Opinion
Civ. No. 99-1526. SECTION "K" (3).
March 13, 2000.
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the court is a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 15), pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 12 (c) filed by defendant Orleans Parish Criminal Sheriff Charles C. Foti, Jr. For the reasons explained below, the motion is granted.
I. BACKGROUND
The facts of this case were set forth in the court's Order and Reasons dated July 13, 1999 (Doc. 10). Accordingly, only a brief summary is necessary here. Jo Ann Johnson ("Ms. Johnson") was arrested at home on April 3, 1999. At the time of her arrest, Ms. Johnson informed the officer that she was diabetic and required medication, but the arresting officer refused to allow her to retrieve her insulin before leaving the house. Her physical condition began to deteriorate while in prison, and she died three days later, after being rushed to Charity Hospital.
Several of Ms. Johnson's relatives then filed this suit alleging various causes of action. Since the court ruled on defendant's first Motion to Dismiss in its July 13, 1999 Order and Reasons, the only plaintiffs remaining in this action are Jamara L. Johnson ("Johnson"), Ms. Johnson's two-year-old daughter, and Victoria G. Francis ("Francis"), Ms. Johnson's biological mother. In its Order and Reasons, the court suggested to the plaintiffs that Francis might have a cause of action under section 1983 for injury to her constitutionally protected liberty interest in parenthood. It was not until the defendant filed this Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings that plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint "in an effort to clear up any remaining defects" with respect to Francis' claim.
Magistrate Judge Africk granted plaintiffs leave to file their amended complaint (Doc. 30), and the court has considered Francis' additional allegations in ruling on defendant's motion.
II. STANDARD FOR MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
Defendant seeks dismissal of Francis' section 1983 claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c), i.e., a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The standard of review is similar to that under Rule 12(b)(6), and a court must "look only at the pleadings and accept them as true." St. Paul Ins. of Bellaire v. AFIA Worldwide Ins., 937 F.2d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 1991). The district court in Park Center, Inc. v. Champion International Corporation, 804 F. Supp. 294, 301 (S.D.Ala. 1992), provided a succinct summary of the standard of review on a motion for judgment on the pleadings:
On a motion for judgment on the pleadings, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) requires the Court to view the pleadings in the light most favorable to, and to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmovant. The Court may grant judgment on the pleadings if it appears beyond doubt that the non-movant [sic] can plead or prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Judgment on the pleadings is also appropriate where material facts are undisputed and where judgment on the merits is possible merely by considering the contents of the pleadings. The Court may grant judgment on the pleadings only if, on the admitted facts, the moving party is clearly entitled to judgment.
(Citations omitted.) See also Greenbert v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 478 F.2d 254, 256 (5th Cir. 1973) (comparing motion for judgment on the pleadings to motion for summary judgment); Wright Miller, Federal Practice Procedure: Civil 2d § 1368.
With these standards in mind, the court analyzes the defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.
III. ANALYSIS
Defendant maintains that it is entitled to qualified immunity because: 1) Francis has failed to allege facts sufficient to support the claimed violation of a constitutional right actionable under section 1983; and 2) recovery for interference with the right of parental association is not a clearly established right of which a reasonable person would be aware.
First defendant argues that to recover for injury to the parental right of intimate association, the plaintiff must allege that the state acted intentionally to interfere with the relationship. Trujillo v. Board of County Commissioners of the County of Santa Fe, 768 F.2d 1186, 1188 (10th Cir. 1985). In Trujillo, the mother and sister of the decedent alleged that they were deprived of their constitutional right of familial association in a factual situation very similar to the one before this court. The Tenth Circuit reasoned that "an allegation of intent to interfere with a particular relationship protected by the freedom of intimate association is required to state a claim under section 1983." Trujillo, 768 F.2d at 1190.
In reaching this conclusion, the Trujillo court analogized the freedom of intimate association to the freedom of expressive association. The court noted that in some cases protecting the First Amendment freedom of expressive association and freedom of speech, courts have imposed the requirement that the state have acted intentionally. Id., citing Mt. Health City School District v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977); Wilson v. Taylor, 733 F.2d 1539 (11th Cir, 1984).
In further support of its argument that a showing of intent is required to recover for interference with the plaintiffs right of intimate association, defendant cites Ortiz v. Burgos, 807 F.2d 6, 8-9 (1st Cir. 1986) ( citing, Kelson v. City of Springfield, 767 F.2d 651, 653-55 (9th Cir. 1985); Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1242-48 (7th Cir. 1984); Logan v. Hollier, 711 F.2d 690, 690-691 (5th Cir. 1983)), cert denied, Spencer v. Logan, 466 U.S. 936 (1984). Although the principal issue before the Ortiz court was whether the stepfather and siblings of the deceased inmate had a right to assert claims under section 1983, the court noted as an aside that
the [Supreme Court] has never held that governmental action that affects the parental relationship only incidentally — as in this case — is susceptible to challenge for a violation of due process. Moreover, as in the substantive due process cases involving parents and children, the right to procedural due process has not been extended beyond settings in which the state was attempting to affect the relationship between a parent and his or her minor child.Id. The Ortiz court noted one exception to the general trend limiting recovery under section 1983 to government action directly aimed at the relationship between a parent and a young child. Id. ( citing Trujillo, 768 F.2d at 1188-90.)
While Trujillo required a showing of intent, it did not limit recovery to parents of minor children.
