Section 1346(a)(2), known as the "Little Tucker Act", confers concurrent jurisdiction in district court and the Claims Court for civil actions against the United States not exceeding $10,000 in amount. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2)); see also Iyer v. Everson, 382 F. Supp. 2d 749, 759 (E.D. Penn. 2005). The Court of Federal Claims, however, has exclusive jurisdiction over monetary claims under EPA exceeding $10,000.
As an initial matter, the parties have identified a matter of disagreement in connection with the third element of a prima facie case of discriminatory failure to promote, which requires that another, not in the protected class, was treated more favorably by the employer. Certain courts within this circuit have described a fourth element in failure to promote claims, which requires a plaintiff to show that "the employer continued to seek out individuals with qualifications similar to . . . [the plaintiff's] . . . to fill the position," Iyer v. Everson, 382 F. Supp. 2d. 749, 756 (E.D. Pa. 2005), or that "the person who filled the desired position had equivalent or lesser qualifications," Gilmore v. Macys Retail Holdings, Inc., 385 F. App'x 233, 237 (3d Cir. 2010). Thus, Lockheed argues that Plaintiff must show that her qualifications were at least equal to each successful candidate.
Certain courts within this circuit have described a fourth element in failure to promote claims, which requires a plaintiff to show that "the employer continued to seek out individuals with qualifications similar to [the plaintiff's] to fill the position," or that "the person who filled the desired position had equivalent or lesser qualifications." See Iyer v. Everson, 382 F. Supp. 2d. 749, 756 (E.D. Pa. 2005); Gilmore v. Macys Retail Holdings, Inc., 385 F. App'x 233, 237 (3d Cir. 2010). Thus, Lockheed argues that Plaintiff must show that her qualifications were at least equal to each successful candidate.
However, a plaintiff is not obligated to make such a showing. See Iyer v. Everson, 382 F. Supp. 2d 749, 756 n. 14 (E.D. Pa. 2005) ("Showing that similarly situated employees outside of plaintiff's protected class were more favorably treated under similar circumstances is one way, but not the only way, to raise an inference of unlawful discrimination."); Klimczak v. Shoe Show Cos., 420 F. Supp. 2d 376, 382-83 (M.D. Pa. 2005). Here, Defendant contends that Roddy cannot satisfy her burden to show a prima facie case of sex discrimination because she has not identified any non-probationary employees that were treated differently from her. As discussed above, such a showing is not required by law, nor does it seem appropriate in this case as there do not appear to have been any similarly situated employees with whom Roddy could offer such a comparison.