J. B. H. v. State

16 Citing cases

  1. In the Interest of R.D.F

    266 Ga. 294 (Ga. 1996)   Cited 23 times
    Explaining that the goal of former OCGA § 15–11–26 was to provide for "prompt resolution of charges brought against a delinquent or unruly child and expeditious handling of matters involving a deprived child"

    See, e.g., In the Interest of L.A.E., supra at (1); In the Interest of M.D.C., 214 Ga. App. 59 ( 447 S.E.2d 143) (1994); R.A.S. v. State of Ga., 156 Ga. App. 366 ( 274 S.E.2d 752) (1980); J.B.H., v. State of Ga., 139 Ga. App. 199 (1) ( 228 S.E.2d 189) (1976). Notwithstanding the lack of statutory speedy trial rights in juvenile proceedings, constitutional speedy trial rights still apply in such proceedings.

  2. P. D. v. State

    270 S.E.2d 1 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980)   Cited 2 times

    1. This appeal is based upon the lack of jurisdiction because the petition was not filed until 171 days after the juvenile had been detained in violation of Code Ann. § 24A-1404, supra, and denied his statutory right to a "speedy trial." The time limits set forth in the juvenile court code are jurisdictional and must be strictly adhered to. See J. B. H. v. State of Ga., 139 Ga. App. 199, 203 ( 228 S.E.2d 189). When this child was picked up for allegedly committing delinquent acts on May 28, 1979, constituting the offense of aggravated assault were he an adult, Code Ann. § 24A-1401, supra, and Code Ann. § 24A-1402 (Ga. L. 1971, pp. 709, 723; 1973, pp. 882, 885; 1977, pp. 1237, 1238) were immediately complied with in that the detained child was immediately released without bond to his father, and the father caused him to be admitted to the psychiatric ward of West Paces Ferry Hospital in Atlanta, Georgia.

  3. Washington v. Ga. Baptist Med. Center

    223 Ga. App. 762 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 10 times

    Although the ruling in Hewett allowed additional evidence to be presented regarding the expert's competency, we do not see the holding as being limited to that particular challenge to the affidavit's sufficiency, and find that when an affidavit has been filed with the complaint, it can be amended to respond to challenges to its sufficiency. Compare Hardman v. Knight, 203 Ga. App. 519 ( 417 S.E.2d 338) (1992). (b) Appellees argue on appeal that this Court should not consider the amended § 9-11-9.1 affidavit because it was not filed and served at least 24 hours before the hearing. See Strickland v. DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 197 Ga. App. 63, 64 (1) ( 397 S.E.2d 576) (1990); J. B. H. v. State, 139 Ga. App. 199, 202 (1) ( 228 S.E.2d 189) (1976), overruled on other grounds, In re R. D. F., 266 Ga. 294, 196 (3) ( 466 S.E.2d 572) (1996). It is well-settled that the trial court has the discretion to decide whether it will consider affidavits not served within the time limits contemplated by the statutes. Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Houk, 248 Ga. 111, 112 (1) ( 281 S.E.2d 583) (1981).

  4. In the Interest of R. D. F

    216 Ga. App. 563 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995)   Cited 2 times

    The State's appeal from the dismissal in this case is the equivalent of an appeal from an order sustaining a plea in bar for violation of the right to a speedy trial. See State v. Benton, 246 Ga. 132 ( 269 S.E.2d 470) (1980); Lett v. State, 164 Ga. App. 584, 587 ( 298 S.E.2d 541) (1982); J. B. H. v. State of Ga., 139 Ga. App. 199, 203 ( 228 S.E.2d 189) (1976). OCGA § 15-11-26 (a) provides that: "After the petition has been filed the court shall fix a time for hearing thereon, which, if the child is in detention, shall not be later than ten days after the filing of the petition.

