J-Mart v. Standard Design

20 Citing cases

  1. Scott Brothers, Inc. v. Warren

    261 Ga. App. 285 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003)   Cited 15 times

    4. Glenn Scott enumerates as error the denial of his motion for a directed verdict on his personal liability. He argues that no evidence justified the piercing of the corporate veil so as to hold him personally liable for the breach-of-contract damages. To justify piercing the corporate veil to hold a corporate owner liable, the plaintiff must show the owner abused the corporate form by disregarding the separateness of legal entities by commingling on an interchangeable or joint basis or confusing the otherwise separate properties, records, or control. J-Mart Jewelry Outlets, Inc. v. StandardDesign, 218 Ga. App. 459, 460(1) ( 462 S.E.2d 406) (1995); see Abbott Foods of Ga., Inc. v. Elberton Poultry Co., 173 Ga. App. 672, 673(2) ( 327 S.E.2d 751) (1985). [I]t must be shown that the stockholders' disregard of the corporate entity made it a mere instrumentality for the transaction of their own affairs; that there is such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the owners no longer exist; and to adhere to the doctrine of corporate entity would promote injustice or protect fraud.

  2. Soerries v. Dancause

    248 Ga. App. 374 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 18 times
    Piercing the corporate veil without making express finding on issue of insolvency

    Even so, friends testified that Pursley drank additional alcohol at the club and was visibly intoxicated when she left at approximately 3:00 a.m. on August 1, 1996. Security videotapes showed that she left the club with a beer in her hand. Shortly thereafter, Pursley was killed when she lost control of her car and struck a tree. J-Mart Jewelry Outlets, Inc. v. Standard Design, 218 Ga. App. 459, 461 (1) ( 462 S.E.2d 406) (1995). Joseph Dancause, Pursley's step-father, sued the Chickasaw Club, Inc. and Soerries individually for the cost of the car and for punitive damages.

  3. Jamal v. Hussein

    237 Ga. App. 779 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 8 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Reversing grant of summary judgment on attorney fees in light of holding that summary judgment on main claim was improper

    On the other, it is axiomatic that when litigated, the issue of `piercing the corporate veil' is for the jury unless there is no evidence sufficient to justify disregarding the corporate form. J-Mart Jewelry Outlets, Inc. v. Standard Design, 218 Ga. App. 459, 460 (1) ( 462 S.E.2d 406) (1995) (citations and punctuation omitted). J-Mart Jewelry Outlets, Inc. v. Standard Design, 218 Ga. App. 459, 460 (1) ( 462 S.E.2d 406) (1995) (citations and punctuation omitted).

  4. Smith v. Ga. Energy USA, LLC

    CV 208-020 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 4, 2014)   Cited 1 times

    Given the fact-intensive nature of the veil-piercing analysis, the determination is typically one to be resolved at trial, where the trier of fact can make choices as to the credibility and weight of the evidence. J-Mart Jewelry Outlets, Inc. v. Standard Design, 462 S.E.2d 406, 407-08 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (citing Williams Plaza, Inc. v. Sedgefield Sportswear Div. of Blue Bell, Inc., 297 S.E.2d 342, 343 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982)). In light of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, however, a court may grant summary judgment if a jury would have but one result.

  5. In re Friedman's Inc.

    385 B.R. 381 (S.D. Ga. 2008)   Cited 11 times

    Specifically, plaintiff cites to Baillie Lumber Co., 279 Ga. at 289-90; McKesson Corp., 266 Ga. App. at 166; Scott Bros. v. Warren, 261 Ga. App. 285, 287-88 (2003); Soerries v. Dancause, 248 Ga. App. 374, 375 (2001); J-Mart Jewelry Outlets, Inc. v. Standard Design, 218 Ga. App. 459, 460 (1995). However, out of the five cases that the plaintiff cites for his proposition, three make an express finding that the corporation involved is insolvent.

