Opinion
A179953
11-15-2023
J. S., Petitioner-Respondent, v. Jonas HUDGINS, Respondent-Appellant.
R. Brady Williams fled the brief for appellant. J. S. fled the brief pro se. Also on the brief was J. S.
This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
Submitted July 7, 2023.
Deschutes County Circuit Court 22SK03027; Michelle A. McIver, Judge.
R. Brady Williams fled the brief for appellant.
J. S. fled the brief pro se. Also on the brief was J. S.
Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Powers, Judge, and Hellman, Judge.
HELLMAN, J.
Respondent appeals from the trial court's entry of a civil stalking protective order (SPO) against him under ORS 30.866. In his assignment of error, respondent contends that the trial court erred when it determined that the statutory requirements for an SPO were satisfied. Specifically, he argues that there were not repeated contacts as required by ORS 30.866 because the only contacts alleged-three of his text messages-were constitutionally protected speech under Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution. As explained below, we reverse.
In civil stalking cases, we ordinarily refer to the parties by their designation in the trial court. J. D. K. v. W. T. F., 276 Or.App. 533, 534 n 1, 369 P.3d 1181 (2016) (so stating).
Article I, section 8, provides, in relevant part, that "[n]o law shall be passed restraining the free expression of opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever!.]"
As a preliminary matter, we note that neither party requested de novo review and that this is not a case that warrants such review. See ORS 19.415(3)(b) (describing discretionary de novo review); ORAP 5.40(8)(c) (providing that the court will exercise its discretion to review de novo "only in exceptional cases"). Therefore, in conducting our review, '"we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the trial court's disposition and assess whether, when so viewed, the record is legally sufficient to permit that outcome.'" H. L. P. v. Jones, 309 Or.App. 108, 109, 481 P.3d 415 (2021) (quoting J. D. K. v. W. T. K, 276 Or.App. 533, 537, 369 P.3d 1181 (2016)).
On appeal, respondent argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the SPO. We agree. We considered the same facts in a related case, also decided today, concerning petitioner's husband, J. S. v. Hudgins, 329
Or App 176,P.3d(2023). In that case, we reversed petitioner's husband's SPO against respondent that was based on the same text messages at issue in this case. Id. at 177-78. Because the trial court relied on the same text messages and record to issue the SPO here, we conclude that it erred for the same reasons that we articulate in our other opinion. See id. at 180-82 (holding same in related case).
Reversed.