Opinion
No. 69 / 00-2112.
Filed June 12, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, LINDA R. READE, Judge.
Appeal from district court decision affirming agency action. AFFIRMED.
Arthur C. Hedberg, Jr. and Joseph L. Walsh of Hedberg, Ward, Owens and Vonderhaar, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Craig Kelinson, Special Assistant Attorney General, for appellees.
A labor union contends the State is failing to regulate workers' compensation claims as required by law. The merits of the contention have not been considered because of agency rulings that neither of the two administrative proceedings (a petition for declaratory order and a contested case petition) were appropriate. The matter is before us on appeal from an order of the district court, sitting on review of agency action, which affirmed the agency determination. We also affirm.
The allegations, though conclusory, are serious. The petitioner, United Auto, Aerospace, Agriculture, and Implement Workers of America (the Union), contends state agencies are neglecting both "compliance" and "adjudicatory" functions in processing workers' compensation claims. Respondent agencies are the Iowa Department of Workforce Development (IWD) and the Division of Workers' Compensation (DWC). Under Iowa Code section 84A.1(2) (1999) the director of IWD is required to "direct the administrative and compliance functions" of DWC.
Because of the procedural posture of the case, the facts are relevant only insofar as they highlight the problem urged by the Union. The Union asserts a backlog of 340 appeal cases before the commissioner, and an average 549-day period from filing of a contested case to initial agency decision.
The Union's first petition before the Iowa Workers' Compensation Commissioner was for "a declaratory order involving compliance statutes, rules and policies." It sought seven orders declaring the responsibilities of IWD and DWC, all of which the Union characterized as "compliance" functions, and requested an order compelling IWD and DWC "to enforce compliance." The commissioner determined the questions presented were not appropriate for declaratory ruling and declined the petition.
The Union, as complainant, also filed what is called a "contested case petition re compliance," naming IWD and DWC as defendants and raising exactly the same issues. In both the Union is asking for an advisory opinion declaring the agencies in the past have not been doing their job in resolving disputes between the Union members and their employers (and employers' insurers). The commissioner directed the Union to amend this petition or to provide authority that a contested case proceeding was appropriate for the matters raised. The Union neither amended nor submitted any response to the order, and the commissioner also dismissed that petition.
Both rulings were affirmed on judicial review and have been consolidated on the Union's appeal to us. Our inquiry is strictly limited to whether the district court correctly applied the law. IBP, Inc. v. Harpole, 621 N.W.2d 410, 413 (Iowa 2001). The burden of proving error is on the party asserting it, in this case the Union. Iowa Code § 17A.19(8)(a).
I. State agencies adopt rules for declaratory orders in accordance with Iowa Code section 17A.9. Iowa's workers' compensation rules provide for declaratory orders. Iowa Admin. Code r. 876-5.1 et. seq. If the commissioner declines to issue such a ruling, the reasons for doing so must be specified. Iowa Code § 17A.9(5)(d); Iowa Admin. Code r. 876-5.9(2). The commissioner's refusal to issue a declaratory order here relied on at least six grounds.
Declaratory rulings by administrative agencies serve a useful purpose quite similar to declaratory judgments in court proceedings. That purpose is to permit "persons to seek formal opinions on the effect of future transactions and arrange their affairs accordingly." Women Aware v. Reagen, 331 N.W.2d 88, 92 (Iowa 1983) (citing Arthur Bonfield, The Iowa Administrative Procedure Act: Background, Construction, Applicability, Public Access To Agency Law, The Rulemaking Process, 60 Iowa L. Rev. 731, 807 (1975) [hereinafter Bonfield]). Declaratory rulings may be based on hypothetical facts. Bennett v. Iowa Dep't of Nat'l Res., 573 N.W.2d 25, 26 (Iowa 1997). Judicial review of a declination to issue declaratory orders is far from de novo. The Iowa scheme accords considerable discretion to the agency, so long as it does not decline unreasonably, arbitrarily, or capriciously. Bonfield, 60 Iowa L. Rev. at 818-20. The requirement that the agency specify which of the listed grounds prompted declination should not be understood to elevate the court's scope of review. The stated grounds for declining to rule are reviewed only to assess whether there has been an abuse of the agency's discretion or action that is unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious.
Among the reasons for declining cited by the agency here were (1) the questions posed are premised on past, not future, conduct; (2) the questions do not serve the purpose of a declaratory ruling; and (3) they involve and might adversely affect the rights of nonparties to the action. We agree with the district court that the agency's declination was not unreasonable and certainly no abuse of discretion.
The petition is out of plumb with the theory and purpose of declaratory relief. Declaratory actions differ from nearly all others, such as tort, contract, and most special actions. Typically, parties seek court judgments to resolve consequences of past acts or conduct. The view of most court proceedings is retrospective. The view for declaratory relief is prospective. These unique proceedings are designed to address the consequences of contemplated or imagined future conduct. In the present case no future conduct, hypothetical or otherwise, is at issue, only a complaint addressed to whether the agencies have been doing their job. The Union's petition states:
[t]he only truly affected interested persons in this matter are the agencies involved and their administrative heads since this is an action designed to compel specific agency action under specified circumstances, not a hypothetical question affecting a legal interpretation which would involve specific employers or insurance carriers.
We think the petition is a clear request for an advisory opinion. We have said we have neither "a duty nor the authority to render advisory opinions." Hartford-Carlisle Sav. Bank v. Shivers, 566 N.W.2d 877, 884 (Iowa 1997). As stated in Grains of Iowa L.C. v. Iowa Department of Agriculture Land Stewardship, 562 N.W.2d 441, 445 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997), "a controversy involving a statute or ordinance must be justiciable — that is, there must be specific adverse claims, based upon present rather than future or speculative facts, which are ripe for judicial adjustment." (Citation omitted.) "[C]ourts frequently decline to pass upon remote, future, or contingent rights which may never arise, at least where there is no present need for such determination or, because of absence of parties or otherwise, the determination may not be final." Id. (citation omitted). Advisory opinions, especially in the agency context, are not particularly useful to the public due to "their lack of binding effect in the absence of an estoppel." Bonfield, 60 Iowa L. Rev. at 809.
A declaratory order petition contemplates a ruling, binding on only the parties to the action, on the specific facts alleged so long as the facts in question presented are purely hypothetical. The Union's request for an opinion regarding agency duties, based on prior conduct does not fulfill the declaratory order requirements. Because the purpose of a declaratory order is to set forth a legal opinion based on hypothetical or future circumstances, the petition does not serve to end the controversy. Rather it will serve only to commence litigation among groups not parties to this action. So the commissioner and district court correctly found the petition was inappropriate.
II. In a separate proceeding the Union submitted the same dispute as a contested case. A contested case is defined as "a proceeding including but not restricted to ratemaking, price fixing, and licensing in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are required by Constitution or statute to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing." Iowa Code § 17A.2(5). The Union has been able to cite no authority for considering its petition for declaratory ruling as a contested case and we find none. The proceeding was correctly dismissed.
Like the agency and the district court, we express no views on the merits of the Union's contention. We do not suggest the delays or backlogs they assert are, or should be, acceptable. The district court was correct, however, in holding we are without authority to resolve the present litigation.
AFFIRMED.
This opinion shall not be published.