Opinion
No. CV-074022831
February 17, 2011
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as "Union") moves to vacate an arbitration award issued by a three-person arbitration panel in accordance with the Municipal Employees Labor Relations Act (MERA) codified in General Statutes § 7-467 et seq. The defendant, Town of Stratford (Town), opposes the Union's application.
The Town was represented by an arbitrator, the Union was represented by an arbitrator and a neutral was selected by the two arbitrators.
The following procedural facts are relevant to the court's decision. The Union and the Town were parties to a collective bargaining agreement that resulted in a pension agreement that expired on June 30, 1994. The parties negotiated over the terms and conditions of a successor pension plan, but failed to reach an agreement.
As a result, the parties proceeded to mandatory binding arbitration pursuant to the provision of § 7-473c. The arbitration panel conducted hearings over twenty-one days. The parties submitted to the panel a joint arbitration statement that set forth the issues on which the parties agreed and a statement of the unresolved issues. In accordance with § 7-473(d)(3), the parties also submitted to the panel their last best offers on each of the unresolved issues. On October 12, 2007, the panel issued its award in which, as required by § 7-473(d)(6), the majority of the panel accepted either the Union's best last offer or the Town's best last offer.
Section 7-473c provides as follows: "(a) The Labor Commissioner shall appoint a Neutral Arbitrator Selection Committee consisting of ten members, five of whom shall represent the interests of employees and employee organizations and five of whom shall represent the interests of municipal employers, provided one of the members representing the interests of municipal employers shall be a representative of the Connecticut Conference of Municipalities. The members of the selection committee shall serve for a term of four years. Arbitrators may be removed for good cause. The selection committee shall appoint a panel of neutral arbitrators consisting of not less than twenty impartial persons representing the interests of the public in general to serve as provided in this section. Each member of the panel shall be a resident of the state and shall be selected by a unanimous vote of the selection committee. The members of the panel shall serve for a term of two years.
(b)(1) If neither the municipal employer nor the municipal employee organization has requested the arbitration services of the State Board of Mediation and Arbitration (A) within one hundred eighty days after the certification or recognition of a newly certified or recognized municipal employee organization required to commence negotiations pursuant to Section 7-473a, or (B) within thirty days after the expiration of the current collective bargaining agreement, or within thirty days after the specified date for implementation of reopener provisions in an existing collective bargaining agreement, or within thirty days after the date the parties to an existing collective bargaining agreement commence negotiations to revise said agreement on any matter affecting wages, hours, and other conditions of employment, said board shall notify the municipal employer and municipal employee organization that one hundred eighty days have passed since the certification or recognition of the newly certified or recognized municipal employee organization, or that thirty days have passed since the specified date for implementation of reopener provisions in an existing agreement, or the date the parties commenced negotiations to revise an existing agreement on any matter affecting wages, hours and other conditions of employment or the expiration of such collective bargaining agreement and that binding and final arbitration is now imposed on them, provided written notification of such imposition shall be sent by registered mail or certified mail, return receipt requested, to each party.
(2) Within ten days of receipt of the written notification required pursuant to subdivision (1) of this subsection, the chief executive officer of the municipal employer and the executive head of the municipal employee organization each shall select one member of the arbitration panel. Within five days of their appointment, the two members of the arbitration panel shall select a third member, who shall be an impartial representative of the interests of the public in general and who shall be selected from the panel of neutral arbitrators appointed pursuant to subsection (a) of this section. Such third member shall be the chairperson of the panel.
(3) In the event that the municipal employer or the municipal employee organization have not selected their respective members of the arbitration panel or the two members of the panel have not selected the third member, the State Board of Mediation and Arbitration shall appoint such members as are needed to complete the panel, provided (A) the member or members so appointed are residents of this state, and (B) the selection of the third member of the panel by the State Board of Mediation and Arbitration shall be made at random from among the members of the panel of neutral arbitrators appointed pursuant to subsection (a) of this section.
