson's problems at the Center began when Nelson hired a white woman named Rose Christensen ("Christensen") in November 2000. The parties dispute Christensen's position at the Center, but there is no dispute that she performed some of the same duties as a Shelter Worker, including having direct contact with clients of the Center and answering the Center's phones. Jackson claims that after Christensen was hired, Nelson began treating Jackson disrespectfully, refusing to answer her questions and behaving rudely toward her.
Jackson also contends that Christensen treated the Center's clients, and especially clients of color, rudely. Jackson reported Christensen's behavior to another employee, who in turn reported Jackson's allegations to Nelson and Herndon. Nelson and Herndon subsequently met with Christensen. Jackson claims that as a result of this meeting, Christensen's job duties changed and she was given less contact with the Center's clients. Christensen was not, however, terminated.
In January 2001, Nelson hired another white woman, Robin Chen ("Chen"), as his assistant. As Nelson's assistant, Chen was to be Jackson's direct supervisor. The day Chen began work, January 18, 2001, Jackson allegedly met with Nelson and told him that she "ha[d] issues with white people in positions of authority" and that she "doesn't get along well with men." (Boisvert Aff. Ex. A (e-mail from Nelson to Boisvert and Herndon).) Jackson disputes that she made these comments to Nelson. According to Catholic Charities, Boisvert, Herndon, and Nelson made the decision that day to terminate Jackson's employment. Jackson was not terminated immediately, however. Several days later, on Tuesday, January 23, 2001, Jackson became angry when she saw Christensen dispensing furniture vouchers, which Jackson thought was not Christensen's job but rather was Jackson's job. She confronted Nelson about this, and according to Jackson, Nelson dismissed her concerns. Jackson returned to her office and slammed the door. Jackson then went back to Nelson's office and demanded to know why Nelson treated black women "like dirt" but treated white women well. The incident culminated with Nelson ordering Jackson out of his office. Nelson then told Jackson to get her things and leave. Jackson received official notice of her termination in early February 2001, when a copy of a "Disciplinary Action Form" was mailed to her. (Marshall Aff. Ex. A (Jackson Dep.) at Ex. 20.) The stated reason for her termination was Jackson's "expressed inability to conduct [her] duties in an unbiased manner." (Id.)
Jackson originally brought this lawsuit pro se. She retained counsel more than six months later, and her counsel did not amend Jackson's original "statement" of the case. Thus, the specific claims Jackson raises are difficult to discern. In this Motion, both parties proceed under the assumption that Jackson has brought claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII") for disparate treatment race discrimination and for retaliation.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is proper if there are no disputed issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The Court must view the evidence and the inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Enter. Bank v. Magna Bank. 92 F.3d 743, 747 (8th Cir. 1996). However, as the United States Supreme Court has stated, "summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986).
The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Enter. Bank. 92 F.3d at 747. A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but must set forth specific facts in the record showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986); Krenik v. County of Le Sueur 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995). In employment discrimination cases, the Eighth Circuit has cautioned that summary judgment should be granted sparingly. Crawford v. Runyoa 37 F.3d 1338, 1341 (8th Cir. 1994).
Defendant contends that Jackson has pled a single-motive case and that therefore the Supreme Court's recent decision in Desert Palace. Inc. v. Costa. ___ U.S. ___, 123 S.Ct. 2148 (2003), does not apply to her claims. As this Court has held, however, the reasoning of Desert Palace is equally applicable to single-motive cases, and thus the Court will apply Desert Palace to the instant matter. Dare v. Wal-Mart Stores. Inc,. 267 F. Supp.2d 987 (D. Minn. 2003) (Magnuson, J.); see also Gonzalez v. City of Minneapolis. 267 F. Supp.2d 1004 (D. Minn. 2003) (Magnuson, J.) (applying Desert Palace to ADA claims);Skomsky v. Speedway SuperAmerica. LLC. 267 F. Supp.2d 995 (D. Minn. 2003) (Magnuson, J.) (applying Desert Palace to ADEA claims). However, even if Desert Palace did not apply to single-motive cases, the Court notes that Jackson raises both discrimination and retaliation claims. Thus, Jackson has pled a mixed-motive case and Desert Palace applies.
Desert Palace held that the burden-shifting pretext analysis of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Greea 411 U.S. 792 (1973), does not apply to mixed-motive Title VII cases. As Defendant points out, the Eighth Circuit has continued to apply theMcDonnell Douglas analysis to single-motive cases. The Eighth Circuit has explicitly declined to address whether Desert Palace alters the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis. Allen v. City of Pocahontas. 340 F.3d 551, 558 n. 5 (8th Cir. 2003). As this Court explained in Dare v. Wal-Mart Stores. Inc., the only logical reading of Desert Palace is that its holding applies to both mixed-motive and single-motive cases, and the burden-shifting of McDonnell Douglas is no longer good law.
