Nor, for that matter, do the other cases cited by appellant. The easement agreement in Jabour v. Toppino , 293 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974) stated expressly that the agreement was a personal one, revocable by the grantor. In Walters v. McCall , 450 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), an easement granting a footpath to the beach provided that it was "solely for the benefit of the owner or owners" of the dominant parcel.

Moreover, the question of whether an instrument creates a license or easement is determined by the intent of the parties. Jabour v. Toppino, 293 So.2d 123, 126 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). As both parties agreed at oral argument, it is clear that the Developer intended to create an easement that granted the Vendor the exclusive right to provide beach services. Typically, an easement contains the following five elements: (1) it grants an incorporeal right; (2) it is imposed on corporeal property; (3) it does not entitle the holder to profit from the land; (4) it benefits a corporeal property; and (5) it involves a dominant and servient estate.

Of course, the mere fact that an agreement is entitled a “license” or contains a conclusory provision that the parties have a relationship of licensor and licensee, is not determinative. Rather, the proper characterization of the agreement is discerned by the actual terms, conditions, rights and obligations expressly set forth in the agreement. See e.g., Jabour v. Toppino, 293 So.2d 123 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); Napoleon v. Glass, 229 So.2d 883 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969).Ryan v. Nat'l Marine Mfrs. Ass'n, 103 So.3d 1001, 1005 n. 5 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012).

Of course, the mere fact that an agreement is entitled a “license” or contains a conclusory provision that the parties have a relationship of licensor and licensee, is not determinative. Rather, the proper characterization of the agreement is discerned by the actual terms, conditions, rights and obligations expressly set forth in the agreement. See e.g., Jabour v. Toppino, 293 So.2d 123 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); Napoleon v. Glass, 229 So.2d 883 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969). Although the Agreement does not expressly provide that NMMA has “exclusive” use and possession of the property, see Outdoor Media of Pensacola, Inc. v. Santa Rosa Cnty., 554 So.2d 613, 616 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (determining that the subject agreement was a lease because the county granted the company “an exclusive right to place signs on county rights of way for a three-year period”), neither are we obliged to reach such a conclusion in order to determine (as we do) that the provisions of the Agreement described above sufficiently establish that, during the term of the Agreement, NMMA was “controlling an interest” in the property.

See Dupont, 721 So.2d at 1263; Brown. If the language of an agreement reflects that the grantor can revoke permissive rights under certain circumstances, the agreement can typically be no more than a license. See Jabour v. Toppino, 293 So.2d 123, 127 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). Because the 1954 agreement fits this definition, it is a license. The more important subset of this discussion concerns whether the license became irrevocable at some time before Mr. and Mrs. Blasky rescinded the license in 1998, because of some inequity that would result to the licensee.

Trial courts are required to honor the express intentions of parties to an easement. See Kotick v. Durrant, 143 Fla. 386, 196 So. 802 (1940); Richardson v. Deerwood Club, Inc., 589 So.2d 937 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Avery Dev. Corp. v. Village by the Sea Condominium Apts., Inc., 567 So.2d 447 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); Walters v. McCall, 450 So.2d 1139 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Jabour v. Toppino, 293 So.2d 123 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); Claughton Hotels, Inc. v. City of Miami, 140 So.2d 608 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962), cert. denied, 146 So.2d 750 (Fla. 1962). The Royals' reliance on the Cartish case is misplaced.

Mr. Balfe testified that he was willing to let the nursing home use his land because "we made an agreement that [the nursing home manager] could use that property until such time as we sold it"; however, the license expressly limited use to the nursing home patients. See Jabour v. Tobbino, 293 So.2d 123, 126 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974) (quoting Burdine v. Sewell, 92 Fla. 375, 390, 109 So. 648, 654 (1926)) ("`Where the parties have fully manifested an intention to limit the duration of the right of passage, it is the duty of the courts to enforce that limitation and not to disregard it by giving a perpetual right where only a determinable one was intended.'"). Furthermore, G J offered no evidence of the expenses incurred in building the slab. G J's records were destroyed in a fire in 1974.

Moreover, a contract may operate as a grant of an easement if it is necessary to give the agreement that affect in order to carry out the parties' intent. Kingdon v. Walker, 156 So.2d 208 (Fla.2d DCA 1963); Jabour v. Toppino, 293 So.2d 123 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). In the case sub judice, it is the October 1975 Agreement and companion Lease (which we have noted incorporated by reference the terms and conditions of the 1965 original lease) that would form the basis of any possible express easements.

, which (a) gave to Consolidated "an exclusive franchise" to "install and maintain gas tanks, gas lines, appliances and appurtenances" in the developed subdivision did not create an easement or property right in the land enforceable by Consolidated against City Gas Company, see Colen v. Sunhaven Homes, Inc., 98 So.2d 501 (Fla. 1957); Leonard v. Baylen Street Wharf Co., 59 Fla. 547, 52 So. 718 (1910); St. Joe Natural Gas Co. v. City of Ward Ridge, 265 So.2d 714 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972); North Dade Water Co. v. Florida State Turnpike Authority, 114 So.2d 458 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959); G.W. Thompson, Thompson On Real Property § 295 at 644 (1980 replacement); see generally Loxahatchee Recreation, Inc. v. Harrison, 367 So.2d 237 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979), and (b) gave to Consolidated a " perpetual right-of-way easement" did not create an " exclusive right-of-way easement," see Holbrook v. Telesio, 225 Cal.App. 152, 37 Cal.Rptr. 153 (1964) (the grant of an exclusive easement must be clearly stated); see also Jabour v. Toppino, 293 So.2d 123 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); Claughton Hotels, Inc. v. City of Miami, 140 So.2d 608 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962); and (2) in the absence of an easement specifically and clearly stated to be exclusive, City Gas Company of Florida, a public utility granted statutory easement rights, is privileged to use the servient land in any manner not inconsistent with the limited use vested in the easement owner, cf. City of Pasadena v. California-Michigan Light Water Co., 17 Cal.2d 576, 110 P.2d 983 (1941) (grant to city of non-exclusive easement for the installation of water pipes did not preclude grant to another water company of similar rights in easement). Affirmed.