(c) Within ten days of appointment of the chairperson, the arbitration panel shall, by call of its chairperson, hold a hearing within the municipality involved. At least five days prior to such hearing, a written notice of the time and place of such hearing shall be sent to the municipal employer, the municipal employee organization and the other members of the panel. The chairperson of the panel shall preside over such hearing. Any member of the panel shall have the power to take testimony, to administer oaths and to summon, by subpoena, any person whose testimony may be pertinent to the matters before said panel, together with any records or other documents relating to such matters. In the case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena issued to any person, the Superior Court, upon application by the panel, shall have jurisdiction to order such person to appear before the panel to produce evidence or to give testimony touching the matter under investigation or in question, and any failure to obey such order may be punished by said court as a contempt thereof.
(d)(1) The hearing may, at the discretion of the panel, be continued and shall be concluded within twenty days after its commencement. Not less than two days prior to the commencement of the hearing, each party shall file with the chairperson of the panel, and deliver to the other party, a proposed collective bargaining agreement, in numbered paragraphs, which such party is willing to execute and cost data for all provisions of such proposed agreement. At the commencement of the hearing each party shall file with the panel a reply setting forth (A) those paragraphs of the proposed agreement of the other party which it is willing to accept, and (B) those paragraphs of the proposed agreement of the other party which it is unwilling to accept, together with any alternative contract language which such party would accept in lieu of those paragraphs of the proposed agreement of the other party which it is unwilling to accept. At any time prior to the issuance of a decision by the panel, the parties may jointly file with the panel stipulations setting forth the agreement provisions which both parties have agreed to accept.
(2) Within five days after the conclusion of the taking of testimony, the panel shall forward to each party an arbitration statement, approved by a majority vote of the panel, setting forth all agreement provisions agreed upon by both parties in the proposed agreements and the replies, and in the stipulations, and stating, in numbered paragraphs, those issues which are unresolved.
(3) Within ten days after the conclusion of the taking of testimony, the parties shall file with the secretary of the State Board of Mediation and Arbitration five copies of their statements of last best offer setting forth, in numbered paragraphs corresponding to the statement of unresolved issues contained in the arbitration statement, the final agreement provisions proposed by such party. Immediately upon receipt of both statement of last best offer or upon the expiration of the time for filing such statements of last best offer, whichever is sooner, said secretary shall distribute a copy of each such statement of last best offer to the opposing party.
(4) Within seven days after the distribution of the statements of last best offer or within seven days of the expiration of the time for filing the statements of last best offer, whichever is sooner, the parties may file with the secretary of the State Board of Mediation and Arbitration five copies of their briefs on the unresolved issues. Immediately upon receipt of both briefs or upon the expiration of the time for filing such briefs, whichever is sooner, said secretary shall distribute a copy of each such brief to the opposing party.
(5) Within five days after the distribution of the briefs on the unresolved issues or within five days after the last day for filing such briefs, whichever is sooner, each party may file with said secretary five copies of a reply brief, responding to the briefs on the unresolved issues. Immediately upon receipt of the reply briefs or upon the expiration of the time for filing such reply briefs, whichever is sooner, said secretary shall simultaneously distribute a copy of each such reply brief to the opposing party.
(6) Within twenty days after the last day for filing such reply briefs, the panel shall issue, upon majority vote, and file with the State Board of Mediation and Arbitration its decision on all unresolved issues set forth in the arbitration statement, and said secretary shall immediately and simultaneously distribute a copy thereof to each party. The panel shall treat each unresolved issue set forth in the arbitration statement as a separate question to be decided by it. In deciding each such question, the panel agreement shall accept the final provision relating to such unresolved issue as contained in the statement of last best offer of one party or the other. As part of the arbitration decision, each member shall state the specific reasons and standards used in making a choice on each unresolved issue.
(7) The parties may jointly file with the panel stipulations modifying, deferring or waiving any or all provisions of this subsection.
(8) If the day for filing any document required or permitted to be filed under this subsection falls on a day which is not a business day of the State Board of Mediation and Arbitration then the time for such filing shall be extended to the next business day of such board.
