Opinion
09-23-2016
Vincent JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. ABRAMS, FENSTERMAN, FENSTERMAN, FLOWERS, GREENBERG & EISMAN, LLP, Defendant.
David C. Wims, Esq., Law Office of David Wims, Brooklyn, attorneys for plaintiff. Frank Seddio, Esq., Abrams, Fensterman, et al., Brooklyn, Sharon Stiller, Esq., Abrams, Fensterman, et al., Rochester, attorneys for defendant.
David C. Wims, Esq., Law Office of David Wims, Brooklyn, attorneys for plaintiff.
Frank Seddio, Esq., Abrams, Fensterman, et al., Brooklyn, Sharon Stiller, Esq., Abrams, Fensterman, et al., Rochester, attorneys for defendant.
KATHERINE A. LEVINE, J.
This case comes before this Court on defendant law firm Abrams, Fensterman, et al.(“defendant” or “law firm”) motion for reconsideration. As one of its arguments, defendant contends that plaintiff Vincent Jackson (“plaintiff” or “Jackson”) cannot be considered an employee under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). For the reasons stated below, this Court grants defendant's motion reconsideration and its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
By decision dated January 12, 2016, this Court granted defendant partial summary judgment dismissing Jackson's claims under both the New York State Human Rights Law (“State HRL”), N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290 et seq. ; and the New York City Human Rights Law (“City HRL”), NYC Admin. Code §§ 8–101 et seq. The Court found that the law firm's managing partner Howard Fensterman (“Fensterman”), rather than the firm, was plaintiff's actual employer under the State and City HRLs, and that as a personal chauffeur to Fensterman, plaintiff performed the type of domestic service excluded from the definition of employee pursuant to Exec. Law § 292(6). This Court also addressed, for the first time, plaintiff's claim that the law firm improperly terminated him as a chauffeur/driver after he was hospitalized to insert a stent, in violation of the Family Medical and Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq. The Court noted that this case presented the novel issue of whether the work that Jackson performed solely for Fensterman, who was not individually sued, might still be attributable to the firm since Fensterman was the managing partner and principal of the firm.
See, Jackson v. Abrams, et al., 52 Misc.3d 183, 29 N.Y.S.3d 91 (Civil Ct., Kings Co.2016) (“Jackson II ”).
See, Jackson v. Abrams, Fensterman, 2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 50285U, 42 Misc.3d 1230(A), 2014 WL 804158 (Civil Ct., Kings Co.2014) ( “Jackson I ”).
There is no legally cognizable cause of action against Fensterman under the FMLA, since Fensterman, as an individual, did not employ 50 or more workers.
The Court first found that the definition of an employer under the FMLA was broader than under the HRL as it included the term “any person who acts, directly or indirectly, in the interest of an employer to any of the employees of such employer.” See, 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i)–(iii). The FMLA and the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) contain equivalent definitions of employer, and the Department of Labor Regulations interpreting the FMLA (29 C.F.R. § 825.104(d) ) stated that the courts should look to the FLSA (29 U.S.C. § 201 –219 ) for guidance in construing the term “employer” under the FMLA. Cf. Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 77 fn15 (2nd Cir.2003) (Given this identical language, the courts, in determining whether a joint employment relationship exists under FMLA, borrow directly from the FLSA's joint employment case law). The Court then noted that the courts have adopted an expansive interpretation of the term employer with “striking breadth” under the FLSA. Guobadia v. Irowa, 103 F.Supp.3d 325, 337 (E.D.N.Y.2015), citing to Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. V. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326, 112 S.Ct. 1344, 117 L.Ed.2d 581 (1992) ; Falk v. Brennan, 414 U.S. 190, 195, 94 S.Ct. 427, 38 L.Ed.2d 406 (1973) ; Herman v. RSR Servs. Ltd., 172 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir.1999) ; Johnson v. AP Products, 934 F.Supp. 625, 628 (S.D.N.Y.1996), and that exemptions from FLSA coverage are “to be narrowly construed against the employers seeking to assert them.” Hallissey v. Am. Online, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12964 at 14 (S.D.N.Y.2006).
