Opinion
No. CV 10-6010937S
August 4, 2011
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION AND RESTRAINING ORDER
Preliminary Statement
Through this action the plaintiffs seek an adjudication of the parties' interest in a parcel of property known as "Pent Court" located in Fairfield, Connecticut. The plaintiffs seek to temporarily enjoin the defendant Town of Fairfield from closing on a contract with defendant 2316 Post Road, LLC, which contract purports to transfer by quit claim deed the town's interest in "Pent Court." The plaintiffs, who themselves assert an interest in "Pent Court," aver that the town's purported transfer is not in compliance with statutory and town code requirements; that it is illegal and that it should therefore be enjoined pending adjudication of the plaintiffs verified complaint. The defendant town and defendants 2316 Post Road, LLC and its principal Walter Levine argue that no injunction should issue.
Plaintiff Exide Corporation is the current abutting landowner of the property both north and east of Pent Court. Plaintiff Invest II has a contract with Exide Corporation to purchase the land. Walter Levine is the principal in 2316 Post Road, LLC, which owns the property abutting Pent Court to the west.
Standard of Review
The Superior Court has the statutory authority to grant relief by way of a writ of injunction. General Statutes § 52-471. A temporary injunction is a court order issued at the outset or during the pendency of a case forbidding the performance or continuance of certain acts until the rights of the parties have been finally adjudicated. Deming v. Bradstreet, 85 Conn. 650, 84 A. 116 (1912). "The principal purpose of a temporary injunction `is to preserve the status quo until the rights of the parties can be finally determined after a hearing on the merits.'" Clinton v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 37 Conn.App. 269, 270 (1995), quoting, Olcott v. Pendleton, 128 Conn. 292, 295, 22 A.2d 633 (1941). The court applies "familiar equitable principles in the context of adjusting the rights of the parties during the pendency of litigation." Griffin Hospital v. Commission on Hospitals, 196 Conn. 451, 458-60 (1985). The court employs a four-part analysis. In order to issue a temporary injunction, the court must determine that: (1) the plaintiff has no adequate legal remedy; (2) the plaintiff would suffer irreparable injury absent the injunction; (3) the plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits of the case; and (4) the balance of the equities favor the injunction. On these issues, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof. See, Waterbury Teacher's Association v. Freedom of Information Commission, 230 Conn. 441, 446 (1994).
However, a plaintiff is relieved of the normal burden of establishing irreparable harm and lack of an adequate remedy at law when a statutory violation is alleged. See, Gelinas v. Town of West Hartford, 225 Conn. 575, 588 (1993) (Where town sought injunction for various zoning and building code violations, the town needed only to prove that the statutes or ordinances were violated in order to obtain injunctive relief); see also, Conservation Commission v. Price, 193 Conn. 414, 429 (1984) (Present harm was not a necessary showing in order to obtain injunctive relief for violations of the Inland Wetlands and Watercourses Act); Johnson v. Murzyn, 1 Conn.App. 176, 469 A.2d 1227 (1984) (zoning enforcement officer seeking injunction under General Statutes 8-12 for violation of town zoning regulation not required to allege and prove irreparable harm and the lack of an adequate legal remedy).
Here, the plaintiffs allege that the action by the Town of Fairfield violated both Section 8-24 of the Connecticut General Statutes but also the express provision of the Town of Fairfield Code, § 35-5. It does not appear to this court that such alleged violations relieve the plaintiff of the burden of establishing irreparable harm and the lack of an adequate remedy at law. See, e.g., Theurkauf v. Miller, 153 Conn. 159, 161 (1965) (Plaintiffs seeking to enjoin a town from holding a referendum on the continuance of its historic district failed to show irreparable harm or lack of adequate remedy at law). Indeed, in each of the cases wherein the plaintiff was relieved of its burden, the statute that was allegedly violated expressly provided for injunctive relief or other restraint as a remedy therefore. Under those circumstances, the court noted that "[t]he rationale underlying [the] rule that the complainant is relieved of his burden of proving irreparable harm and no adequate remedy at law is that the enactment of the statute by implication assumes that no adequate alternative remedy exists and that the injury was irreparable, that is, the legislation was needed or else it would not have been enacted." Crab Tree v. Van Hise, 39 Conn.Sup. 334, 338 (App. Sess. 1983). See also, Price v. Conservation Commission, supra. See also, Sound Trefoil, LLC v. Old Mine Associates, LLC, Dkt. No. CV 05 4012487, judicial district of Fairfield, (November 9, 2005, Arnold, J.) [ 40 Conn. L. Rptr. 263] (Plaintiffs seeking to enjoin the planning and zoning commission from holding a hearing on defendant's special permit application due to the defendant's failure to submit a wetlands application as required by statute failed to demonstrate that they had no adequate remedy at law). Conn. Gen. Stat. § 8-24 contains no provision allowing for restraint or injunctive relief in the event of a violation thereof. Thus, the plaintiffs here are not relieved of their burden of establishing irreparable harm and an inadequate remedy at law.