(9) In arriving at a decision, the arbitration panel shall give priority to the public interest and the financial capability of the municipal employer, including consideration of other demands on the financial capability of the municipal employer. The panel shall further consider the following factors in light of such financial capability: (A) The negotiations between the parties prior to arbitration; (B) the interests and welfare of the employee group; (C) changes in the cost of living; (D) the existing conditions of employment of the employee group and those of similar groups; and (E) the wages, salaries, fringe benefits, and other conditions of employment prevailing in the labor market, including developments in private sector wages and benefits.
(10) The decision of the panel and the resolved issues shall be final and binding upon the municipal employer and the municipal employee organization except as provided in subdivision (12) of this subsection and, if such award is not rejected by the legislative body pursuant to said subdivision, except that a motion to vacate or modify such decision may be made in accordance with Sections 52-418 and 52-419.
(11) In regard to all proceedings undertaken pursuant to this subsection the secretary of the State Board of Mediation and Arbitration shall serve as staff to the arbitration panel.
(12) Within twenty-five days of the receipt of an arbitration award issued pursuant to this section, the legislative body of the municipal employer may reject the award of the arbitrators or single arbitrator by a two-thirds majority vote of the members of such legislative body present at a regular or special meeting called and convened for such purpose.
(13) Within ten days after such rejection, the legislative body or its authorized representative shall be required to state, in writing, the reasons for such vote and shall submit such written statement to the State Board of Mediation and Arbitration and the municipal employee organization. Within ten days after receipt of such notice, the municipal employee organization shall prepare a written response to such rejection and shall submit it to the legislative body and the State Board of Mediation and Arbitration.
(14) Within ten days after receipt of such rejection notice, the State Board of Mediation and Arbitration shall select a review panel of three arbitrators or, if the parties agree, a single arbitrator who are residents of Connecticut and labor relations arbitrators approved by the American Arbitration Association and not members of the panel who issued the rejected award. Such arbitrators or single arbitrator shall review the decision on each such rejected issue. The review conducted pursuant to this subdivision shall be limited to the record and briefs of the hearing pursuant to subsection (c) of this section, the written explanation of the reasons for the vote and a written response by either party. In conducting such review, the arbitrators or single arbitrator shall be limited to consideration of the criteria set forth in subdivision (9) of this subsection. Such review shall be completed within twenty days of the appointment of the arbitrators or single arbitrator. The arbitrators or single arbitrator shall accept the last best offer of either of the parties.
(15) Within five days after the completion of such review the arbitrators or single arbitrator shall render a decision with respect to each rejected issue which shall be final and binding upon the municipal employer and the employee organization except that a motion to vacate or modify such award may be made in accordance with Sections 52-418 and 52-419. The decision of the arbitrators or single arbitrator shall be in writing and shall include specific reasons and standards used by each arbitrator in making a decision on each issue. The decision shall be filed with the parties. The reasonable costs of the arbitrators or single arbitrator and the cost of the transcript shall be paid by the legislative body. Where the legislative body of a municipal employer is the town meeting, the board of selectmen shall perform all of the duties and shall have all of the authority and responsibilities required of and granted to the legislative body under this subsection.
(e) The cost of the arbitration panel shall be distributed among the parties in the following manner: (1) The municipal employer shall pay the costs of the arbitrator appointed by it, (2) the municipal employee organization shall pay the costs of the arbitrator appointed by it, (3) the municipal employer and the municipal employee organization shall equally divide and pay the cost of the chairperson, and (4) the costs of any arbitrator appointed by the State Board of Mediation and Arbitration shall be paid by the party in whose absence the board appointed.
(f) A municipal employer and a municipal employee organization may, at any time, file with the State Board of Mediation and Arbitration a joint stipulation modifying, deferring or waiving any or all of the provisions of this section, or modifying, deferring or waiving any or all of the provisions of a previously filed stipulation, and any such stipulation shall be controlling over the provisions of this section or of any previously filed stipulation.
