Nor did Dagne object when Walsh explained that she believed Dagne was drunk because the way Dagne was driving was “very oblivious and confused.” Dagne's failure to object to this testimony resulted in a waiver of her challenge to it on appeal. See Ivy Rd. Properties, LLC v. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 311 Ga.App. 409, 410(1), 715 S.E.2d 809 (2011).3. Dagne also argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion for a directed verdict on the issue of punitive damages, because there was no admissible evidence that she was impaired.
But, as we have also held on numerous occasions, the confirmation statute does not specify, or preclude, any particular method for appraising property to determine its true market value at the time of the foreclosure. Ivy Road Properties, LLC v. First Citizens Bank, etc., Co., 311 Ga.App. 409, 411(2), 715 S.E.2d 809 (2011) (“ OCGA § 44–14–161(b) does not preclude any specific method of property appraisal”). And, as stated above, Gragg testified extensively about his training and the factual informationand methods he used to arrive at his opinion, and there is no contention that those methods were not reliable-indeed Gragg testified that he adhered to the standards in appraising the property that Powder Springs argues on appeal were applicable here. Using these methods, and the market conditions existing at the time of the foreclosure, Gragg was able to give his opinion about the market value of the property as of the date of foreclosure.
The Appellants failed to lodge a contemporaneous objection to this testimony, and thus, they have waived this argument. See Ivy Road Properties, LLC v. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 311 Ga.App. 409, 410(1), 715 S.E.2d 809 (2011). See also Gilliam v. State, 240 Ga.App. 158, 159(1), 522 S.E.2d 766 (1999), citing Stephens v. State, 232 Ga.App. 738, 739(2), 503 S.E.2d 643 (1998) and Sweeney v. State, 233 Ga.App. 862, 865(4), 506 S.E.2d 150 (1998).