  6. Christopher v. Sinyard

    313 Ga. App. 866 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012)   Cited 15 times
    Finding the trial court did not err in disregarding the corporate form where a homebuilding corporation's only two officers failed to file its annual registration for a number of years; never signed the corporation's bylaws, issued stock certificates, or kept minutes of corporate meetings; made undocumented loans to the corporation; paid some of the corporation's creditors from their personal funds; and executed a false affidavit at a closing

    โ€ See Jโ€“Mart Jewelry Outlets v. Standard Design, 218 Ga.App. 459, 461(1), 462 S.E.2d 406 (1995). Regarding the separateness of Spellbrook Builders' existence from that of its officers, the evidence showed the following: Spellbrook Builders was incorporated in 2004, and in May 2008 was administratively dissolved or had its certificate revoked by the Secretary of State of the State of Georgia for failing to file its annual registration; Christopher and Spell, the only officers, never signed the corporation's bylaws; no stock certificates were ever issued; no minutes of corporate meetings were ever kept; no annual registrations for the corporation were filed after 2005; the lots upon which Spellbrook Builders built its houses were titled in Christopher's name and then transferred to Spellbrook Builders at or near closing (and then conveyed to third parties); the corporation did not have a physical location; funds obtained at the closing of the Sinyards' home and during construction were paid to Christopher's and Spell's other businesses; Christopher made

  7. Anthony v. Gator Cochran Const

    299 Ga. App. 126 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009)   Cited 6 times
    In Anthony v. Gator Cochran Constr., 299 Ga.App. 126, 128โ€“129(2), 682 S.E.2d 140 (2009), this court held that Anthony had waived any right to challenge the verdict by its failure to object to the verdict prior to the dismissal of the jury.

    (Punctuation omitted.) J-Mart Jewelry Outlets v. Standard Design, 218 Ga. App. 459, 460 (1) ( 462 SE2d 406) (1995). Here, the trial evidence included testimony from Cochran's accountant that Anthony personally, and the Anthony Entities companies separately, "entwined" their finances and dealings with Cochran.

  8. Pazur v. Belcher

    290 Ga. App. 703 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008)   Cited 16 times
    In Pazur, the alleged alter ego owner loaned the corporation $250,000 and then forgave the debt to facilitate the corporation's sale.

    See J-Mart Jewelry Outlets v. Standard Design.J-Mart Jewelry Outlets v. Standard Design, 218 Ga. App. 459, 460 (1) ( 462 SE2d 406) (1995). Pazur argues that the trial court's order denying Belcher's motion for summary judgment correctly found that several statements made by Belcher during her deposition created questions of fact as to whether she abused the corporate form as Med-Quip's sole shareholder.

  9. Ishak v. Lanier Contractor's Supply Co., Inc.

    254 Ga. App. 237 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 9 times
    Holding that the trial court properly pierced the corporate veil because there was evidence of officers using corporate funds for personal use

    Where those who own or control a corporation have brought about such a unity of interest and ownership as between themselves and the corporation, the unpaid corporate creditor may look to them for satisfaction of the corporation's debts. See id.; J-Mart Jewelry Outlets v. Standard Design, 218 Ga. App. 459, 460 (1) ( 462 S.E.2d 406) (1995). See Summit-Top, supra; see also Johnson v. Lipton, 254 Ga. 326 ( 328 S.E.2d 533) (1985).

  10. Garrett v. Women's Health Care of Gwinnett

    243 Ga. App. 53 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 25 times
    Affirming grant of summary judgment to defendant on plaintiff's OCGA ยง 13-6-11 claim for bad faith attorney fees in breach of contract and fraud case and finding that there was no evidence that the defendant "acted through ill will or furtive design with regard to the performance of the contract" where the defendant relied upon the calculations of a corporate accountant in calculating bonus payments due under a contract and where the accountant "clearly believed that his method of calculation was appropriate, and there [was] no evidence that [the defendant] had reason to believe otherwise"

    (Punctuation omitted.) J-Mart Jewelry Outlets v. Standard Design, 218 Ga. App. 459, 460 (1) ( 462 S.E.2d 406) (1995). Id.