Izumi v. Park

9 Citing cases

  1. Johnson v. Sartain

    46 Haw. 112 (Haw. 1962)   Cited 15 times

    Vasconcellos v. Juarez, 37 Haw. 364, 366. See also Tsuruoka v. Lukens, 32 Haw. 263; Ward v. I.-I.S.N. Co., 22 Haw. 488; Alau v. Everett, 7 Haw. 82. Cf., Territory v. Adelmeyer, 45 Haw. 144, 363 P.2d 979; Izumi v. Park, 44 Haw. 123, 351 P.2d 1083. In applying the above principle, we are required to resolve any conflict in the evidence "in favor of the jury's award and to that end give the evidence the strongest probative force it will admit."

  2. Quedding v. Arisumi Brothers, Inc.

    66 Haw. 335 (Haw. 1983)   Cited 26 times
    Recognizing the "general rule that the existing law is part of a contract where there is no stipulation to the contrary"

    Arisumi accurately reiterates that "in Hawaii, the measure of damages in building contracts is generally the cost of correction." Izumi v. Park, 44 Haw. 123, 128, 351 P.2d 1083, 1086 (1960); see also Ritchey v. Sato, 39 Haw. 500, 503 (1952). But we do not concur with its further thesis that the special damages awarded in this case were exorbitant.

  3. Anchorage Asphalt Paving Co. v. Lewis

    629 P.2d 65 (Alaska 1981)   Cited 12 times
    In Anchorage Asphalt Paving Co. v. Lewis, 629 P.2d 65, 70 (Alaska 1981), we observed that special damages must be pleaded to put the other party on notice of specific sums claimed and that failure to raise the issue in the pleadings or at trial precluded consideration of it on appeal. Special damages "must be specifically claimed and described if recovery for them is to be allowed."

    Since this allows the wrongdoer to gain by delaying payment, where allowable prejudgment interest is exceeded by inflation, we see nothing to recommend it. The apposite cases cited by Anchorage Asphalt are: Universal Towing Co. v. United Barge Co., 579 F.2d 1098, 1104 (8th Cir. 1978); Izumi v. Kwan Doo Park, 44 Haw. 123, 351 P.2d 1083, 1086-87 (1960); Calais v. Dura-White Roofs, Co., 208 So.2d 397 (La.App. 1968); cert. denied, 252 La. 174, 210 So.2d 55 (1968); Gaylord Builders v. Richmond Metal Mfg. Corp., 186 Pa. Super. 101, 140 A.2d 358, 360 (1958). Cases indicating no duty to mitigate include: Fairway Builders, Inc. v. Malouf, 124 Ariz. 242, 603 P.2d 513, 525-26 (Ariz.App. 1979); Camrosa County Water Dist. v. S.W. Welding Mfg. Co., 49 Cal.App.3d 951, 123 Cal.Rptr. 93 (1975).

  4. Kang v. Harrington

    59 Haw. 652 (Haw. 1978)   Cited 96 times
    Holding that a claim for punitive damages "is not an independent tort, but is purely incidental to a separate cause of action"

    The rule has been adopted by this court that it is proper, either for the trial court upon an application for a new trial, or for an appellate court in reviewing a judgment, to permit the party, in whose favor a verdict or judgment has been returned or entered, to avoid the granting of a new trial on account of error affecting only a part thereof, by entering a remittitur as to such erroneous part, when the court can clearly distinguish and separate the same.Izumi v. Park, 44 Haw. 123, 132, 351 P.2d 1083, 1088 (1960) citing Hansen v. Boyd, 161 U.S. 397, 411 (1896). The test on appellate review as to whether the damages awarded by the jury were excessive is whether the award was "palpably not supported by the evidence, or so excessive and outrageous when considered with the circumstances of the case as to demonstrate that the jury in assessing damages acted against rules of law or suffered their passions or prejudices to mislead them.