(g) No party may submit for binding arbitration pursuant to this section any issue or proposal which was not presented during the negotiation process, unless the submittal of such additional issue or proposal is agreed to by the parties.
The Union moves to vacate the award pursuant to § 52-418(4) and for various public policy reasons. Section 52-418(4) provides that an award shall be vacated if the court finds that "the arbitrators have exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made." More particularly, the Union claims that (1) the panel failed to state the specific reasons and standards used by them in choosing a last best offer in contravention of §§ 7-473(d)(9) and (15); (2) the panel failed to make only improvements to the plan in accordance with the parties agreement; (3) the panel accepted the last best offer from the Town on certain issues that were not supported by any evidence; and, (4) that a mutual, final and definite award was not made because the award eliminates all references to the "The Act Concerning Pension for Employees of the Town of Stratford" (Act) resulting in the structural integrity of the plan being destroyed and interfering with the administration of the pension plan.
The Union additionally contends that the award violates public policy for the reasons that (1) the award violates the Union members right to due process for the loss of a property right in their vested pension; (2) it would be illegal to enforce the award because it violates § 7-450; (3) it would be illegal to enforce the award because it eliminates all references to the Act thereby destroying the structural integrity of the pension system; (4) it would be illegal to enforce the award because it violates § 7-474(f).
I
The court must initially determine the standard of review to be applied to the arbitrators' award for purposes of deciding the Union's motion to vacate. The Town contends that the court should compare the award to the submission and the Union counters that the court should undertake a de novo review of the award.
"Judicial review of arbitral decisions is narrowly confined . . . When the parties agree to arbitration and establish the authority of the arbitrator through the terms of their submission, the extent of our judicial review of the award is delineated by the scope of the parties' agreement . . . When the scope of the submission is unrestricted, the resulting award is not subject to de novo review even for errors of law so long as the award conforms to the submission . . . Because we favor arbitration as a means of settling private disputes, we undertake judicial review of arbitration awards in a manner designed to minimize interference with an efficient and economical system of alternative dispute resolution . . .
"Where the submission does not otherwise state, the arbitrators are empowered to decide factual and legal questions and an award cannot be vacated on the grounds that . . . the interpretation of the agreement by the arbitrators was erroneous. Courts will not review the evidence nor, where the submission is unrestricted, will they review the arbitrators' decision of the legal questions involved . . . In other words, [u]nder an unrestricted submission, the arbitrators' decision is considered final and binding; thus the courts will not review the evidence considered by the arbitrators nor will they review the award for errors of law or fact . . .
"The significance . . . of a determination that an arbitration submission was unrestricted or restricted is not to determine what the arbitrators are obligated to do, but to determine the scope of judicial review of what they have done. Put another way, the submission tells the arbitrators what they are obligated to decide. The determination by a court of whether the submission was restricted or unrestricted tells the court what its scope of review is regarding the arbitrators' decision . . .
"Even in the case of an unrestricted submission, we have . . . recognized three grounds for vacating an award: (1) the award rules on the constitutionality of a statute . . . (2) the award violates clear public policy . . . [and] (3) the award contravenes one or more of the statutory proscriptions of § 52-418 . . . [Section] 52-418(a)(4) provides that an arbitration award shall be vacated if the arbitrators have exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
"In our construction of § 52-418(a)(4), we have, as a general matter, looked to a comparison of the award with the submission to determine whether the arbitrators have exceeded their powers . . . We have also recognized, however, that . . . [a]n award that manifests an egregious or patently irrational application of the law is an award that should be set aside pursuant to § 52-418(a)(4) because the arbitrator has exceeded [his] powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made." Harty v. Cantor Fitzgerald Co., 275 Conn. 72, 80-81, 881 A.2d 139 (2005).