This Court then cited to the “economic realities” test, employed by the Second Circuit, under which a number of factors are considered in determining whether an entity is an employer, including whether the alleged employer (1) had the power to hire and terminate the employee; (2) supervised and controlled the employee's work schedule or conditions of employment; (3) set the rate and method of payment; and (4) maintained employment records. See, Herman v. RSR Sec. Servs., supra, 172 F.3d at 139 ; Housel v, Rochester Inst. Of Technology, 6 F.Supp.3d 294, 315 (W.D.N.Y.2014) ; Noia v. Orthopedic Assocs of Long Island, 93 F.Supp.3d 13, 16–17 (E.D.N.Y.2015) ; Singh v. New York State Dept. of Taxation and Finance, 911 F.Supp.2d 223, 232 (W.D.N.Y.2012). Under the economic realities test, the totality of the circumstances must be considered to “avoid having the test confined to a narrow legalistic definition.” Herman, 172 F.3d at 139. See, Astudillo v. U.S. News & World Report, 2005 WL 23185 at *1–2, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92 at *4 (S.D.N.Y.2005). While no single factor is controlling (Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., Inc., 355 F.3d 61, 72 (2d Cir.2003) ), the overarching consideration is whether the entity “possessed the power to control the worker in question.” Herman v. RSR Sec. Servs., 172 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir.1999). See, Jacqueline Astudillo v. U.S. News & World Report & Zuckerman, 2004 WL 2075179, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18685 (S.D.N.Y.2004). Day-to-day personnel decisions and the authority to make determinations related to leave under an employer's own policies or the FMLA are also relevant. Singh v. New York State Dept., supra 911 F.Supp.2d at 242.
This Court then reviewed the closest case on point to the instant matter, Astudillo v. U.S. News & World Report, 2004 WL 2075179, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18685 (S.D.N.Y.2004) where the court considered whether a corporate defendant was an “employer” under the FMLA even though the employee was hired to perform domestic services for an individual who owned many corporate entities. See Jackson II, 52 Misc.3d at 192, 29 N.Y.S.3d 91. Zuckerman, through his executive assistant Osborne, hired plaintiff (Astudillo) to work as his personal assistant and house manager in his private residence. Osborne was both a personal and professional assistant to Zuckerman and received two checks—one from Zuckerman and the other from U.S. World News for his work in two capacities. Astudillo admitted that she performed many domestic functions at the private home including “ordering Zuckerman's medications, fixing fruit bowls, walking his dog, making beds ...” Id. 2004 WL 2075179 at *1, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18685 at *3. However, she also acted as Zuckerman's “receptionist” by answering his phones, recording messages for him, keeping files of those messages and confirming his schedule.” Id. Similar to the instant case, Zuckerman initially paid plaintiff with a personal check but then plaintiff began to receive her paychecks from U.S. News. Id. 2004 WL 2075179 at *1–2, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18685 at *4. Zuckerman also asserted that it was “an administrative decision” to pay his household staff from corporate accounts and that he personally reimbursed two of his corporations for his residence staff salaries. Id. 2004 WL 2075179 at *1–2, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18685 at *4.
Without ruling on U.S. News' argument that plaintiff's maintenance on the corporate payroll was purely ministerial, the court focused on the whether U.S. News did, in fact, exercise a degree of control over plaintiff's employment since plaintiff requested and was granted maternity leave from U.S. News under its family leave policy. Id. 2004 WL 2075179 at *3, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18685 at *10. Furthermore, plaintiff received some of her instructions from Osborne who worked for and was paid by U.S. World News. Id. 2004 WL 2075179 at *3, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18685 at *11. These factors led the court to conclude that there were material issues of fact concerning whether U.S. News was her employer under the FMLA. Id.
Based upon the Astudillo case, this Court concluded that under the economics realities test, a genuine issue of fact still exists as to whether the firm is Jackson's employer under the FMLA. Jackson, II, supra, 52 Misc.3d at 192, 29 N.Y.S.3d 91. The record developed to date was not clear as to whether Fensterman always exercised control over Jackson in his capacity as a private entity as opposed to as the principal of the firm. It appeared that at least one of the activities that Fensterman had plaintiff perform on the job could be construed as directly accruing to the interest of defendant firm. Fensterman's primary responsibilities are the “running the business affairs of the law firm” and some litigation. Furthermore, Fensterman explicitly stated in his deposition that one of his responsibilities as managing partner is to ensure that the firm is paid. He would call clients and if the clients were not paying him he would “literally personally ... go in my car and pick up a check. So instead of me going to pick up the check. I would tell Lloyd (what he called plaintiff) to go pick up the check for me.” [Dep. 40–41] Fensterman then seemed to modify this declaration by stating that “he never ultimately—there was some contemplation—because he was sitting in his car all day while he was working for me out in front of the building.” Id. Additionally, similar to Astudillo case, Fensterman transmitted instructions to Jackson at times through Lorraine Takesky who had a dual role at the firm, as both the firm and his personal comptroller.