In addition to the claim that the town failed to follow proper procedure, the plaintiffs argue that the town is attempting to sell a town road in excess of the delegated powers of the municipality. When a municipality has acted in excess of its delegated powers, the plaintiff is not required to show that he has been irreparably harmed by the ultra vires act or that damages are not available in order to obtain relief, as such acts are void ab initio. See, Wellswood Columbia, LLC v. Town of Hebron, 295 Conn. 802, 824 (2010). This court does not reach the question of success on the merits of this specific claim.
Facts
Pent Court is currently a strip of land approximately 150 feet long and 50 feet wide. On its southern border lies the Post Road in Fairfield, Connecticut. To the west is 2316 Post Road, which is owned by defendant 2316 Post Road, LLC and on which a restaurant is operated by defendant Martin Levine. To the north and east is property owned by plaintiff Exide Group Incorporated. The Town of Fairfield maintains a sewer line which runs beneath Pent Court.
Prior to 1950, Pent Court extended from the Post Road north to the Metro North Railroad tracks. In 1950, the Town of Fairfield implemented procedures under the statutes and the Code to formally abandon the northern portion of Pent Court. The Minutes of the Representative Town Meeting (RTM) from December 18, 1950 provide:
Mr. D.L. Kinnie, seconded by Mr. Biggs, moved: RESOLVED, That, in accordance with the recommendations of the Town Plan and Zoning Commission and of the Board of Selectmen, the so-called Pent Road on the west side of The Electric Storage Battery Company plant is discontinued and abandoned from a point 150 feet north of the northerly side of the Boston Post Road to the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad right of way.
Mr. Lehr explained the arrangements.
Mr. Goodspeed for the Legislative and Administrative Committee and Mr. Cudmore for the Public Works and Highways Committee expressed the approval of their committees.
On vote the motion was Carried.
The land over which this northern portion of Pent Court ran is currently owned by plaintiff Exide.
Since 1950, Pent Court has been put to various uses. The primary purpose to which it has been put is public parking for the patrons of the various restaurants which have occupied the abutting property at 2316 Post Road. Pent Court is used by the public for parking on those occasions that a parade might be occurring downtown. Pent Court has been used as overflow parking for the establishments that are across the street along the south side of the Post Road. Pent Court has been used, on occasion, by the plaintiff Exide, to gain access to that portion of its property which abuts Pent Court. The town accesses Pent Court as necessary to maintain its sewer line beneath Pent Court.
The testimony established that over the past 25 (approximately) years, the defendant has leased the property to others for purposes of running a restaurant; the defendant has himself run a restaurant at the location; and that 2316 Post Road has also been vacant for periods of time, with no restaurant operating thereon.
On one occasion, Pent Court was the site of an excavation as Exide was required to remove underground storage tanks which lay beneath Pent Court.
Since 1950, the town has declared Pent Court to be a town road for purposes of its annual inventory of town roads maintained by the town. This annual inventory is verified as accurate and submitted to the State pursuant to statute. At some point in the past, Pent Court was demarcated with a town street sign. The town has never assessed taxes against any person or entity for Pent Court. On an as-needed basis, the town would perform maintenance or repairs to Pent Court, though evidence of any particular maintenance is absent.
In June 2010, the town First Selectmen, Kenneth Flatto, entered into an agreement with the defendants to quit claim Pent Court to the defendant 2316 Post Road, LLC in exchange for $50,000.00. Flatto testified that he believed that the town owned the land. However, he did not solicit any other prospective buyers; he did not put Pent Court up for bid, or engage in any process by which someone other than the defendant might be offered the property. Nor did First Selectman Flatto take any meaningful steps to determine the fair market value of Pent Court.
He was only vaguely aware of the assessor's valuation of the neighboring properties. He did not consult a realtor, an appraiser or any other person knowledgeable on such issues.
