J. O. Partain Company v. Southern Bell Telephone

Full title: J. O. PARTAIN COMPANY INCORPORATED v. SOUTHERN BELL TELEPHONE TELEGRAPH CO

Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia

Date published: Jun 17, 1940

10 S.E.2d 304 (Ga. Ct. App. 1940)

10 S.E.2d 304

Opinion

28383.

DECIDED JUNE 17, 1940. REHEARING DENIED JULY 30, 1940.

Complaint; from Fulton civil court — appellate division. February 12, 1940. (Application to Supreme Court for certiorari.)

Winfield P. Jones, for plaintiff in error.

Burress Dillard, D. A. Pirkle Jr., contra.

Judgment for the plaintiff in a suit on account was authorized.

DECIDED JUNE 17, 1940. REHEARING DENIED JULY 30, 1940.

SUTTON, J.

The Southern Bell Telephone Telegraph Company sued J. O. Partain Co. Inc., on an account for $228.27. The itemized statement attached to the petition showed that one item of $51.72 and one for $57.32 were charged against J. O. Partain Co. Inc., one for $108.54 was billed against J. O. Partain Co., and one for $10.69 was charged to J. O. Partain Inc. The defendant filed an answer denying the indebtedness sued for. The record recites that "the plaintiff introduced oral testimony in evidence with reference to the account, and a certain contract for telephone service as sued for, as per itemized statement, with the several accounts therein specified; said contract being signed by J. O. Partain Company, by J. O. Partain. Plaintiff further introduced testimony that the amount sued for was just, due, true, and correct, and unpaid. Defendant introduced testimony to show that the accounts against J. O. Partain Company Inc. was not owing by the defendant, for the reason that said account was an account of J. O. Partain individually, doing business under the name of J. O. Partain Co., and was not the account of the defendant." Held: The judgment rendered by the judge of the civil court of Fulton County in favor of the plaintiff for the amount sued for was authorized by the evidence, and the appellate division of that court did not err in affirming the judgment.

Judgment affirmed. Stephens, P. J., concurs. Felton, J., dissents.

FELTON, J., dissenting.

Presumably the obligation to pay for services arose by virtue of the contract which the undisputed evidence shows was signed by an individual doing business in a trade-name. The obligation therefore could not possibly have been that of a corporation, in the absence of further evidence.