Moreover, as a practical matter, the distinction between mixed-motive and single motive cases is truly a distinction without a difference. Indeed, all discrimination claims are mixed-motive cases, because the plaintiff offers an illegitimate motive for the adverse action and the defendant responds with at least one different, legitimate motive. Thus, the Court must consider at least two motives for the adverse action in all cases.
B. Disparate Treatment
Jackson contends that she was discriminated against in violation of Title VII in several ways. First, she contends that Christensen, a white woman, was paid more than Jackson was for a job with fewer responsibilities than Jackson's job. Next, she contends that Christensen was given "mediation" when she experienced problems at work, while Jackson was immediately terminated. Finally, she contends that her termination was racially motivated. To proceed on her claims, Jackson must first establish that genuine issues of material fact exist on each element of a prima facie case of discrimination. To establish a prima facie case, Jackson must show that "she was a member of a protected group, that she was performing her job at a level that met her employer's legitimate expectations, that she suffered an adverse employment action, and that there are facts that permit an inference of discrimination." Taylor v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 251 F.3d 735, 740 (8th Cir. 2001). "[A]n inference of discrimination may be drawn from evidence that a plaintiff was treated less favorably than other similarly situated employees who are not in the protected class."Id. (citing Breeding v. Arthur J. Gallagher Co., 164 F.3d 1151, 1156 (8th Cir. 1999)). There is no dispute that Jackson is a member of a protected group and that she suffered an adverse employment action.
Defendant asserts that Jackson cannot establish the remaining two elements of her prima facie case. First, Defendant contends that Jackson was not meeting the legitimate expectations of her employer because she stated that she had a problem with white women in positions of authority and had trouble working with men. It is certainly true that an employee's ability to get along with others is a legitimate employment expectation. However, in this case there is a dispute as to whether Jackson actually made the comments Nelson attributed to her. Defendant argues that Jackson has no explanation for why Nelson would "make up" these statements. On a motion for summary judgment, however, this is not the relevant standard. At this stage, the Court is bound to construe the evidence in the light most favorable to Jackson and may not resolve issues of credibility. If a jury believes that Jackson did not make the statements, that jury could conclude that Jackson was in fact meeting Defendant's legitimate expectations.
Defendant argues that Jackson's insubordination is further evidence that she was not meeting Defendant's legitimate expectations. Again, there is some dispute as to exactly what occurred on the day Jackson was fired. Moreover, in responding to Jackson's retaliation claim, Defendant maintains that the decision to terminate Jackson was made on January 18, 2001. Jackson's alleged insubordination did not occur until January 23, 2001. If the decision to fire Jackson was made on January 18, 2001, then her alleged insubordination on January 23 is irrelevant to whether she was meeting Defendant's legitimate expectations as of January 18. Jackson has at least raised a question of fact as to whether she was meeting Defendant's legitimate expectations at the time Defendant decided to terminate her employment.
Defendant next argues that Jackson cannot show that any similarly situated white employee was treated differently than she was. In response, Jackson points to the treatment that Christensen, a white woman, received. Jackson contends that Christensen was verbally abusive toward the Center's clients, and particularly toward clients who were not white. Christensen was not fired for this behavior, however. Instead, she received a "mediation" and a change in her job duties. In contrast, Jackson was terminated for allegedly making statements to her boss that reflected a biased attitude. Jackson also contends that Christensen's pay was higher than Jackson's pay, despite the fact that Christensen's job had fewer responsibilities than Jackson's job.
Defendant asserts that the treatment of Christensen is not relevant to whether Jackson has established a prima facie case of disparate treatment discrimination. According to Defendant, Christensen had a different job than Jackson and did not act in an insubordinate manner. Thus, Defendant argues, Christensen was not similarly situated to Jackson. See Clark v. Runyoa 218 F.3d 915, 918 (8th Cir. 2000). However, both Jackson and Christensen were responsible for interacting with clients and answering the Center's phones. Both Jackson and Christensen were accused of racially biased behavior, but while Jackson was terminated, Christensen was not. Jackson has raised a question of fact as to whether Christensen was similarly situated to Jackson with respect to the treatment each received for alleged job problems, and thus, for the purposes of this Motion, Jackson has established the elements of her prima facie case on her claims arising out of her termination.