On June 16, 2010, the Board of Selectmen approved the proposed sale. Thereafter, at a meeting of the RTM the sale was approved, subject to obtaining an indemnification and hold harmless agreement from 2316 Post Road, LLC in the event of legal action as a result of the RTM's approval. At the time the RTM approved the sale, the town attorney took the position and so advised the RTM that Pent Court was a town road.
Following the approval of the RTM, the plaintiffs filed their initial request for a temporary injunction in which they alleged, among other things, that the town had failed to obtain the approval of the Town Plan and Zoning Commission, as required by statute as well as the town Code. The initial relief sought was to enjoin the purported transfer to 2316 Post Road, LLC until the statutory and code provisions were followed. On August 4, 2010, the plaintiffs amended their request for temporary injunctive relief requesting that the transfer be enjoined until such time as each of the parties' rights to the property in question are resolved through adjudication of their verified complaint.
After the litigation was commenced, in September 2010, presumably in an effort to satisfy applicable statutes and code provisions, the proposal was presented to the Town Plan and Zoning Commission, which approved the agreement. In addition, on September 8, 2010, the town caused to be published a "Legal Advertisement" which was a solicitation for bids to purchase Pent Court. Two days later, the town retracted that "Legal Advertisement" and issued a different "Legal Advertisement" which simply advised of the intended "disposal" of the property. Both advertisement refer to the property as a "right-of-way."
Standing
In their post trial brief, defendants 2316 Post Road, LLC and Walter Levine, raise for the first time a claim that the plaintiffs lack standing to seek this injunctive relief. They acknowledge standing to bring the underlying action, but challenge the plaintiffs' standing to enjoin the municipality. In a case similar to that presented here, our Supreme Court has very recently discussed the requisites of standing.
The issue of standing implicates this court's subject matter jurisdiction . . . Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he [or she] has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy . . . When standing is put in issue, the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of the issue . . . Standing requires no more than a colorable claim of injury; a [party] ordinarily establishes . . . standing by allegations of injury. Similarly, standing exists to attempt to vindicate arguably protected interests . . . Standing is established by showing that the party claiming it is authorized by statute to bring an action, in other words statutorily aggrieved, or is classically aggrieved . . . The fundamental test for determining [classical] aggrievement encompasses a well-settled twofold determination: [F]irst, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in [the challenged action], as distinguished from a general interest, such as is the concern of all members of the community as a whole. Second, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully establish that this specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the [challenged action] . . . Aggrievement is established if there is a possibility, as distinguished from a certainty, that some legally protected interest . . . has been adversely affected." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Eder Bros., Inc. v. Wine Merchants of Connecticut, Inc., 275 Conn. 363, 368-70, 880 A.2d 138 (2005).
Wellswood Columbia, LLC v. Town of Hebron, 295 Conn. 802, 809-10 (2010).
This court finds that the plaintiffs have standing to bring this action and seek this injunctive relief. The plaintiffs are the abutting land owner to Pent Court and the entity with a contractual interest to purchase the abutting land; the town's action will result in restricted access to the Exide property via Pent Court; the plaintiff's allegations include that the town's proposed transfer to the defendants is ultra vires and therefore void ab initio. Under the rationale of the Supreme Court in Wellswood, the plaintiffs have demonstrated a specific, personal and legal interest in the town's proposed transfer of Pent Court, "as distinguished from a general interest, such as is the concern of all members of the community as a whole." The plaintiffs have further established that their specific personal and legal interest may be injuriously affected by the proposed transfer of Pent Court. See, Wellswood Columbia, LLC v. Town of Hebron, supra, 295 Conn. at 812-13.
Discussion
The plaintiff bears the burden of proving irreparable harm, the lack of an adequate remedy at law; likely success on the merits of its claim and as well that the equities favor injunctive relief. See, Waterbury Teacher's Association v. Freedom of Information Commission, 230 Conn. 441, 446 (1994). As set forth in the complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the agreement between the town and 2316 Post Road LLC was made and approved in contravention of procedures set forth by statute and code provisions. The plaintiffs also argue that the purported transfer is an ultra vires act.
The thrust of the plaintiff's claim is premised on the allegation that Pent Court is a town road or highway. As such, if the town wished to discontinue its use, as it did in 1950, it must formally abandon the road. The town Code provides that under such circumstances, (a) certain procedures must be followed and (b) the land reverts to adjacent property owners at no transfer cost to the recipient. Thus, if the court determines that Pent Court is a town road, one-half of the property would revert to Exide (and ultimately to Invest as the contract purchaser) and one-half would revert to 2316 Post Road, LLC, with no cost to either landowner.