  5. Malani v. Clapp Furuya

    56 Haw. 507 (Haw. 1975)   Cited 33 times

    Enco, Incorporated v. F.C. Russell Company, 210 Ore. 324, 311 P.2d 737 (1957). See Branning Mfg. Co. v. Norfolk-Southern R.R., supra; Izumi v. Park, 44 Haw. 123, 351 P.2d 1083 (1960); Franco v. Fujimoto, 47 Haw. 408, 390 P.2d 740 (1964). The burden, however, is upon the defendant to prove that mitigation is possible, and that the injured party has failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate his damages.

  6. Orso v. City & County of Honolulu

    56 Haw. 241 (Haw. 1975)   Cited 44 times
    Holding that City and County could be "liable for the tortious conduct of the prosecuting attorney under the doctrine of respondeat superior" when the intentional torts of defamation, false arrest, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution were alleged

    We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to set aside the verdict as excessive and order a new trial or in failing to order a remittitur of $49,000 general damages. See 3 BARRON AND HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ยง 1305.1; Izumi v. Park, 44 Haw. 123, 131, 351 P.2d 1083, 1088 (1960). IV. IS APPELLANT ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL ON THE GROUND OF NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE

  7. Lopez v. Wigwam Dep't Stores

    421 P.2d 289 (Haw. 1966)   Cited 7 times
    In Lopez, employees of the defendant-department store detained plaintiff because they believed she had shoplifted a jacket from the store.

    Reversed and remanded for entry of judgment for both defendants on the claims for special and general damages for malicious prosecution and punitive damages for malicious prosecution and false imprisonment. We have recognized the doctrine of remittitur. Izumi v. Park, 44 Haw. 123, 351 P.2d 1083; Young v. Wong Ming, 35 Haw. 685. This is a proper case for application of that doctrine. As to the general damages for false imprisonment, the cause is remanded for a new trial unless, within sixty (60) days from the date of remand hereof plaintiff agrees to remit the sum of ONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($1,500.00), in which event the judgment will be affirmed as of the date of its rendition in the sum of THREE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($3,500.00).

  8. Cozine v. Hawaiian Catamaran, Ltd.

    414 P.2d 428 (Haw. 1966)   Cited 10 times

    The power to limit the new trial to the question of damages of course exists, but whether we should do so rests in our judicial discretion. Cf., Izumi v. Park, 44 Haw. 123, 133, 351 P.2d 1083, 1088; Kaimana v. Kamaunu, 11 Haw. 767, 771; Hansen v. Bledsoe, 130 Cal.App.2d 70, 278 P.2d 514; 6 Moore, Federal Practice, ยง 59.06, at 3766-67 (2d ed.). In this case, taking into consideration the matter of the surprise witness, and the limitations placed on defendant in the matter of plaintiff's pre-trial affidavit, we decline to limit the issues at the new trial to the damages only.

  9. Franco v. Fujimoto

    47 Haw. 408 (Haw. 1964)   Cited 24 times
    In Franco, upholding the trial judge's refusal to give an unavoidable accident instruction, this court at page 437 declared that "whether or not such an instruction should be given depends entirely upon the facts of the particular case" since "it is impossible to announce a fixed rule applicable to all cases by which it can be decided just when the issue of unavoidable accident is presented."

    " See Tiggerman v. City of Butte, 44 Mont. 138, 119 P. 477; Christiansen v. Hollings, 44 Cal.App.2d 332, 112 P.2d 723, 729-730; Morro v. Brockett, 109 Conn. 87, 145 A. 659, 661; cf., Izumi v. Park, 44 Haw. 123, 128, 351 P.2d 1083, 1086. It is urged on behalf of plaintiff that the course of action followed by her was reasonable and substantiated by the following: her ignorance of financial aid; the fact that on each of the three occasions she visited her doctor she was given the same instructions; that the nature of her complaints had not changed; and that she obtained relief whenever she had pain by following the prescribed treatment.