The case law likewise is clear that the admission of evidence of the State authorization to act as agent is proper, and the evidence prima facie establishes the agency of the person named. Irvin v. Metropolitan-Hibernia Fire Ins. Co., 247 Ill. App. 562, 569. And it is unquestioned that the State has the right to designate who are the authorized or even the acting agents of an insurance company doing business within its jurisdiction.
An action on a promise to provide insurance may be distinct from an action on an insurance policy. ( Irvin v. Metropolitan-Hibernia Fire Insurance Co. (1928), 247 Ill. App. 562, 566; see also De Luxe Motor Stages v. Hartford Accident Indemnity Co. (1967), 88 Ill. App.2d 188, 193, 232 N.E.2d 141; Lawrence v. Massachusetts Bonding Insurance Co. (Sup. Ct. 1916), 160 N.Y.S. 883, 895.) Moreover, contractual limitation periods generally do not apply to "different or collateral actions involving, in some measure, the policy proceeds or growing out of the insurer's duties to the insured."