Jackson has not established a prima facie case, however, on her claim that Christensen was paid more than Jackson. The only evidence Jackson has of this allegation is her own assertions. Defendant contends that Christensen was actually paid less than Jackson. Absent some evidence to rebut Defendant's assertions, Jackson has not come forward with evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact on her claim arising out of the alleged salary disparity.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Desert Palace, the Court would have proceeded to analyze whether Jackson presented direct or indirect evidence of a discriminatory motive with respect to her termination. If Jackson had no direct evidence of such a motive, then the Court would determine whether the legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for Jackson's termination was in fact a pretext for illegal discrimination.See McDonnell Douglas. 411 U.S. at 802. Desert Palace overruled the direct/indirect evidence distinction, however, and instructed courts to instead focus on the requirements of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 states that a plaintiff satisfies its burden of proof when she "demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). In response, a defendant may avoid having to pay damages by proving an affirmative defense that it "would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). Thus, instead of requiring the defendant to produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason and then shifting the burden of proof to plaintiff to prove that this proffered nondiscriminatory reason was false and a pretext for a discriminatory motive, the defendant bears the burden of proof on the "same decision test."Dare v. Wal-Mart Stores. Inc., 267 F. Supp.2d 987, 990 (D. Minn. 2003) (Magnuson, J.). In other words, once Jackson establishes her prima facie case, the burden shifts to Defendant to prove that ? would have made the same decision absent the alleged discrimination. At this stage of the litigation, this means that Jackson's disparate treatment claim arising out of her termination survives summary judgment. A jury will determine whether Jackson was in fact discriminated against, and Defendant may at that time put forward evidence on the "same decision test."
C. Retaliation
Jackson's second claim is that her termination was retaliation in violation of Title Vn. Title VII makes ? unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee "because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this title [ 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17], or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this title [ 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17]." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, Jackson must demonstrate that she engaged in a statutorily protected activity, that she suffered an adverse employment action, and that there was a causal connection between the adverse employment action and the protected activity. Stevens v. St. Lows Univ. Med. Ctr., 97 F.3d 268, 270 (8th Cir. 1996); see also Coffman 141 F.3d at 1245. If Jackson establishes a prima facie case, then the holding of Desert Palace applies and the burden shifts to Defendant to prove that it would have made terminated Jackson even if she had not engaged in the protected activity. See Smith v. Riceland Foods. Inc., 151 F.3d 813, 818 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that retaliation claims are analyzed under the same framework as disparate treatment claims under Title VII); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(2)(B).
Defendant contends that Jackson cannot establish the elements of her prima facie case because she cannot show that she engaged in statutorily protected activity, and she cannot show that there is a causal connection between the alleged protected activity and Jackson's termination.
1. Protected Activity
In relevant part, Title VII provides that an employer may not discriminate against an employee "because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII]." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Jackson argues that her confrontation with Nelson on January 23, 2001, in which she asked him why he treated black women like dirt but treated white women well, constitutes statutorily protected activity under this subsection. Taken in the light most favorable to Jackson, her discussion with Nelson could be construed as opposing racial discrimination, which is undisputedly "an unlawful employment practice" under Title VII. While the Court has doubts about whether Jackson can convince a jury that yelling at a supervisor indeed constitutes protected activity, it is bound to construe the facts in the light most favorable to Jackson. In that light, Jackson has established that questions of fact remain as to whether she engaged in statutorily protected activity.
2. Causal Connection
Defendant maintains that Jackson cannot establish the requisite causal connection between her alleged protected activity and her termination because the decision to terminate her was made five days before she engaged in the allegedly protected activity. As noted previously, Defendant's claims about Jackson's termination are inconsistent. For the purposes of her disparate treatment claim, Defendant contends that Jackson was fired both for allegedly making biased comments to Nelson and for allegedly being insubordinate to Nelson. For the purposes of Jackson's retaliation claim, however, Defendant asserts that Jackson was fired solely for allegedly making biased comments to Nelson. This inconsistency leads the Court to conclude that genuine issues of fact remain on the causal connection between Jackson's allegedly protected activity and her termination. If Defendant can prove that the decision to terminate Jackson's employment was made before Jackson's confrontation with Nelson on January 23, 2001, then Jackson's retaliation claim will fail. The initial burden, of course, will be on Jackson to prove that she engaged in statutorily protected activity and was terminated as a result of that activity. The burden will then shift to Defendant to rebut Jackson's evidence on protected activity and causation, or to show that it would have decided to terminate her even if she had not engaged in the allegedly protected activity. CONCLUSION
Jackson has succeeded in raising genuine issues of material fact on her claims. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Clerk Doc. No. 23) is DENIED.