Opinion
8:04CV70.
March 21, 2005
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on a motion for summary judgment filed by defendants James Heller and Bruce Mills, Filing No. 35. This is an action for damages and injunctive relief for deprivation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendant law enforcement officers and the City of Norfolk. Plaintiff alleges that defendants Heller and Mills wrongfully arrested and detained him after an altercation at his apartment in May 2002.
The incident that led to the arrest involved a physical altercation between the plaintiff and two others, Jerry Patterson and Vincent Anderson. The uncontroverted evidence, gleaned from plaintiff's deposition, shows that on May 24, 2002, plaintiff Isom attended a party at Jerry Patterson's apartment in Norfolk, Nebraska. Filing No. 37, Ex. C, Deposition of Alex Isom ("Isom dep.") at 77-79. Vincent Anderson, who lived in the same apartment complex, was also present at the party. Id. at 80. Plaintiff testified that he drank a couple of beers and a shot of peppermint schnapps. Id. at 83-84. Plaintiff also testified that, after watching three movies, people began to leave the party at about 1:00 a.m. Id. at 81-83. Isom fell asleep on the couch for approximately fifteen minutes and after waking up, entered into a argument with Jerry Patterson. Id. at 83-85. Plaintiff threw water on Patterson and then picked up a bottle of peppermint schnapps that did not belong to him and left. Id. at 86. Once outside the apartment, he was jumped from behind by Patterson and a fight ensued. Id. at 87. Plaintiff admits that he hit Patterson "upside the head" twice with the bottle, the second time breaking it. Id. at 89. Plaintiff cut his hand on the broken bottle. Id. Plaintiff returned to his apartment and heard one of his windows being broken shortly thereafter. Id. at 90. Plaintiff testified that Patterson and Anderson broke into his apartment and came at him with knives. Id. at 92-93. Isom testified that he grabbed the machete that he kept next to his bed, and hit Anderson with the blade of his machete. Id. at 95, 100. He cut Anderson on the shoulder and the back of the head. Id. at 101. Patterson then left "because he thought I was going to cut Vince's head off" and Anderson tore the door off and crawled out of Isom's apartment. Id. at 97-100. Plaintiff testified that he then called 911, but police arrived at his apartment at about the same time. Id. at 102. He was told he needed medical attention and was taken to the emergency room by paramedics. Id. at 108. He was arrested at the emergency room. Id. at 119.
Officers Heller and Mills have shown by affidavit that they took statements from Anderson and Patterson at the scene. Filing No. 37, Ex. A, Affidavit of Bruce Mills ("Mills Aff.") at ¶¶ 8-10; Ex. B, Affidavit of James Heller ("Heller Aff."). Officer Heller also interviewed an eyewitness who reported that plaintiff had chased Patterson and Anderson around the parking lot. Heller Aff. at ¶ 10. After completing their investigation, plaintiff was charged with assault in the second degree and criminal mischief. Heller Aff. at ¶ 12, Mills Aff. at ¶ 10. Patterson was ticketed for third degree assault and criminal mischief. Id.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no disputed issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In determining if summary judgment is appropriate, the facts must be examined in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). "[I]f there is a genuine dispute concerning predicate facts material to the qualified immunity issue, there can be no summary judgment." Lambert v. City of Dumas, 187 F.3d 931, 935 (8th Cir. 1999). However, the burden is upon the plaintiff to show the existence of such material fact or issue of law precluding summary judgment when qualified immunity is claimed by defendants. Williams v. Kelso, 201 F.3d 1060, 1064 (8th Cir. 2000). Once the predicate facts are established, the reasonableness of the official's conduct under the circumstances is a question of law. Pace v. City of Des Moines, 201 F.3d 1050, 1056 (8th Cir. 2000).The determination of whether a state actor is entitled to the protection of qualified immunity is a two-step process: the initial question is whether, "[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, . . . the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right; and second, whether the right was clearly established at the time of the violation." Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001). If no constitutional right would have been violated if the allegations were established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity. Id. Thus, before addressing the issue of whether the law was clearly established, the court must determine whether plaintiff has set forth sufficient evidence to support a finding that the officers violated his constitutional rights at all. Tlamka v. Serrell, 244 F.3d 628, 632-33 (8th Cir. 2001). If the allegations or evidence shows a violation of a constitutional right, the relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether that right was clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200.
Qualified immunity is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability, and therefore immunity issues should be resolved at the earliest possible stage of the litigation. Id. Qualified immunity shields governmental officials from personal liability if their actions, even if unlawful, were "nevertheless objectively reasonable in light of the clearly established law at the time of the events in question." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638-39 (1987). Thus, summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity is only precluded when the plaintiff has: (1) asserted a violation of a constitutional right; (2) demonstrated that the alleged right is clearly established; and (3) raised a genuine issue of fact as to whether the official would have known that his alleged conduct would have violated the plaintiff's clearly established right. Smithson v. Aldrich, 235 F.3d 1058, 1061 (8th Cir. 2000). In this context, the qualified immunity defense protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). The nonmoving party, however, is given the benefit of all relevant inferences at the summary judgment stage, and if a genuine dispute exists concerning predicate facts material to the qualified immunity issue, the defendant is not entitled to summary judgment on that ground. Smithson, 235 F.2d at 1061.
