Opinion
A22-0155
09-28-2022
Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CV-21-1883
Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Jesson, Judge.
ORDER OPINION
Sarah I. Wheelock Judge.
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. In this breach-of-contract dispute, appellant Steve Sopczak argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of respondent J &J Supplies LLC (J&J) and denying Sopczak's cross-motion for summary judgment.
2. The following facts appear to be undisputed. In November 2019, Sopczak was acting as general contractor for a homeowner on a residential remodeling project and reached out to J&J with a request to install spray-foam insulation. The parties exchanged text messages to arrange for J&J to visit the site, provide an estimate, and confirm a date to perform the work.
3. The homeowner asked Sopczak questions about the spray-foam installation, and Sopczak directed the homeowner to call J&J directly for the requested information. The homeowner spoke with J&J, and J&J informed Sopczak that, during the conversation, it gave the homeowner a 5% discount on the work.
4. In January 2020, J&J performed the installation, and Sopczak accepted J&J's services without objection. J&J invoiced Sopczak $7,885 for the work performed, due on receipt of the invoice. After repeated demands, Sopczak did not render payment.
5. Following a judgment in conciliation court with which Sopczak was aggrieved, Sopczak demanded removal to the district court.
6. J&J moved for summary judgment, arguing that the oral contract between Sopczak and J&J did not contain a condition precedent that Sopczak receive payment from the homeowner before Sopczak was obligated to pay J&J, as Sopczak appeared to claim.
7. Sopczak did not file a response to J&J's motion but did file a cross-motion for summary judgment. Sopczak's motion was not served on J&J and was not supported by an affidavit or sworn statement. Despite these deficiencies, the district court heard both Sopczak's and J&J's arguments on the motions.
8. Following a motion hearing in December 2021, the district court granted J&J's motion and denied Sopczak's motion, reasoning that the existence of an oral contract between J&J and Sopczak was an undisputed fact, that no condition precedent of Sopczak being paid by the homeowner existed in that contract, and that J&J did not enter into a contract with the homeowner rather than with Sopczak by speaking with the homeowner and offering a 5% discount. The district court entered judgment in favor of J&J.
9. Summary judgment is appropriate when "the movant shows there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01. "We review a district court's summary judgment decision de novo. In doing so, we determine whether the district court properly applied the law and whether there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment." Riverview Muir Doran, LLC v. JADT Dev. Grp., LLC, 790 N.W.2d 167, 170 (Minn. 2010) (citation omitted).
10. On appeal, "error is never presumed." Midway Ctr. Assocs. v. Midway Ctr., Inc., 237 N.W.2d 76, 78 (Minn. 1975) (quotation omitted). The burden rests on the appellant, who relies on the error, to make the error appear affirmatively before we will reverse. Id. "Generally, [a]n assignment of error based on mere assertion and not supported by any argument or authorities in appellant's brief is waived and will not be considered on appeal unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection." Surf &Sand, Inc. v. Gardebring, 457 N.W.2d 782, 788 (Minn.App. 1990) (quoting Louden v. Louden, 22 N.W.2d 164, 166 (Minn. 1946)), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 20, 1990). Inadequately briefed issues are not properly before an appellate court. See Melina v. Chaplin, 327 N.W.2d 19, 20 (Minn. 1982). Further, an appellate court generally may consider only matters argued to and considered by the district court. Toth v. Arason, 722 N.W.2d 437, 443 (Minn. 2006).
11. While some accommodations may be made for self-represented litigants, we generally hold those parties to the same standards as attorneys. Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 629 N.W.2d 115, 119 (Minn.App. 2001). Although we may disregard some defects in a brief, the appellant is not relieved of "the necessity of providing an adequate record and preserving it in a way that will permit review." Thorp Loan &Thrift Co. v. Morse, 451 N.W.2d 361, 363 (Minn.App. 1990), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 13, 1990).
12. On appeal, Sopczak's brief primarily consists of certain restated factual assertions that were previously presented to the district court. Sopczak asserts that no contract was formed between the parties and rather that J&J formed a contract with the homeowner. Sopczak's arguments that he could not form a contract with J&J and that J&J's phone conversation with the homeowner formed a contract between J&J and the homeowner are not supported by the facts he asserts. Furthermore, Sopczak fails to cite any legal authority for his arguments in his brief. Sopczak's brief is inadequate and not properly before an appellate court. See Melina, 327 N.W.2d at 20 (inadequately briefed issues are forfeited).
13. The facts Sopczak asserts do not demonstrate that the district court erred as a matter of law in determining that a contract existed between the parties and that Sopczak was not excused from his duties under the contract. Nor do the facts he asserts show that there are genuine issues of material fact supporting his claims or raise a factual dispute with those asserted by J&J. A careful review of the record, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Sopczak, shows that the facts asserted by Sopczak support the district court's determination that granting summary judgment to J&J was appropriate.
14. Further, Sopczak did not make the argument to the district court that no contract was formed between the parties; he raises that argument for the first time on appeal. See Toth, 722 N.W.2d at 443 (appellate court considers only matters argued to and considered by the district court). Sopczak's assertion here is also not supported by legal analysis and does not raise a genuine issue of material fact in support of his claim.
15. Finally, in the final paragraph of its response brief, J&J informally requests that J&J be awarded all legal fees, costs, and disbursements incurred in responding to this matter.
16. Under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 139.05, subd. 1, "a party seeking attorney[] fees on appeal shall submit such a request by motion under Rule 127." See Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd. 16 (2021) (providing that "shall" is mandatory). Rules 139.03 and 139.05 require submission of this request to the court of appeals within 14 days of the filing of the appellate court's order or decision. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 139.05, subd. 1 (providing that "[a]ll motions for fees must be submitted no later than within the time for taxation of costs"); Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 139.03, subd. 1 (providing that "[a] prevailing party seeking taxation of costs and disbursements shall file and serve a notice of taxation of costs and disbursements within 14 days of the filing of the court's order or decision"). Because J&J has not submitted a motion requesting attorney fees on appeal that complies with the applicable procedural rules, we deny its request for an award of fees.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's summary judgment in favor of J&J against Sopczak is affirmed.
2. J&J's improper request for attorney fees on appeal is denied at this time.
3. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.