“[Hawaii's] statute, similar to the English statute of frauds and the statutes of many of the American States, does not stand in the way of one who seeks to enforce a resulting trust.” Ishida v. Naumu (Ishida), 34 Haw 363, 366 (1937). A resulting trust is raised “[w]here, upon the purchase of property, the consideration is paid by one, and the legal title conveyed to another.”

Furthermore, the one case cited by the ICA for support, Nat'l Board of YWCA v. YWCA of Charleston, S.C., 335 F.Supp. 615 (D.S.C.1971), does not mention the moving party's motive once, but rather focuses its analysis on the timing of the motion and the prejudice to other parties. 335 F.Supp. at 627 (noting that the delay in the motion until the morning of trial warrants its denial due to laches, unnecessary delay, and the expense that granting the motion would have caused for the other parties who were ready to proceed). See also Ishida v. Naumu, 34 Haw. 363, 372 (Haw.Terr.1937) ("A court of equity ... has always refused its aid to stale demands where the party has slept upon his [127 Hawai'i 509] rights or acquiesced for a great length of time.

11. An inter vivos trust may be oral unless otherwise required by a statute of frauds. Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 20 (2003); Ishida v. Naumu, 34 Haw. 363, 1937 WL 4469, at *2 (1937) (noting that an express trust may be made by written or spoken words or by conduct). When Warlito deposited funds in the certificate of deposit at American Savings Bank in Waldo's name, he created an express oral trust with the understanding that Waldo was to use the money for the benefit of Warlito until his death.

When these are wanting, the court is passive and does nothing; laches and neglect are always discountenanced. Ishida v. Naumu, 34 Haw. 363, 372 (1937).See also, Lucas v. American-Hawaiian Engineering Construction Co., 16 Haw. 80 (1904).

We disagree. The equitable doctrine of laches applies where "long acquiescence in the assertion of adverse rights has occurred", Ishida v. Naumu, 34 Haw. 363, 373 (1937), or when, "during inexcusable delay, the evidence has become obscured and, under the circumstances of the case, it is too late to ascertain the merits of the controversy." Poka v. Holi, 44 Haw. 464, 475, 357 P.2d 100 (1960); Brown v. Bishop Trust Co., 44 Haw. 385, 355 P.2d 179 (1960).

No question of laches could properly arise until a particular heir died and the question then would arise only as to the share of the deceased heir. See Howe v. Howe, 199 Mass. 598, 85 N.E. 945; Crawford v. Hurst, 299 Ill. 503, 132 N.E. 521, 524; cf., Ishida v. Naumu, 34 Haw. 363, 373. The widow died October 31, 1908.

Additionally, as in all equitable actions, the doctrine of laches is applicable and undue delay may again bar relief. In Ishida v. Naumu, 34 Haw. 363 (1937), our supreme court stated: A court of equity . . . has always refused its aid to stale demands where the party has slept upon his rights or acquiesced for a great length of time.