J. B. D. v. Plan Loving

4 Citing cases

  1. In re K.A.S. v. B.A.S

    232 Or. App. 245 (Or. Ct. App. 2009)   Cited 6 times
    Concluding in parental termination case that state of Oregon "did not run afoul of due process by narrowly limiting parents' right to obtain a set-aside under [Oregon's equivalent of Rule 60] to the time period before the adoptions of the children were complete"

    See, e.g., Kneefel v. McLaughlin, 187 Or App 1, 5, 67 P3d 947 (2003) (construing the appellants' motion to vacate a stipulated judgment to invoke the inherent authority of the trial court to modify the judgment under ORCP 71 C); see also Taylor v. Morrison, 188 Or App 519, 524 n 1, 72 P3d 654 (2003) (noting that, "[a]lthough the wording of ORCP 71 C refers to the authority of the court to `modify' the judgment, the cases interpreting the rule have concluded that the authority recognized in the rule includes the authority to vacate a judgment entirely" and citing, inter alia, Kneefel). But see J. B. D. v. Plan Loving Adoptions Now, Inc., 218 Or App 75, 84, 178 P3d 266, rev den, 344 Or 670 (2008) (declining to decide whether the plaintiff's motion to set aside an adoption judgment could be construed as a motion to modify that judgment for purposes of ORCP 71 C). The Supreme Court's recent decision in State v. Ainsworth, 346 Or 524, 213 P3d 1225 (2009), although ultimately decided on a much narrower basis, reflects some skepticism of the proposition that the power to modify a judgment includes the power to set it aside.

  2. J. B. D. v. Plan Loving

    189 P.3d 25 (Or. 2008)

    June 18, 2008. Appeal from the ( 218 Or App 75). Petitions for Review Denied.

  3. Lunsford v. Engle

    312 So. 3d 904 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021)   Cited 1 times

    After the expiration of the one-year period no one may question the validity of the adoption for any reason, either through collateral or direct proceedings, and all persons shall be bound thereby. ... OR. REV. STAT . § 109.381(3) (emphases added); see alsoJ.B.D. v. Plan Loving Adoptions Now, Inc. , 218 Or.App. 75, 178 P.3d 266, 270 (2008) ( section 109.381(3) "is a statute of limitation.") Here, the Oregon court entered its adoption judgment in the interested parties’ favor on March 5, 2018.

  4. Jones v. Douglas County

    247 Or. App. 56 (Or. Ct. App. 2011)   Cited 1 times

    The neighbors contend that HB 3166 runs afoul of both concerns. In resolving that contention, two cases— A.K.H. v. R.C.T., 312 Or. 497, 822 P.2d 135 (1991), and Phariss v. Welshans, 150 Or.App. 498, 946 P.2d 1160 (1997), abrogated on other grounds by J.B.D. v. Plan Loving Adoptions Now, Inc., 218 Or.App. 75, 178 P.3d 266, rev. den., 344 Or. 670, 189 P.3d 25 (2008)—are especially instructive. In A.K.H., the defendant contended that an amendment to a limitation period that applied retroactively to revive actions that were previously barred violated separation of powers protections.