Fourth Amendment
In his complaint, Isom alleges a violation of Fourteenth Amendment rights. Filing No. 1, ¶ 2. Plaintiff's allegations, liberally construed, amount to a claim for unlawful arrest, wrongful initiation of a baseless prosecution, or failure to reasonably investigate under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 274-75, 289 (1994) (plurality opinion) (stating allegations of malicious prosecution by a detective did not state a claim of violation of substantive due process rights, but might amount to a claim of improper arrest under the Fourth Amendment). However interpreted, the claim falls under the ambit of the Fourth Amendment. See Moran v. Clarke, 296 F.3d 638, 645 (8th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (acknowledging that pretrial deprivations involving lack of probable cause are better addressed under the Fourth Amendment than under substantive due process).
A substantive due process violation would require a showing of conduct that "shocks the conscience." The evidence presented in this case does not even approach such a showing. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
A person has "a clearly established right under the Fourth Amendment not to be arrested unless there [is] probable cause for [the] arrest." Habiger v. City of Fargo, 80 F.3d 289, 295 (8th Cir. 1996). The standard governing a qualified immunity defense to a charge that an arrest lacks probable cause is "not probable cause in fact but arguable probable cause." Id. Thus, a qualified immunity analysis "somewhat expands the leeway already afforded by the substantive Fourth Amendment law. . . . [a court does] examine the conduct more deferentially at the qualified immunity stage." Audio Odyssey, Ltd. v. Brenton First Nat. Bank, 245 F.3d 721, 737 (8th Cir. 2001), reconsideration en banc granted, judgment vacated (8th Cir. July 30, 2001), reinstated 286 F.3d 498 (8th Cir. 2002) (en banc). Therefore, law enforcement officers are entitled to qualified immunity if they arrest a suspect under the mistaken belief that they have probable cause to do so — provided that the mistake is objectively reasonable. Smithson, 235 F.3d at 1061 (8th Cir. 2000) (explaining "arguable probable cause").
Law enforcement officers have a corresponding duty to conduct a reasonably thorough investigation prior to arresting a suspect, at least in the absence of exigent circumstances and as long as law enforcement would not be unduly hampered if officers waited to obtain more facts before the arrest. Kuehl v. Burris, 173 F.3d 646, 650 (8th Cir. 1999). Although an officer need not conduct a "mini-trial" before making an arrest, probable cause will not exist when minimal further investigation would have exonerated the suspect. Id. The fact that the officers did not interview every available witness, however, does not bar a finding of probable cause. Smithson, 235 F.3d at 1063. Probable cause is to be determined upon the objective facts available to the officers at the time of the arrest. Id. A claim of false arrest brought pursuant to § 1983 fails if the officer had probable cause to make the arrest. Anderson v. Larson, 327 F.3d 762, 770 (8th Cir. 2003).
There is no constitutional right to have a perfect investigation by the police. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145-46 (1979) (noting that law enforcement officers are not required under the Constitution "to perform an error-free investigation"). Moreover, unreasonable or negligent failure to investigate an arrestee's claim of innocence or mistaken identity does not amount to a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Lane v. Sarpy County, 165 F.3d 623, 624 (8th Cir. 1999). Deliberate indifference, at the least, is necessary to support a claim of wrongful detention under Section 1983. Kennell v. Gates, 215 F. 3d 825, 828 n. 4 (8th Cir. 2000).
Under these standards, the court finds that Isom has not presented sufficient evidence of any Fourth Amendment violation. At the time of Isom's arrest in this case, the officers had, at the least, arguable probable cause to conclude that Isom had committed, or was somehow involved in, a crime. The officers were presented with evidence that Isom had violently assaulted Patterson. The officers have shown that they conducted a reasonable investigation by interviewing Anderson and Patterson and a witness. Even assuming that defendants had not interviewed plaintiff, the court cannot find any unconstitutional failure to investigate. Defendants have shown that the physical evidence at the scene supported Anderson's and Patterson's version of the events. They had no reason to believe that Anderson's and Patterson's statements were fabricated. Isom has not refuted that evidence.
The evidence shows that the officers surely had probable cause to arrest Isom for second-degree assault. Plaintiff's own testimony establishes that he either intentionally or recklessly caused bodily injury to another. Defendant officers were presented with evidence at the scene that created a reason for them to believe that Isom had committed an assault. Isom's contention that his use of force may have been justified as self-defense does not enter into the calculus at the arrest and/or charging stage. See Baker, 443 U.S. at 146.
Under Nebraska law, a person commits the offense of assault in the second degree if he or she: (a) Intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to another person with a dangerous instrument; or (b) recklessly causes serious bodily injury to another person with a dangerous instrument;" Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-309.
Because the court finds Officer Heller and Mills are entitled to qualified immunity, the City of Norfolk cannot be held liable for improper training and supervision. See Kiser v. City of Huron, 219 F.3d 814 (8th Cir. 2000) ("when a § 1983 plaintiff seeks to hold a municipality liable based on its alleged inadequate training and supervision of its police officers that plaintiff must first establish that the officers' actions were unlawful"). Accordingly, the court finds defendants' motion for summary judgment (Filing No. 35) should be granted.
IT IS ORDERED that:
1. Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Filing No. 35) is granted;
2. Judgment will be entered in favor of defendants and against plaintiff and this action will be dismissed by separate order.