Opinion
No. 4-378 / 02-1254.
August 26, 2004.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Shelby County, James M. Richardson, Judge.
The plaintiff has filed a petition for writ of certiorari challenging the district court's ruling in a criminal case requiring the plaintiff to issue a driver's license without the installation of an ignition interlock device as required by Iowa Code section 321J.17(3) (2001). WRIT SUSTAINED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Mark Hunacek, Assistant Attorney General, for plaintiff.
Marcus Gross, Jr. of Kohorst, Early, Gross, Louis, Harlan, until withdrawal, then no appearance for defendant.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Miller, J., and Brown, S.J.
Senior Judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2003).
The Iowa District Court, sitting in Shelby County, countermanded the refusal of the Iowa Department of Transportation (IDOT) to reinstate the Iowa operator's privileges for Timothy Coenen, and ordered the department to issue him a driver's license. IDOT has challenged that order in this certiorari action. We conclude the district court had no authority to order the department to reinstate the license, and therefore sustain the writ.
Timothy Lee Coenen was defendant in an Operating While Intoxicated (OWI) case. His driver's license was suspended until May 30, 2000. At that time, Iowa law would have permitted reinstatement of his license without the installation of an ignition interlock device. However, the legislature enacted what became Iowa Code section 321J.17(3) (2001), which directed IDOT require an interlock device on all vehicles owned or operated by persons in Coenen's situation as a condition of reinstatement. The statute was effective July 1, 2000. Coenen did not apply for reinstatement until after July 1, 2000. IDOT refused to reinstate Coenen's license unless he first installed an ignition interlock device.
Some of the background facts are taken from IDOT's brief, supported by the district court's orders and Coenen's petition. Coenen's application for reinstatement, IDOT's refusal to reinstate, and the documents concerning Coenen's suspension are not included in the appendix. No brief has been filed on the district court's behalf.
Coenen then filed this action, styled as his "Petition for Declaratory Judgment or, Alternatively, Appeal to the District Court, or, Alternatively, Petition for Declaratory Judgment." This petition was filed in the OWI criminal case in which Coenen was the defendant. It designated Coenen as plaintiff and IDOT as defendant. Of course, IDOT was not a party in the criminal case. Coenen requested the court order IDOT to reinstate his driver's license without requiring Coenen to first install an ignition interlock device. The district court ordered IDOT to reinstate Coenen's driving privileges as Coenen requested.
In its certiorari action, IDOT first challenges the authority of the district court to issue any order directed to it concerning Coenen's driver's license suspension. It also claims the court erred in holding the July 1, 2000 ignition interlock requirement did not apply to Coenen and consequently acted beyond its authority. We think it clear the exclusive method of challenging IDOT's action in this case is found in Iowa Code chapter 17A, the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act. Coenen has not complied with the mandates of the Act. Thus we do not address the merits of the court's order.
IDOT is statutorily charged with administering the reinstatement of drivers' licenses. Iowa Code § 321J.17. Its decision to deny reinstatement to Coenen unless the ignition interlock was installed was agency action, invoking the requirements for judicial review contained in section 17A.19. Iowa Code § 17A.2(2); Kotlers v. Iowa Dep't. of Transp., 589 N.W.2d 733, 734-35 (Iowa 1999). With few exceptions, not applicable here, the remedy prescribed by chapter 17A is exclusive and failure to follow its mandates deprives the district court of authority to act. Iowa Code § 17A.19 ("Except as expressly provided otherwise by another statute referring to this chapter by name, the judicial review provisions of this chapter shall be the exclusive means by which a person or party who is aggrieved or adversely affected by agency action may seek judicial review of such agency action."); City of Des Moines v. City Development Bd., 633 N.W.2d 305, 311 (Iowa 2001) (section 17A.19 provides exclusive means for judicial review of agency action in all cases except when another statute expressly provides otherwise by specific reference to chapter 17A); Kotlers, 589 N.W.2d at 735 ("Most important, the judicial review provisions of chapter 17A are exclusive.").
We think the rule applicable here is that "the court must refuse to issue a ruling unless the action is indistinguishable in substance from a petition for judicial review, and all of the jurisdictional prerequisites for judicial review of agency action have been met." State v. Clark, 608 N.W.2d 5, 7 (Iowa 2000). Literal compliance is not required, but the procedural process must be substantially followed. Brown v. John Deere Waterloo Tractor Works, 423 N.W.2d 193, 194 (Iowa 1988). The record here fails to disclose even minimal compliance with the notice and procedural requirements of Iowa Code section 17A.19. By its terms, failure to so comply deprives the court of jurisdiction. Iowa Code § 17A.19 (2); Brown, 423 N.W.2d at 194.
Iowa Code section 17A.19(6) requires IDOT be allowed thirty days within which to respond to an administrative appeal petition by transmitting the entire record before the agency to the court. The initial order setting hearing on Coenen's petition only provided five days notice to IDOT. Coenen's resistance to IDOT's motion to reconsider claims notice of the initial July 22 hearing was mailed July 15. However, IDOT's unchallenged motion for rescheduled hearing states IDOT did not receive any notice and that none was in fact mailed to it. The record does not show any notice was sent or otherwise provided to IDOT. No proof-of-mailing affidavit, required by Iowa Code section 17A.19(2), appears in the record.
IDOT initially objected to the court's authority to proceed in this case based on Coenen's failure to appeal as required by Iowa Code chapter 17A, and has consistently raised this jurisdictional objection throughout.
The opening paragraph in Iowa Department of Transportation v. Iowa District Court for Bremer County, 534 N.W.2d 457, 458 (Iowa 1995), succinctly summarizes our conclusion here:
Does a district court have authority in a criminal case to enter an order that in effect prohibits the revocation of the defendant's driver's license by the Iowa Department of Transportation (DOT)? We think it does not. Therefore, we sustain the DOT's petition for writ of certiorari challenging the legality of the district court's order doing so here.WRIT SUSTAINED.