As managing partner, Fensterman apparently did not have to obtain permission from the firm to give Jackson health insurance. Nor did he ever discuss with the partners the financial arrangements he made with Jackson prior to employing him, including that the firm pay part of Jackson's salary and his health insurance. The Court took at face value Fensterman's generosity in deciding to have the firm pay part of Jackson's salary so that Jackson could also be covered by the firm's medical insurance policy, and also his decision to have Jackson's health insurance extended under COBRA for two and a half months. These factors, standing alone, would not make the firm Jackson's employer. 52 Misc.3d at 193, 29 N.Y.S.3d 91.
This Court concluded that until the record is clarified as to whether Jackson performed some work for Fensterman in his capacity as managing partner, and whether this work directly benefitted the firm, it could not rule on the summary judgment motion seeking dismissal on the ground that the firm is not an employer under the FMLA. As such, this Court directed that this matter proceed to a hearing on this narrowly framed issue wherein the parties would also clarify who, if anyone at the firm filled out the Department of Labor Unemployment Insurance Division forms. 52 Misc.3d at 193–94, 29 N.Y.S.3d 91.
Defendant moved for reconsideration/reargument on the sole remaining claim regarding the FMLA and, upon reargument, for summary judgment because “the firm cannot be considered to be Jackson's employer and cannot be held liable under the FMLA as a matter of law.” Plaintiff opposed this motion and cross moved for reconsideration of that part of the Court's decision which dismissed the claims brought under the City and State HRLs. This Court denied plaintiff's motion at the onset of the hearing.Defendant set forth a plethora of arguments concerning why the Astudillo case was distinguishable and why, under any reading of the facts, the firm did not exercise control over Jackson's work. However, this Court need not revisit the issue of whether Fensterman, while acting in his capacity as managing partner of the firm, was an agent or alterego of the firm when he directed Jackson to perform work that inured to the benefit of the firm. In its brief and during oral argument, defendant asserted that as a matter of law, Jackson cannot be considered an “employee” for FMLA purposes, since neither he nor Fensterman asserted in their EBTs that Jackson worked the requisite number of hours to even be eligible for FMLA purposes.
To be an “eligible employee” under the FMLA, an employee must have been employed “(i) for at least twelve months by the employer with respect to whom leave is requested ... and (ii) for at least 1,250 hours of service with such employer during the previous 12–month period.” 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A). Smith v. Westchester County, et al., 769 F.Supp.2d 448, 465 (S.D.N.Y.2011). See also, Woodford v. Community Action of Greene CTY., Inc., 268 F.3d 51, 54 (2d Cir.2001). Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(d), the “determination of whether an employee ... [is eligible] must be made as of the date the FMLA leave is to start.” “Eligibility is a threshold issue” and it is insufficient for a plaintiff to “merely assert in a conclusory manner that he is eligible without stating any facts that relate to the definition of an eligible employee.” Spurlock v. NYNEX, 949 F.Supp. 1022, 1033 (W.D.N.Y.1996) ; Smith v. Westchester County, supra, 769 F.Supp.2d at 465. Simply alleging that the employee was “employed full-time” is not enough to establish the 1,250 hour requirement. Simmons v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., No. 96–CV–3414, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12170, 2001 WL 984905, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 6, 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).