Defendant urges the court to dismiss Francis' claim because neither the complaint nor the amended complaint in this matter contain allegations that the defendant intentionally interfered with Francis' right of intimate association with her daughter. In opposition to defendant's motion, plaintiff contends that this matter had already been ruled upon and adopted the court's prior reasons as its own. Plaintiff refers to the court's prior Order and Reasons in which it suggested that plaintiff may have a cause of action for deprivation of her interest in parenthood. Nonetheless, once the defendant has raised the defense of qualified immunity, the court must thoroughly analyze both the currently applicable law and the law which was clearly established at the time of the alleged injury.
The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for civil damages when "their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The Supreme Court enunciated a two-prong test to ascertain the viability of a government official's assertion of qualified immunity in Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991). First, we must examine whether the "plaintiff has alleged a violation of a clearly established right." Fontenot v. Cormier, 56 F.3d 669, 673 (5th Cir. 1995); see also Siegert, 500 U.S. at 231. Second, the court must determine whether the defendant's conduct was objectively reasonable in light of "clearly established" law at the time of the alleged violation. Id. at 231-32; see also Kelly v. Foti, 77 F.3d 819, 821 (5th Cir. 1996). "Objective reasonableness is a matter of law for the courts to decide[.]" Williams v. Bramer, 180 F.3d 699, 702 (5th Cir. 1999). The touchstone of this inquiry is whether a reasonable person would have believed that his conduct conformed to the constitutional standard in light of the information available to him and the clearly established law. See Gutierrez v. City of San Antonio, 139 F.3d 441, 447 (5th Cir. 1998). Therefore, "[e]ven law enforcement officials who "reasonably but mistakenly [commit a constitutional violation]' are entitled to immunity." Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) ( quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987)). "Clearly established" means that "[t]he contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640; see also Goodson v. City of Corpus Christi, 202 F.3d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 2000).
Recently, the Supreme Court reviewed the doctrine of qualified immunity in Wilson v. Layne, 119 S.Ct. 1692 (1999). Although Wilson dealt with an alleged intrusion on plaintiffs Fourth Amendment rights (media observers accompanying officers during a search and seizure in plaintiffs' home), the court's discussion of the second prong of the doctrine of qualified immunity is particularly instructive. "It could plausibly be asserted that any violation of the Fourth Amendment is "clearly established," since it is clearly established that the protections of the Fourth Amendment apply to the actions of police." Id. at 1699. The Wilson court, however, held that the officers did enjoy qualified immunity for their actions because 1) the constitutional question presented was not "open and shut;" and 2) at the time of the officers' action, there were no judicial opinions specifically holding the action unlawful. Id. at 1700. The court also noted that the defendants' actions did have some social utility ("media coverage of police activities serves an important public purpose"). Id.
With respect to the first prong of the analysis, the court must determine whether plaintiff has actually alleged violation of a clearly established constitutional right. Although "the Supreme Court has long recognized the fundamental familial rights involved in marriage, procreation, and child rearing as the source of a substantive due process right in the parent-child relationship." Irvin v. Foti, 1999 WL 504916 (E.D.La.), no case controlling in this circuit has "clearly established" the right of recovery under section 1983 for intrusion upon relationship between a parent and her adult child.
Neither the Fifth Circuit nor the Supreme Court had clearly addressed the issue. The Fifth Circuit in Logan v. Hollier vacated the district court's dismissal of a mother's section 1983 claim for the death of her daughter, who was also survived by five minor children. 711 F.2d 690. The district court had concluded that hierarchy of beneficiaries found in Louisiana Civil Code article 2315 precluded plaintiff from asserting any section 1983 claims. Id. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that while the hierarchy of beneficiaries applied to wrongful death and survival actions, it did not preclude the mother from asserting her claim for intrusion on her interest in parenthood. 711 F.2d at 691. The Logan court, however, did not decide whether such a right exists but remanded the case for further inquiry by the district court. The court reviewed the line of precedent from the Supreme Court that emphasizes the importance of the family and basic familial relationships. Id. Furthermore, the court advised that the language in Jones v. Hildebrant might be particularly instructive. Id. ( citing Jones v. Hildebrant, 432 U.S. 183 (1977) (dismissing petition for certiorari as improvidently granted)).
The Supreme Court in Jones did not squarely address the issue before this court. In Jones, the plaintiff brought suit after her fifteen-year-old son was killed by a police officer. Her claims were based on Colorado's wrongful death statute as well as on section 1983 for deprivation of federal constitutional rights. The trial court ruled that her section 1983 claim was "merged" with her state claims. Because the state law limited recovery for wrongful death to $45,000, the plaintiff stipulated to a reduction in recovery and received a jury award of only $1,500. Jones, 432 U.S. 184. The Supreme Court was asked to decide whether plaintiff was limited in her recovery to the $45,000 available under state law. Id. The Court explained that the plaintiff had assumed that the constitutional violation supporting her section 1983 claim was undisputed and had not briefed that issue to the Colorado Supreme Court. Id. at 188. Consequently, her petition for certiorari was dismissed as improvidently granted, and the Court did not address the validity of plaintiffs section 1983 claim. Id. at 189.
While the Fifth Circuit in Logan noted the significance of Jones, neither the Supreme Court nor the Fifth Circuit has directly addressed the issue of whether the parent of an adult child has a cause of action under section 1983 for injury to the right of intimate association with that child. The constitutional question before this court is not open and shut, and there are no eases controlling in this circuit which establish such a cause of action, either with or without a requirement of demonstrating intentional conduct. The court does not find that the right to recover for the death of an adult child under section 1983 is clearly established such that a reasonable person would have been aware of the right. The court does not reach the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis. Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Francis' section 1983 claim. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and the claim of plaintiff Victoria Francis is dismissed with prejudice.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 13th day of March, 2000.
MINUTE ENTRY BARBIER, J. MARCH 14, 2000.