4. Glenn Scott enumerates as error the denial of his motion for a directed verdict on his personal liability. He argues that no evidence justified the piercing of the corporate veil so as to hold him personally liable for the breach-of-contract damages. To justify piercing the corporate veil to hold a corporate owner liable, the plaintiff must show the owner abused the corporate form by disregarding the separateness of legal entities by commingling on an interchangeable or joint basis or confusing the otherwise separate properties, records, or control. J-Mart Jewelry Outlets, Inc. v. StandardDesign, 218 Ga. App. 459, 460(1) ( 462 S.E.2d 406) (1995); see Abbott Foods of Ga., Inc. v. Elberton Poultry Co., 173 Ga. App. 672, 673(2) ( 327 S.E.2d 751) (1985). [I]t must be shown that the stockholders' disregard of the corporate entity made it a mere instrumentality for the transaction of their own affairs; that there is such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the owners no longer exist; and to adhere to the doctrine of corporate entity would promote injustice or protect fraud.
Even so, friends testified that Pursley drank additional alcohol at the club and was visibly intoxicated when she left at approximately 3:00 a.m. on August 1, 1996. Security videotapes showed that she left the club with a beer in her hand. Shortly thereafter, Pursley was killed when she lost control of her car and struck a tree. J-Mart Jewelry Outlets, Inc. v. Standard Design, 218 Ga. App. 459, 461 (1) ( 462 S.E.2d 406) (1995). Joseph Dancause, Pursley's step-father, sued the Chickasaw Club, Inc. and Soerries individually for the cost of the car and for punitive damages.
On the other, it is axiomatic that when litigated, the issue of `piercing the corporate veil' is for the jury unless there is no evidence sufficient to justify disregarding the corporate form. J-Mart Jewelry Outlets, Inc. v. Standard Design, 218 Ga. App. 459, 460 (1) ( 462 S.E.2d 406) (1995) (citations and punctuation omitted). J-Mart Jewelry Outlets, Inc. v. Standard Design, 218 Ga. App. 459, 460 (1) ( 462 S.E.2d 406) (1995) (citations and punctuation omitted).
Given the fact-intensive nature of the veil-piercing analysis, the determination is typically one to be resolved at trial, where the trier of fact can make choices as to the credibility and weight of the evidence. J-Mart Jewelry Outlets, Inc. v. Standard Design, 462 S.E.2d 406, 407-08 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (citing Williams Plaza, Inc. v. Sedgefield Sportswear Div. of Blue Bell, Inc., 297 S.E.2d 342, 343 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982)). In light of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, however, a court may grant summary judgment if a jury would have but one result.
Specifically, plaintiff cites to Baillie Lumber Co., 279 Ga. at 289-90; McKesson Corp., 266 Ga. App. at 166; Scott Bros. v. Warren, 261 Ga. App. 285, 287-88 (2003); Soerries v. Dancause, 248 Ga. App. 374, 375 (2001); J-Mart Jewelry Outlets, Inc. v. Standard Design, 218 Ga. App. 459, 460 (1995). However, out of the five cases that the plaintiff cites for his proposition, three make an express finding that the corporation involved is insolvent.
โ See JโMart Jewelry Outlets v. Standard Design, 218 Ga.App. 459, 461(1), 462 S.E.2d 406 (1995). Regarding the separateness of Spellbrook Builders' existence from that of its officers, the evidence showed the following: Spellbrook Builders was incorporated in 2004, and in May 2008 was administratively dissolved or had its certificate revoked by the Secretary of State of the State of Georgia for failing to file its annual registration; Christopher and Spell, the only officers, never signed the corporation's bylaws; no stock certificates were ever issued; no minutes of corporate meetings were ever kept; no annual registrations for the corporation were filed after 2005; the lots upon which Spellbrook Builders built its houses were titled in Christopher's name and then transferred to Spellbrook Builders at or near closing (and then conveyed to third parties); the corporation did not have a physical location; funds obtained at the closing of the Sinyards' home and during construction were paid to Christopher's and Spell's other businesses; Christopher made
(Punctuation omitted.) J-Mart Jewelry Outlets v. Standard Design, 218 Ga. App. 459, 460 (1) ( 462 SE2d 406) (1995). Here, the trial evidence included testimony from Cochran's accountant that Anthony personally, and the Anthony Entities companies separately, "entwined" their finances and dealings with Cochran.
See J-Mart Jewelry Outlets v. Standard Design.J-Mart Jewelry Outlets v. Standard Design, 218 Ga. App. 459, 460 (1) ( 462 SE2d 406) (1995). Pazur argues that the trial court's order denying Belcher's motion for summary judgment correctly found that several statements made by Belcher during her deposition created questions of fact as to whether she abused the corporate form as Med-Quip's sole shareholder.
Where those who own or control a corporation have brought about such a unity of interest and ownership as between themselves and the corporation, the unpaid corporate creditor may look to them for satisfaction of the corporation's debts. See id.; J-Mart Jewelry Outlets v. Standard Design, 218 Ga. App. 459, 460 (1) ( 462 S.E.2d 406) (1995). See Summit-Top, supra; see also Johnson v. Lipton, 254 Ga. 326 ( 328 S.E.2d 533) (1985).
(Punctuation omitted.) J-Mart Jewelry Outlets v. Standard Design, 218 Ga. App. 459, 460 (1) ( 462 S.E.2d 406) (1995). Id.