During the hearing this Court inquired what proportion of an employee's work during the 12 month period must be non-exempt, i.e. work for the employer which is covered under the Act, in order for the employee to accrue the requisite 1250 hours of service. Although there are no cases brought under the FMLA that specifically address this issue, guidance can be garnered from the few cases decided under the FLSA. In drafting the FMLA, Congress adopted by cross-reference the definition of “employee” in the FLSA. Alexander v. Avera St. Luke's Hosp., 768 F.3d 756, 763 (8th Cir.2014). 29 U.S.C. § 2611(3) of the FMLA provides that for purposes of the FMLA, the terms “employ” and “employee” have the same meaning as given in 29 U.S.C. § 203(e) and (g), the definitions section of the FLSA. See, Mendel v. City of Gibraltar, 727 F.3d 565, 569 (6th Cir.2013). The FLSA generally defines “employee” as “any individual employed by an employer.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1).
The FMLA also refers to the FLSA in order to determine whether an employee meets the hours of service requirements contained in the FMLA. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(c) provides that the “legal standards established under section 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. § 207 ) shall apply” in determining whether an employee has met FMLA hours of service requirements. See, Donnelly v. Greenburgh Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 7, 691 F.3d 134 141–142(2d Cir.2012) ; Mutchler v. Dunlap Mem'l Hosp., 485 F.3d 854, 857 (6th Cir.2007) (“In calculating the ‘hours of service,’ the Act [FMLA] incorporates by reference the legal standards set forth in § 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 207 ”). While neither the FMLA nor the FLSA actually define the term “hours of service,” the FMLA's implementing regulations clarify that “[t]he determining factor is the number of hours an employee has worked for the employer within the meaning of the FLSA ....any accurate accounting of actual hours worked under FLSA's principles may be used.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(c)(1) (emphasis added). See, Saulsberry v. Fed. Express Corp., 552 Fed.Appx. 424, 429 (6th Cir.2014) ; Plumley v. S. Container, Inc., 303 F.3d 364, 372 (1st Cir.2002) (looking to FLSA § 207, court held that “hours of service” as used in the FMLA, “include only those hours actually worked in the service and at the gain of the employer”).
Given the aforementioned paradigm, the Court must look at the most analogous sections of the FLSA in order to determine what proportion of Jackson's work during the 12 month period had to be non-exempt in order for him to accrue 1250 eligible hours for FMLA coverage. The FLSA mandates that hourly workers be compensated at a rate one and one-half times the regular rate for hours worked in excess of forty hours per workweek. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). The FLSA contains a similar exemption for domestic workers. Fezard v. United Cerebral Palsy of Cent. Ark., 2014 WL 11516094, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188434 (E.D.Ark.2014) ; Anu Upadhyay v. Neeraj Sethi, et al, 848 F.Supp.2d 439 (S.D.N.Y.2012). In 1974, Congress extended the FLSA to include persons employed in domestic service in a household, but exempted certain domestic service employees from its minimum wage and overtime protection where said employees provided companionship services for individuals who were “unable to care for themselves.” 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15) (“companionship services exemption”). See, Fezard, supra, 2014 WL 11516094 at *2–3, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188434 at *5–6. Clopton v. TSS, Inc., 2011 WL 346478, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10196 (D.Kansas 2011). While the statute itself does not define these terms, the Department of Labor regulations define “domestic service employment” as “services of a household nature performed by an employee in or about a private home (permanent or temporary) of the person by whom he or she is employed.” 29 C.F.R. § 552.3. The regulations list as illustrative of this category valets, butlers, housekeepers, and caretakers. Id. See, Upadhyay v. Sethi, supra at 442. This exemption might also include drivers. See, De Veyra Palana v. Mission Bay Inc., 2015 WL 4110432, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88091 (N.D.Cal.2015)
There appears to be only one case which addresses what percentage of time an exempt employee must work in a non-exempt capacity in order to be covered by the FLSA. In Upadhyay v. Sethi, supra, the plaintiff was hired by the Sethis as a live-in domestic service employee whose responsibilities included a panoply of activities normally considered to be exempt from the FLSA, and the performance of massage therapy upon Mr. Sethi. Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that she was owed unpaid wages under both the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the FLSA. While not disagreeing that she was prima facie covered by the domestic services exemption, since she performed household work in a private household where she was a resident, plaintiff contended that the massage work she performed for the Sethis was not of a “household nature” and hence not exempt from FLSA coverage. She also argued that if she performed any non-exempt work during a given week, then all of the work she performed during the week had to be treated as non-exempt. 848 F.Supp.2d at 442.
