Irby v. Southern Railway Co.

5 Citing cases

  1. Dixon v. CSX Transportation, Inc.

    990 F.2d 1440 (4th Cir. 1993)   Cited 77 times
    Holding that where an individual could not show that, at the time of the accident, he was employed to perform services for the railroad, or was subject to the control of the railroad, then he was not an employee for FELA liability purposes

    Although "[their] failure to do so does not relieve the [motorist] of the duty to exercise due care for his own safety," operators are "under duty to give [motorists] timely warning of the approach of [their] train to a public crossing." Irby v. Southern Ry., 246 N.C. 384, 98 S.E.2d 349, 354 (1957). And under North Carolina common law, railroad companies must maintain automatic warning devices at crossings if the crossings are "so dangerous that prudent persons cannot use them with safety unless extraordinary protective means are used."

  2. Price v. Railroad

    161 S.E.2d 590 (N.C. 1968)   Cited 19 times
    In Price v. Seaboard Air Line Railroad Co., 274 N.C. 32, 161 S.E.2d 590, 595 (1968), the Court announced the doctrines applied in 1965, and nothing appears to render them inapposite in 1967, when Hunter was hurt.

    "A railroad company is under duty to give travelers timely warning of the approach of its train to a public crossing, but its failure to do so does not relieve a traveler of his duty to exercise due care for his own safety, and the failure of a traveler to exercise such care bars recovery when such failure is a proximate cause of the injury." In Irby v. R. R., 246 N.C. 384, 98 S.E.2d 349, it is said: "In the instant case plaintiff knew that he was approaching a railroad, and he knew he was entering a zone of danger.

  3. Greene v. Laboratories, Inc.

    254 N.C. 680 (N.C. 1961)   Cited 74 times
    Affirming trial court's order dismissing implied-in-law indemnification claim when there was an express indemnification agreement between the parties that did not cover the losses sought

    Taylor v. Rierson, 210 N.C. 185, 189, 185 S.E. 627. The doctrine has application only as between plaintiff and a defendant. The doctrine as applied in this jurisdiction is defined and explained in Irby v. R. R., 246 N.C. 384, 391, 98 S.E.2d 349; and Ingram v. Smoky Mountain Stages, Inc., 225 N.C. 444, 448, 35 S.E.2d 337. Under the facts as alleged in the instant case the last clear chance doctrine is not available, even to plaintiff.

  4. Jarrett v. R.R

    119 S.E.2d 383 (N.C. 1961)   Cited 3 times

    Two thousand vehicles traverse four railroad tracks each day. The degree of vigilance required of both parties is in proportion to the known danger. One of the leading cases is Johnson v. R.R., 163 N.C. 431, 79 S.E. 690. Others are Sherrill v. R.R., 140 N.C. 252, 52 S.E. 940; Coleman v. R.R., 153 N.C. 322, 69 S.E. 251; Moseley v. R.R., 197 N.C. 628, 150 S.E. 184; Lincoln v. R.R., 207 N.C. 787, 178 S.E. 601; Cole v. Koonce, 214 N.C. 188, 198 S.E. 637; White v. R.R., 216 N.C. 79, 3 S.E.2d 310; Godwin v. R.R., 220 N.C. 281, 17 S.E.2d 137; Beaman v. R.R., 238 N.C. 418, 78 S.E.2d 182; Irby v. R.R., 246 N.C. 384, 98 S.E.2d 349; Faircloth v. R.R., 247 N.C. 190, 100 S.E.2d 328; High v. R.R., 248 N.C. 414, 103 S.E.2d 498; Arvin v. McClintock, 253 N.C. 679, 118 S.E.2d 129. This is a close case.

  5. Miller v. Davis

    321 S.E.2d 470 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 2 times

    There have been many cases dealing with the contributory negligence of a motor vehicle operator at a railroad crossing. See Cox v. Gallamore, 267 N.C. 537, 148 S.E.2d 616 (1966); Ramey v. R.R., 262 N.C. 230, 136 S.E.2d 638 (1964); Carter v. R.R., 256 N.C. 545, 124 S.E.2d 561 (1962); Arvin v. McClintock, 253 N.C. 679, 118 S.E.2d 129 (1961); Faircloth v. R.R., 247 N.C. 190, 100 S.E.2d 328 (1957); Irby v. R.R., 246 N.C. 384, 98 S.E.2d 349 (1957); Dowdy v. R.R., 237 N.C. 519, 75 S.E.2d 639 (1953); Jones v. R.R., 235 N.C. 640, 70 S.E.2d 669 (1952); Parker v. R.R., 232 N.C. 472, 61 S.E.2d 370 (1950) and Jeffries v. Powell, 221 N.C. 415, 20 S.E.2d 561 (1942). We believe the general rule from these cases is that a motorist is contributorily negligent in approaching a railroad track if he does not see what he could have seen even if he had to come to a stop to do so.