"[T]he Court does hereby find that the law firms of Chason Chason, P.C., and Thomas P. Ollinger, Jr., have rendered legal services in this matter which were for the common benefit of the parties hereto and that attorneys fees are otherwise due to be paid to said attorneys out of the sales proceeds in this case. On consideration of the factors set out in Irons v. Le Sueur, 487 So.2d 1352 (Ala. 1986), the Court finds that said attorneys are collectively entitled to the payment of a reasonable attorney fee from the proceeds of sale in this matter in the sum of $ 198,750.00 and that they have advanced expenses in connection with this matter in the amount of $ 5,561.20, for which they are entitled to reimbursement. Said fees and expenses are hereby approved as expenses of sale in this cause and the Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to pay those sums to said attorneys from the proceeds of sale on deposit in this cause.
The reasonableness of an attorney fee under a contract providing for the recovery of reasonable attorney fees is largely within the discretion of the trial court. Peebles v. Miley, 439 So. 2d 137 (Ala. 1983); see [also] Irons v. Le Sueur, 487 So. 2d 1352 (Ala. 1986); Mann v. Mann, 451 So. 2d 783 (Ala. 1984).
"Irons v. Le Sueur, 487 So.2d 1352, 1359 (Ala. 1986). III. AnalysisA.
The Bryants next assert that the trial court erred in ordering that, due to the Bryants' failure to properly or to timely respond to the Robledos' requests for admissions, those matters would be deemed admitted. See Rule 36(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. The Bryants rely primarily on the decision of Cole v. Cooley, 547 So.2d 1187 (Ala.Civ.App. 1989), which was ostensibly predicated upon our Supreme Court's holding in Irons v. Le Sueur, 487 So.2d 1352 (Ala. 1986). The underlying facts in Irons were quite unusual.
Rule 36(b), however, is not to be construed "as a device whereby facts, obviously disputed by the party propounding the request, may be conclusively established against that party." Irons v. Le Sueur, 487 So. 2d 1352, 1355 (Ala. 1986). The rule thus does not apply where, as here, the proponent disputes the accuracy of the admissions.
The reasonableness of fees is determined on a case-by-case basis by the trial court. Lanier v. Moore–Handley, Inc. , 575 So.2d 83, 85 (Ala. 1991) (citing Irons v. Le Sueur , 487 So.2d 1352 (Ala. 1986) ; Mann v. Mann , 451 So.2d 783 (Ala. 1984) ; Peebles v. Miley , 439 So.2d 137 (Ala. 1983).
The reasonableness of fees is determined on a case-by-case basis by the trial court. Lanier v. Moore–Handley, Inc. , 575 So.2d 83, 85 (Ala. 1991) (citing Irons v. Le Sueur , 487 So.2d 1352 (Ala. 1986) ; Mann v. Mann , 451 So.2d 783 (Ala. 1984) ; Peebles v. Miley , 439 So.2d 137 (Ala. 1983). "Alabama law reads into every agreement allowing for the recovery of attorney's fees a reasonableness limitation." Willow Lake Residential Ass'n, Inc. v. Juliano , 80 So.3d 226, 241 (2010).
' Id. . . . While some of the successive codifications, including the present one, have omitted the language that `the services must be for the common benefit of all,' this Court has consistently maintained that condition on the trial judge's authority to award attorney fees pursuant to these codifications. Id. See, e.g., Irons v. Le Sueur, 487 So.2d 1352, 1359 (Ala. 1986): "`Likewise, when attorney's fees are allowed under § 34-3-60, [Ala.] Code 1975, it is on the basis of, and solely for, the benefits inuring to the common estate and to the tenants in common and not involving controversy as to respective rights or interests of individual tenants in common.
The reasonableness of an attorney fee under a contract providing for the recovery of reasonable attorney fees is largely within the discretion of the trial court. Peebles v. Miley, 439 So.2d 137 (Ala. 1983); see Irons v. Le Sueur, 487 So.2d 1352 (Ala. 1986); Mann v. Mann, 451 So.2d 783 (Ala. 1984).
Id. (Emphasis added.) While some of the successive codifications, including the present one, have omitted the language that "the services must be for the common benefit of all," this Court has consistently maintained that condition on the trial judge's authority to award attorney fees pursuant to these codifications.Id. See, e.g., Irons v. Le Sueur, 487 So.2d 1352, 1359 (Ala. 1986): "Likewise, when attorney's fees are allowed under § 34-3-60, Code 1975, it is on the basis of, and solely for, the benefits inuring to the common estate and to the tenants in common and not involving controversy as to respective rights or interests of individual tenants in common.