It has long been the law that the fee to the land beneath a town road belongs to the landowner over whose land the town road traverses. In the event of abutting landowners, the fee of the land beneath the road belongs half to each abutting land owner from the center of the highway. See, Peck v. Smith, 1 Conn. 103 (1814); Antenuuci v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 142 Conn. 349 (1955).
Such a conclusion would render the proposed transfer to 2316 Post Road, LLC a derogation of the plaintiffs' property rights and interests. The plaintiffs therefore seek to enjoin the transfer.
Alternatively, if the court ultimately determines that the town has some ownership interest in the property, the plaintiff alleges, once again, that the town failed to comply with the statutory and code provisions applicable to the sale of town-owned property. As such, the proposed transfer to 2316 Post Road, LLC would still be voidable.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 8-24 provides that a municipality must present any proposal for the abandonment of a "street" or "other public way" to the town planning commission for a report prior to such abandonment. The statute has a similar requirement if a municipality intends to sell any town-owned property. The Town of Fairfield Code provides at Section 35-5 as follows:
A. The First Selectman may, with the approval of the Board of Selectmen, referral to the Town Plan and Zoning Commission and subsequent approval of the Representative Town Meeting and after advertisements in trade journals or newspapers with circulation in Fairfield, dispose of unneeded real property at fair market value.
B. The First Selectman may, with the approval of the Board of Selectmen, referral to the Town Plan and Zoning Commission and subsequent approval of the Representative Town Meeting, abandon or discontinue paper streets and private ways to adjacent property owners at no transfer cost to the recipient.
Success on the Merits
In its verified complaint, the plaintiffs aver that Pent Court is a town road. This is the issue which, if resolved in the plaintiffs' favor, would completely undo and derail the proposed "sale" to 2316 Post Road, LLC. In reviewing the evidence presented, this court finds that it is likely that the trier of fact will determine that Pent Court is in fact, a town road, and therefore subject to the provisions of CGS § 8-24 as well as Code Section 35-5B. The evidence has further established that it is likely that the plaintiffs will prevail on their claim that the town failed to comply with the provisions of CGS § 8-24 and Code § 35-5B insofar as (a) the town failed to get plan and zoning commission approval in advance of approval from the RTM and (b) the town's purported interest in the land is not reverting to the adjacent property owners, but rather is being quit claimed to the defendant for consideration of $50,000.00.
Whether a right of way is a town road may be established through circumstantial evidence. See, e.g. Meder v. Milford, 190 Conn. 72, (1983). A town road is generally established through a process known as dedication, which occurs upon a landowner's manifest intent to allow the public's use of a right of way and the town's or public's acceptance thereof. Id. at 74. Acceptance may be express or implied. Id. at 75. Implied acceptance may be inferred from either the public's actual use of the property or by actions of the municipality. Id. In this case, there is both.
As outlined above, Pent Court has been used by the public without restriction for downtown parking or overflow parking to nearby establishments. The defendants have not made any effort to restrict access to Pent Court and acknowledges that it is used by the public for purposes other than parking for the restaurant at 2316 Post Road. The municipality has, at some point in the past, posted a town street sign on Pent Court. The municipality formally abandoned the northern portion of Pent Court. The municipality lists Pent Court as among its town roads. The municipality has assessed no taxes against anyone for the Pent Court property. See, Stohlts v. Kilkinson, 87 Conn.App. 634 (2005) (Where town, as of 1988, considered the road in question to be a town road, and although the town did not plow the road, having never formally abandoned it, it remained a town road).
The evidence as to the creation of Pent Court as it originally existed is scarce. However, insofar as acceptance of a town road necessarily follows its original dedication, the circumstantial evidence of acceptance may also support a finding of original dedication. That the town determined to formally abandon a portion of Pent Court is persuasive evidence that Pent Court had previously been dedicated and accepted by the town. Further, in specifying abandonment of that portion of the road commencing 150 feet north of the Post Road, the town impliedly retained the southern portion running to the Post Road for itself.
As such, if the town determined to discontinue its use or abandon the road, it was required to do so in strict compliance with the statutory and code provisions. Stohlts v. Kilkinson, 87 Conn.App. 634, 643 (2005) ("The methods of discontinuing a highway through governmental agencies are prescribed by law and must be strictly followed); Savalle v. Hilzinger, 123 Conn.App. 174 (2010) (same).