The court concludes that this matter involves a restricted submission. The Town and the Union reached an impasse in their more than decade long collective bargaining negotiations and compulsory arbitration was statutorily imposed on the parties. "The mandatory binding arbitration that is authorized by MERA does not permit the arbitration panel to exercise the broad discretion normally associated with consensual arbitration. Section 7-473c(d) limits the discretion of the arbitration panel in two significant respects. First, with regard to any issue that the parties have not been able to resolve themselves, the statute confines the discretion of the arbitration panel to a choice between the "last best offer" of one party or another . . . This narrowing of the scope of arbitrator discretion to a choice between two proposals as formulated by the parties upon an unresolved issue significantly circumscribes what might otherwise be deemed [an unconstitutionally] broad delegation of legislative power . . . Second, in the exercise of a choice between one or another "last best offer," the arbitration panel must "give priority to the public interest and the financial capability of the municipal employer . . . This further limitation on arbitral discretion lends additional support to the constitutional validity of MERA." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted) International Brotherhood of Police O. v. Jewett City, 234 Conn. 123, 132, 661 A.2d 573 (1995).
"A submission is unrestricted when . . . the parties' arbitration agreement contains no language restricting the breath of issues, reserving explicit rights, or conditioning the award on court review." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Industrial Risk Insurers v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection Ins. Co., 273 Conn. 86, 89 n. 3, 868 A.2d 47 (2005). An arbitration panel has limited discretion under MERA. The legislatively constrained authority of the arbitrators to resolve the dispute results in the submission being a restricted one. As a result, the court will undertake a de novo review of the award.
II
In the present case, the Union seeks to vacate the award based on statutory and on common law grounds. The Court will first address the Union's statutory claims.
A
The Union claims that the panel exceeded their powers or imperfectly executed them in violation of § 52-418(a)(4) because each member failed to state the specific reasons and standards used by them in choosing a last best offer in contravention of §§ 7-473(d)(9) and(15). As a result, the Union asserts that the award should be vacated. The Town counters that the arbitrators complied with their statutory duties in rendering the award. The Town further claims that assuming that the arbitrators failed to so comply, the Union has failed to show that the arbitrators acted with manifest disregard for the law.
The process of final and binding arbitration under MERA is delineated in § 7-473c. In rendering their decision, the arbitration panel is required to "treat each unresolved issue set forth in the arbitration statement as a separate question to be decided by it. In deciding each such question, the panel agreement shall accept the final provision relating to such unresolved issue as contained in the statement of last best offer of one party or the other. As part of the arbitration decision, each member shall state the specific reasons and standards used in making a choice on each unresolved issue." General Statutes § 7-473c(d)(6). In reaching their decision, the panel must give priority to the public interest and the financial capability of the municipality. General Statutes § 7-473c(d)(9).
The record includes the "Agreed Upon Language Document" and the Arbitration Award dated October 12, 2007. The cover page of the award contains the case heading and identifies the parties' representatives. The first page is entitled "Statutory Factors," and quotes, verbatim, the factors set forth in § 7-473c(d)(9) that the panel must give priority to in reaching their decision. The second page has the following introduction:
"This dispute concerns bargaining between the Town of Stratford and IAFF, Local 998 over the negotiation of a Pension.
"The [u]ndersigned arbitrators were designated to hear and decide the dispute in accordance with Section 7-473c of the Connecticut General Statutes. On [s]everal hearings over an eight year period the parties appeared before the arbitration panel in the Town of Stratford, Connecticut. Both parties were represented and were accorded a full opportunity to submit evidence, examine and cross examine witnesses and present arguments. The parties' last best offers on the issues in dispute were submitted to the panel. The panel members met in several executive sessions to deliberate and decide each outstanding issue.
"The agreed upon language submitted as an Arbitration Statement dated October 4, 2006 is incorporated and made a part of this award."
Beginning with "Issue 1" on the third page, the award sets forth each issue that the panel considered and resolved in their executive sessions. A review of the award shows that on each issue the Town and the neutral arbitrators agreed on the selection of each last best offer, and that the Union's arbitrator dissented from their decision. The arbitrators concluded with the following statement in deciding each issue: "Therefore, after reviewing all of the information received by the arbitration panel, in light of the Statutory Criteria, the Last Best Offer of the [Town or Union on the particular issue] is accepted. The Town appointed Arbitrator agrees with the Neutral Arbitrator based upon the same Statutory Criteria, and the Union appointed Panel Member dissents on the selection of the Last Best Offer [of the Town or the Union] based on the same Statutory Criteria."