See also, the Department of Labor Regulation's definition of “companionship services,” as services providing fellowship care and protection of a person who cannot care for his own needs Such services may include household work related to the care of the aged or infirm person and may also include the performance of general household work: “Provided however, that such work is incidental, i.e., does not exceed 20 percent of the total weekly hours worked” 29 C.F.R. § 552.6. (emphasis added). See, Clopton v. TSS, Inc., supra, Fowler v. Incor, 279 Fed.Appx. 590, 600 (10th Cir.2008)
After ruling that massage therapy, regardless of where it is performed, does not constitute “domestic service,” Id., the court found that plaintiff's performance of some non-domestic services “does not necessitate that all of her work be treated as non-exempt.” Id. at 442. The court first found that the so called “default rule” under the FLSA (29 C.F.R. § 780.11 ), which provides that if an employee in the same workweek performs both exempt and non exempt work under the FLSA, then he is considered non-exempt, was inapplicable. While the default rule utilized the term generic term “employee,” the court found that since it was included within Part 780, which pertains only to employees engaged in agricultural work and work incidental thereto, it was inapplicable to domestic workers. Therefore, there was “no regulatory basis on which to deem a workweek that otherwise falls with the domestic services exemption non-exempt because of the performance of some non-exempt work.” Id. at 443. See also, 29 C.F.R. § 780.00, “Purpose of interpretative bulletins in this part” which limits that section's meaning and applicability to the exemption of “certain employees from the minimum wage or overtime pay requirements ... when employed in the agriculture or in certain related activities ... with respect to agricultural commodities.”
The court also held that there was no judicial basis upon which to extend the default rule to non-agricultural exemptions. Id. at 443. The Second Circuit never addressed the issue and the two unpublished district court decisions adopting plaintiff's decision consisted of either one single citation to an agricultural case (Marshall v. Intraworld Commodities Corp. 79 Civ. 918, 1980 WL 2097, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13325 (E.D.N.Y.1980) or contained no comprehensive discussion (Astudillo v. U.S. News, supra at 7–8 where the court cited three cases from other circuits for the general proposition that “(w)here an employee performs both exempt and non-exempt duties, all of the work is treated as non-exempt”)). The Upadhyay Court then declared that it was not bound to proceed by these decisions. Id. at 443. Rather, looking to the wording of 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(21), which provides that “any employee who is employed in domestic service in a household and who resides in such household” is exempt from the overtime provisions, the relevant inquiry was “whether plaintiff engaged in so much non-domestic-service work that she is not fairly characterized as having been “employed in domestic service. ” Id. (Emphasis added).
The complaint included a laundry list of domestic and childcare duties for which plaintiff was responsible seven days a week and noted that “she performed massage therapy as part of those responsibilities several times a week.” Id. at 443–44. The court found that the frequency with which plaintiff performed the massage work for defendants was “insignificant” in comparison to the total amount of time she performed the multitude of domestic tasks she was required to perform” Id. at 444. The court concluded that “a deminimus amount of work that does not fall within the ambit of the domestic service” should not disqualify an employer for utilizing the protections afforded by the FLSA. Id. As an example, which aptly applies to the instant matter, the court noted that had the plaintiff dropped off a package for Dr. Sethi, “a normal favor for someone in plaintiff's position, that small act would not have warranted recharacterizing an entire week's worth of her work” Id. at 444.
Jackson does not dispute this Court's finding that his primary duties were to drive Fensterman back and forth from work and take him to appointments during the day, all of which fell within the realm of a personal chauffeur. In fact, during oral argument on the motion for reconsideration, plaintiff's counsel conceded that Jackons's collection of checks for the firm constituted a minute portion of the otherwise exempt work that he performed for Fensterman. Additionally, plaintiff's counsel admitted during oral argument, and plaintiff's deposition clearly revealed that he rarely performed any xeroxing work for Lorraine Tetsky. As such, plaintiff has failed to prove that he engaged in so much work for the firm that he could not fairly be characterized as having been employed as a personal chauffeur for Mr Fensterman. Thus, any work that Jackson performed that inured to the benefit of the firm was incidental to his overall work as the personal chauffeur to Fensterman and, under the aforementioned FLSA precedent, it is impossible for Jackson to prove that he met the requirement of having worked 1250 hours for a qualified employer—i.e. the firm. He therefore is exempt from coverage under the FMLA and the Court must grant defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint in its entirety.