Town of Fairfield code § 35-5B governs the abandonment of municipal roads. It requires that the First Selectman first obtain approval of the Board of Selectmen and also that he refer the plan to the Town Plan and Zoning Commission for a report. Following a report by the Town Plan and Zoning Commission, the First Selectmen must get the approval of the Representative Town Meeting. It is clearly contemplated that the RTM will have the benefit of the Plan and Zoning Commission's report prior to being asked to approve or not, the proposed abandonment. Section 35-5B also requires that the property then be transferred to adjacent property owners at no cost to the recipient.
CGS § 8-24 also requires a commission report in advance of the RTM vote. Indeed, it provides alternative procedures for the RTM depending upon the content of the commission report, i.e, whether it is favorable or not favorable to the proposed abandonment.
There is no claim or evidence that these procedures were followed, largely because the town did not treat Pent Court, with respect to this transaction, as a town road. Indeed, on the issue of whether Pent Court is a town road, the town's position seems to change to that which is most advantageous to the town at any given point in time. Moreover, it would seem a simple enough inquiry to request the town to identify its interest in Pent Court. The town is unable to articulate any specific interest in Pent Court. It does not claim to own the property; it disavows that the property is a town road. It argues an unarticulated "interest" that the town "may or may not have." It comes as no surprise therefore that the statutory and code provisions were not followed.
The uncertainty or disagreement as to Pent Court's status were presented to the RTM, in part by plaintiffs' counsel, an event upon which the defendants rely in defending the town's conduct. However, the RTM did not resolve these issues. The RTM appears to have been less concerned with whether it had complied with the code and more concerned with getting protection against liability in the event it did not by insisting upon a hold harmless and indemnification agreement with 2316 Post Road, LLC.
In this litigation, so as to defeat the plaintiff's claim (and therefore facilitate its exit stage left from these proceedings), the town argues that Pent Court is not a town road. However, for over 50 years, the First Selectman has certified under oath that Pent Court is a town road. Those certifications were advantageous to the town because the total number of miles of roads under a town's care and maintenance is directly related to the amount of funds the town receives for maintenance thereof from the State. There was also evidence that Walter Levine brought a previous suit against the town claiming adverse possession of Pent Court during which the town took the position that Pent Court was a town road.
Notwithstanding the town's current posture, First Selectmen Flatto repeatedly testified that this was town-owned property. See e.g., Transcript dated December 7, 2010, p. 6, l. 5-7; p. 11, l. 9-11; p. 12, l. 3-6. Indeed, through its conduct vis-a-vis the published "legal advertisements" the town acted as if it was disposing of "unneeded real property" pursuant to § 35-5A. The town's conduct throughout the process leaves this court with little doubt that the applicable statutes and Code provisions under which this proposed transfer could or should occur, were given inadequate attention.
It is worth noting that when the Board of Selectmen approved the transfer, the First Selectman was of the belief that he was disposing of town owned property, a position disavowed by the town in this litigation. When the RTM approved the transfer, it had been advised by the town's attorney that it was transferring a town road, a position disavowed in this litigation. The planning and zoning commission were asked to approve the transfer of an unidentified "interest the town may have" in Pent Court, a posture which became manifest only after this litigation was commenced.
Notwithstanding the contrary evidence outlined above, the town argues that the Public Works Department was "wrong." It made a mistake. The town argues that its counsel was "wrong" when he addressed the RTM. The town's counsel now argues an epiphany of sorts in his realization that Pent Court is not a road at all, let alone a town road. The town essentially asks this court to ignore over 60 years of consistent conduct as "a mistake." The town argues that simply because a municipal agent calls a parcel of land a road, does not make it so. Montanaro v. Aspetuck Land Trust, Inc., 103 Conn.App. 237 (2007). The repeated referral of Pent Court as a town road and conduct consistent with that belief is evidence on the issue however.
Defendant 2316 Post Road LLC argues that the plaintiffs have not sustained their burden on the issue of Pent Court's status as a town road. It avers that the disjointed and infrequent occasions upon which Pent Court was used for anything other than restaurant parking is inadequate to establish a public use as a town road. It discounts as ministerial oversight the repeated certification of Pent Court as a town road to the State of Connecticut. It argues that Exide's unfettered access to Pent Court to excavate and remove oil tanks lying beneath Pent Court is of no evidentiary value on the issue. For purposes of the court's determination of whether temporary injunctive relief is appropriate, this court finds these arguments unpersuasive.
