Opinion
A97A1647.
DECIDED JULY 23, 1997 — RECONSIDERATION DISMISSED AUGUST 6, 1997 — CERT. APPLIED FOR.
Workers' compensation. Wilkinson Superior Court. Before Judge Prior.
Murphy Sibley, R. Napier Murphy, for appellant.
Dozier, Lee, Graham Sikes, Neal B. Graham, Joel M. Grist, Jr., for appellee.
We granted J. M. Huber Corporation's application for discretionary appeal to review an award of workers' compensation benefits to Larry Holliday based on the "superadded injury" theory. Huber contends that the ALJ misapplied this theory in an attempt to find coverage where the claim was not otherwise compensable.
The following facts are not in dispute: Holliday suffered a compensable injury to his left knee in 1985. He was assigned a 16% permanent partial disability rating and was given a mostly sedentary job which never required stress on the knee. Although he had some continuing problems with his knee, including popping and instability, he worked without incident until 1994, when, while walking through the woods near his home, Holliday caught his right foot in some vines. He shifted his weight to his left leg which did not hold him and fell, fracturing his patella.
The ALJ characterized this occurrence as "a new injury, separate and distinct from [Holliday's] original knee condition." Applying workers' compensation principles to this factual finding, however, the legal conclusion which must follow is that the event is non-compensable. "No liability arises from disability resulting from a new accident unrelated to the worker's employment." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Shuman v. Engineered Fabrics, 220 Ga. App. 636, 637 (2) ( 469 S.E.2d 847) (1996). It is uncontroverted here that the activity in which Holliday was engaged at the time the injury occurred was not related to his employment. The ALJ's finding that Holliday's fall constituted a new accident distinguishes it from Hallisey v. Fort Howard Paper Company, (Case no. S96G1408, decided April 14, 1997) in which the Georgia Supreme Court held that the factual finding of the ALJ that the claimant did not sustain a "new injury" was dispositive regardless of whether the claimant's behavior was negligent. Likewise, this case is distinguishable from City of Buford v. Thomas, 179 Ga. App. 769 ( 347 S.E.2d 713) (1986) upon which Holliday relies. As in Fort Howard, supra, in Thomas, the ALJ and the Board concluded that even if Thomas was negligent in attempting to get out of his hospital bed against the doctor's orders while being treated for a work-related injury, that act was not an independent, intervening cause precluding compensability for his resulting death.
Even if we accept the ALJ's conclusion that the weakened condition of Holliday's knee was the proximate cause of this event, the facts of this case do not support compensability under a change in condition theory. In Holt's Bakery v. Hutchinson, 177 Ga. App. 154, 157 ( 338 S.E.2d 742) (1985), we held that "[a] `change in condition' claim for additional compensation is predicated upon the claimant's gradually worsening condition, from the wear and tear of performing his usual employment duties and of ordinary life, to the point that he can no longer perform his ordinary work." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) See cases cited in Shuman, supra: Colonial Stores v. Hambrick, 176 Ga. App. 544 ( 336 S.E.2d 617) (1985) (gradual deterioration of pre-existing lung disease aggravated by work in freezer); Thornton Chevrolet v. Morgan, 148 Ga. App. 711 ( 252 S.E.2d 178) (1979) (pre-existing emphysema aggravated by inhaling fumes at work). Here there was no evidence of a gradual worsening of Holliday's condition as a result of wear and tear at work or in ordinary life. And Holliday acknowledges that a change in condition analysis does not apply to additional injuries resulting from an original compensable injury when the additional injury occurs more than two years after the last payment of income benefits. See OCGA § 34-9-104 (b).
Finally, it is clear from the facts of this case that Holliday's claim is not compensable simply as a job-related accident. See Slattery Assoc. v. Hufstetler, 161 Ga. App. 389, 390-391 ( 288 S.E.2d 654) (1982) in which the court characterized compensable events as accidents, new accidents or changes in condition.
Having established that the ALJ was correct in declining to find compensability under the usual statutory categories, we next examine whether the superadded injury theory was correctly applied here. "The `superadded injury' principle generally has been discussed in regard to consequences stemming from physical injuries which are unrelated to the employee's medical treatment, e.g., psychological disorders, see West Point Pepperell v. Baggett, 139 Ga. App. 813 ( 229 S.E.2d 666) (1976) (schizophrenia) and Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Allen, 123 Ga. App. 741, 742 ( 182 S.E.2d 508) (1971) (traumatic neurosis); aggravation of health problems by the work-related injury, see Globe Indem. Co. v. Brooks, 84 Ga. App. 687 ( 67 S.E.2d 176) (1951) (heart condition aggravated by chest injury); or incapacitating pain in one member caused by the work-related injury. See Bouldware v. Delta Corp., 160 Ga. App. 100 ( 286 S.E.2d 333) (1981) (pain in shoulder from injury to arm)." Standridge v. Candlewick Yarns, 202 Ga. App. 553, 555 ( 415 S.E.2d 10) (1992). A superadded injury generally arises as a natural consequence of, or directly from, the original event and is not the result of a new event or accident. In this case we are bound by the ALJ's finding that Holliday's fall in the woods constituted a new injury, and as such the legal conclusion that the injury was compensable under the superadded injury theory was erroneous.
Finally, this court has held that "[a]n employee sustains a compensable `superadded injury' where, in consequence of a specific member disability, he suffers a disabling injury, disorder, or disease to other portions of his body. [Cits.]" (Emphasis supplied.) ITT Continental Baking Co. v. Comes, 165 Ga. App. 598, 599 (1) ( 302 S.E.2d 137) (1983). Here, Holliday fractured the same knee which had previously been injured on the job.
We decline Huber's invitation to hold that the superadded injury theory is no longer viable. Although it was improperly applied in this case, there will certainly be those cases in which the application of the superadded injury theory is necessary to effect the humane, remedial purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act.
Judgment reversed. Pope, P.J., and Blackburn, J., concur.