It could therefore be argued that by pleading the discharge, defendant placed in issue the validity of the discharge as it related to plaintiff, and plaintiff was entitled to produce at trial any evidence which would overcome the defense. As an example of this approach, in Ivy v. Plyler, 246 Cal.App.2d 678 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 894], the plaintiff was allowed to produce proof at trial, without pleading the material at all, that defendant's bankruptcy discharge defense was invalid because of defendant's fraud. Judgment affirmed.

The kind of "inequitable result" that makes alter ego liability appropriate is an abuse of the corporate form, such as under-capitalization or misrepresentation of the corporate structure to creditors. See RRX Industries, 772 F.2d at 546; United States v. Healthwin-Midtown Convalescent Hosp., 511 F. Supp. 416, 418-19 (C.D. Cal. 1981), aff'd, 685 F.2d 448 (9th Cir. 1982); American Home Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 122 Cal.App.3d 951, 175 Cal.Rptr. 826, 834 (1981); Ivy v. Plyler, 246 Cal.App.2d 678, 54 Cal.Rptr. 894 (1966). No specific finding of bad faith is required if such an abuse is found.

But for the bankrupts' fraudulent conduct, there would have been no debt due from bankrupts; Progressive would be the only debtor. In re Metz, 6 F.2d 962 (2d Cir. 1925); Ivy v. Plyler, 246 Cal.App.2d 678, 54 Cal.Rptr. 894 (1966) (judgment rendered against bankrupt officer of insolvent corporation under doctrine of alter ego held nondischargeable); In re Petersen, 25 F. Supp. 411 (E.D.N.Y. 1938); John P. Maguire Co., Inc. v. Herzog, 421 F.2d 419 (5th Cir. 1970); In re Bernard, 87 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1937). Both the bankruptcy judge and the district judge.

Thus, the alter ego doctrine "is a device imposed by courts to disregard the corporate entity and hold individuals responsible for acts knowingly and intentionally done in the name of the corporation." In re Munson, 6:10-BK-38482-SC, 2011 WL 845846, at *4 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2011) (citing Ivy v. Plyler, 246 Cal. App. 2d 678, 682 (1966)). The court in In re Munson concluded that imposing liability under the alter ego doctrine would necessarily be imposing liability ex maleficio, because it operates to impose liability upon the individual because of his wrongful acts. Id.

Abuse of the corporate form can be demonstrated by a failure to observe corporate formalities with respect to the flow of money between the two entities.Orloff v. Allman, 819 F.2d 904, 909 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing RRX Indus., Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1985)); United States v. Heathwin-Midtown Convalescent Hosp., 511 F. Supp. 416, 418-19 (C.D. Cal. 1981); Am. Home Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 122 Cal. App. 3d 951, 966-67 (1981); Ivy v. Plyler, 246 Cal. App. 2d 678 (1966). See e.g., Doe v.Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 927 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Evidence that a parent provides interest free loans without observing corporate formalities by documenting those loans with promissory notes supports a finding that the parent is the subsidiary's alter ego.")

See, e.g., 5 Witkin, Summary of California Law, Torts, § 890, citing inter alia, California Civil Code, § 1709; Seeger v. Odell, 18 Cal.2d at 414; Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc., 15 Cal.4th at 974. However, Perske's claim for defalcation is perhaps more problematic because the concept of defalcation was apparently not recognized in the California case law until the case of Ivy v. Plyler, 246 Cal.App.2d 678 (1966). In that case, the court observed:

" (In re Gonzales (9th Cir. BAP 1982) 22 B.R. 58, 59)" (Claimant's Proposed Arbitrator's Award at page 7.)It appears to the undersigned, however, after reviewing over 100 California cases, that defalcation is not a recognized tort cause of action in the state nor are there any cases defining exactly what defalcation is. (See Bent v. Rivergate Commons (2006) 2006 WL 3531425, *4; Ivy v. Plyler (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 678, 683-84.) Instead, California courts have generally relied on allegations of defalcation to support claims for, inter alia, fraud.

" ( In re Gonzales (9th Cir. BAP 1982) 22 B.R. 58 , 59)" (Claimant's Proposed Arbitrator's Award at page 7.) It appears to the undersigned, however, after reviewing over 100 California cases, that defalcation is not a recognized tort cause of action in the state nor are there any cases defining exactly what defalcation is. ( See Bent v. Rivergate Commons (2006) 2006 WL 3531425, *4; Ivy v. Plyler (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 678, 683-84.) Instead, California courts have generally relied on allegations of defalcation to support claims for, inter alia, fraud.

The doctrine of alter ego, at least in California, is a device imposed by courts to disregard the corporate entity and hold individuals responsible for acts knowingly and intentionally done in the name of the corporation. Ivy v. Plyler, 246 Cal.App. 2d 678, 682 (Cal. App. 5th Dist. 1966). If a finding of alter ego were to be considered as imposing fiduciary duties, any such imposition would be ex maleficio, i.e., trusts that arose by operation of law upon a wrongful act. Davis v. Aetna Corp., 293 U.S. 328, 333, 79 L.Ed. 393, 55 S.Ct. 151 (1934).          Accordingly, the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted as to the First Cause of Action, without leave to amend.

Since it appears to the Court that all of these events were merely single steps in one scheme to avoid any payment to plaintiffs, the precise moment of insolvency is not necessary to be determined. Obviously, if the steps are separated then insolvency occurred no later than September 1, 1991, or September 4, 1991, when the new service agreement between Atlantic Security Limited and WCI took effect. The issues of alter ego and fiduciary duty of RDD and DKD are so closely allied, that they will be discussed together. Black's Law Dictionary Defines the Latin term (which the Court believes translates literally as "other I") as second self. It cites Ivy v. Plyler, 246 Cal.App.2d 678, 54 Cal.Rptr. 894 (1966) as follows: Under doctrine of "alter ego", court merely disregards corporate entity and holds individual responsible for acts knowingly and intentionally done in the name of the corporation.