For the above reasons, the court finds the plaintiffs have established likely success on the merits of their claim that Pent Court is a town road and that the town failed to comply with the statute and the code when it determined to transfer Pent Court to the defendants.
Whether the town has an ownership or some other as yet unidentified interest in Pent Court; whether the provisions of Section 35-5A apply; and whether those provisions were complied with should they be found to apply are not necessary to this court's determination and so are left to the trial court.
Balance of the Equities
In deciding whether to issue a temporary injunction, the court must "balance the results which may be caused to one party or the other, and if it appears that to deny . . . it may result in great harm to the plaintiff and little to the defendant, the court may well exercise its discretion in favor of granting . . . it, unless indeed, it is very clear that the plaintiff is without legal right. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Nat. Bank v. Trust, 25 Conn.App. 39, 40.
The injunctive relief sought seeks to maintain the status quo until the rights of the parties can be adjudicated through the verified complaint. The plaintiffs argue that Mr. Levine's intention to immediately assume a possessory and titled interest to the property as a result of the transfer will render Pent Court inaccessible to the plaintiffs as well as the public at large. Conversely, they argue, if the injunction is granted, Pent Court shall remain as it has been for 60 or more years, at least for as long as the matter remains pending resolution.
The defendants argue that the lis pendens placed on the property sufficiently protects the plaintiffs' interests insofar as it prevents the defendants from developing, disposing, mortgaging or otherwise encumbering the property. While the lis pendens certainly serves to protect some of the plaintiffs' interests and it may prevent certain of the defendants' development plans until this cause of action is resolved, it does not protect the plaintiffs' access and use of that portion of the property which, if they prevail, will revert to them. Further, the court can discern no negative impact on the defendants if the injunction is granted. This court finds that the equities tip in favor of maintaining the status quo and issuing the temporary injunction sought.
Irreparable Harm and Adequate Remedy at Law
As previously noted, if the town is found to have acted in excess of its delegated authority, the plaintiffs are not required to establish irreparable harm or an inadequate remedy at law. Wellswood Columbia, LLC v. Town of Hebron, 295 Conn. 802, 813 (2010). The plaintiffs allege that the attempted sale of Pent Court is an act in excess of the municipality's delegated powers. While this court has held that the plaintiffs will likely prevail on their claim that the town failed to follow the statute and code, the issue of whether such conduct is beyond the authority of the municipality to act is left to the trial court. This court must find and does find irreparable harm as well as an inadequate remedy at law.
The plaintiffs assert a fee simple interest in one-half of the land beneath Pent Court. Losing access to property in which one claims legal right and title is the type of injury and encroachment which courts have recognized give rise to irreparable harm for which money damages are insufficient. See, Peckheiser v. Tarone, 186 Conn. 53, 60 (1982) (Injunction is the proper remedy to stop interference with an owner's use and enjoyment of an easement); Van Tassel v. Spring Perch Co., 113 Conn. 636, 646 (1931) (Courts of equity have inherent authority to issue injunction to protect property rights where necessary and where no adequate remedy at law is available); Branch v. Occhionero, 239 Conn. 199, 206, 681 A.2d 306 (1996) (Injunction will ordinarily issue at the suit of a landowner to compel the removal of encroachments); Wambeck v. Lovetri, 141 Conn. 558, 564 (1954) (In cases of trespass a plaintiff need not show that irreparable harm will result in the absence of injunctive relief). If a party's wrongful actions pose a threat to some unique property interest, so that the injury will be irreparable and damages will not compensate for the loss of property, the court will feel free to issue an injunction. 11 Wright-Miller Federal Pretrial Procedure Sect. 2944 at 399, Ralph v. Vogeler, 45 Conn.App. 56, 64 (1997). Here, under any of the alternative theories by which the plaintiffs seek relief, substantial property rights are implicated and will be adversely impacted if the transfer is consummated.
Accordingly, the court finds that the plaintiffs have established a reasonable degree of probability of success on the merits, irreparable harm with no adequate remedy at law, and that the harm likely to be suffered by them is greater than that which will result in the interference occasioned by an injunction. An injunction will enter maintaining the status quo until such time as the right, title and interest of all parties to Pent Court is adjudicated by this litigation.
SO ORDERED