  5. In the Interest of M. D.C

    214 Ga. App. 59 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994)   Cited 4 times

    Our opinion in J. B. did not address the issue before us in this case. In J. B. H. v. State of Ga., 139 Ga. App. 199, 203 ( 228 S.E.2d 189) (1976), we determined that the trial court erred in overruling J. B. H.'s motion to dismiss as the delinquency petition was not filed within 72 hours of the delinquency hearing and the adjudicatory hearing was not set for a date within ten days of the filing of the petition. In Crews v. Brantley County Dept. of Family c. Svcs., 146 Ga. App. 408, 409 ( 246 S.E.2d 426) (1978), a case factually similar to the present case, we determined that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the petition as the hearing date was set for a date 12 days after the petition was filed.

  6. In the Interest of L. A. E

    214 Ga. App. 268 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994)   Cited 5 times

    It is apparent to me that in factual situations such as the one presented herein, the defendant's civil liberties are at stake and the statute must be strictly construed. Crews v. Brantley County Dept. of Family c. Svcs., 146 Ga. App. 408, 409 ( 246 S.E.2d 426) (1978); J. B. H. v. State of Ga., 139 Ga. App. 199, 203 ( 228 S.E.2d 189) (1976). The adjudicatory hearing, once timely scheduled, can be continued in the discretion of the trial court in a proper case.

  7. In re B. A. P

    349 S.E.2d 218 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 6 times

    As to Count II, which the trial court did dismiss, the State on cross-appeal contends the error in failing to present a petition on this count within 72 hours of the detention hearing (OCGA § 15-11-21 (e)) was harmless because the juvenile nevertheless received a hearing within 13 days of the detention hearing (72 hours plus 10 days; January 8 to January 17) in accordance with the intent of the statute. The State contends this court has approved that theory because we considered it in the case of J. B. H. v. State of Ga., 139 Ga. App. 199, 201 ( 228 S.E.2d 189), and ruled in favor of it. However, we did not even impliedly approve that theory in the J. B. H. case.

  8. Southern Trust Ins. Co. v. First Fed. c. Assn

    168 Ga. App. 899 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 2 times

    [Cits.]'" J. B. H. v.State of Ga., 139 Ga. App. 199, 202 ( 228 S.E.2d 189). Under these criteria "not less than ten days" means not less than ten full 24-hour periods between one midnight and the next, and the notice sent by Southern Trust to First Federal was necessarily defective. In order for cancellation to take effect at noon on May 25, 1980, notice must have been mailed prior to midnight on May 14, since the date on which it is mailed cannot be counted as one of the statutorily required ten days under CPA § 6 (a) (OCGA § 9-11-6 (a) (Code Ann. § 81A-106)).

  9. Irvin v. Department of Human Resources

    282 S.E.2d 664 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981)   Cited 7 times
    In Irvin v. Dept. of Human Resources, 159 Ga. App. 101, 102 (282 S.E.2d 664) (1981), the hearing date was set for a date beyond ten days from the filing of the petition and we reversed the trial court's denial of Irvin's motion to dismiss.

    Code Ann. § 24A-1701 (a) is mandatory and jurisdictional, and requires that the hearing must be set no later than 10 days after the petition is filed. Crews v. Family c. Services, 146 Ga. App. 408 ( 246 S.E.2d 426) (1978); J. B. H. v. State of Ga., 139 Ga. App. 199, 203 ( 228 S.E.2d 189) (1976). Judgment reversed. Shulman, P. J., and Birdsong, J., concur.

  10. R.A.S. v. State of Georgia

    156 Ga. App. 366 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980)   Cited 6 times
    In R. A. S., supra, three of the four allegations in a second delinquency petition were previously charged in an initial complaint whereupon there was no detention hearing in violation of OCGA § 15-11-21 (c).

    We agree with appellant and reverse the judgment of the lower court. The basis for appellant's argument, and the reason we reverse, is this court's holding in J. B. H. v. State of Ga., 139 Ga. App. 199, 203 ( 228 S.E.2d 189): "[W]e hold that time limits established by the General Assembly in the Juvenile Court Code are jurisdictional and must be strictly adhered to. "As Chief Justice Burger observed in Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, the only available remedy for one denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial is dismissal.