The majority of the arbitration panel selected the last best offer of the Town in deciding each unresolved issue.
The Union's claim that the arbitrators failed to state the particular reasons and standards used in choosing either the Union's or the Town's last best offer presents an issue of statutory interpretation. "The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered." General Statutes § 1-2z.
The parties do not dispute that the plain meaning of the statute is clear. In their decision, each arbitrator is required to state the "specific reasons and standards" on which they relied. General Statutes § 7-473c(d)(6). Further, in arriving at their conclusions, the panel must give priority to the public interest and the financial capability of the municipality. General Statutes § 7-473c(d)(9). The issue to be decided is whether each member of the panel failed to comply with the plain meaning of the statute; that is, whether each member failed to set forth the specific reasons and standards used in making his decision on each unresolved issue such that the award should be vacated under § 52-418(4). The Union claims that each member failed to comply with the statutes requirements, whereas the Town contends that they did comply.
The award in this case addressed seventy-three unresolved issues that were presented by the parties to the panel for resolution in accordance with MERA. In the introduction section to the award, the panel noted that arbitration hearings were held over an eight-year period. The parties were represented at the hearings, and were afforded procedural and substantive due process. In accordance with MERA, the parties submitted their last best offers on each unresolved issue and the panel met in several executive sessions in reaching their decision. The panel indicated that they considered the proper statutory priorities in deciding the issues. As to each issue, the panel stated that the majority of the panel accepted the last best offer of one party or the other after reviewing all of the evidence and giving priority to the statutory criteria, and that the dissenting panel member did so on the basis of reviewing the same information and giving priority to the same statutory criteria.
The Union specifically claims that the panel failed to state their reasons and standards concerning the following numbered issues: 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 21, 22, 22B, 26, 27A, 28A, 28B, 29, 31, 35D, 36A, 36B, 36C, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41B, 45A, 52, 53A, 53B, 66C, 67C, 68, 70, 71, 72, and 73. The court disagrees.
The arbitration panel identified the "Statutory Factors" on the first page of the award. For each issue that they decided, the panel stated that they selected a last best offer based on all of the information received by the arbitration panel and in light of the "Statutory Criteria." In view of the foregoing, the panel stated the standards used in making their choice on each issue.
A review of the award discloses that the arbitrators stated their reason or reasons in resolving each issue, despite the Union's protestations to the contrary. For example, in resolving the fourth issue, the panel stated that "[i]t appears that the Town is making it clear where all of the benefits can be found." In resolving the sixth issue, the panel states that "[t]he Town proposal is aimed at eliminating any confusion as to where the parties are to find there [sic] benefits." Those reasons clearly show that a majority of the panel selected the Town's proposals because they clarified the agreement and that the Union arbitrator dissented from that reason. The resolution of each issue in the award contains similar reasoning.
Issue 67D concerned making procedural changes to the pension agreement. The Union proposed maintaining the existing language and the Town sought removal of the language. The award sets forth each of the parties' last best offer, which details the parties' respective positions. The majority of the panel chose the Town's last best offer, and the Union member dissented. The parties' positions were diametrically opposed and explained in detail. By choosing the Town's position, the majority of the panel manifested their agreement with the Town's self-explanatory position. Their reasoning was clear, and the dissent's reasoning was equally clear.
In rejecting the Union's claim that the award should be vacated pursuant to § 52-418 because the panel failed to state the reasons and standards used in making a choice on each unresolved issue, the court agrees with the comment by Judge Stevens in Bridgeport Firefighters Ass'n v. Bridgeport, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. CV-95-0322106 (December 18, 1996), aff'd, Bridgeport Firefighters Ass'n v. Bridgeport, 48 Conn.App. 667, 711 A.2d 1188 (1998), that Section 7-473c(d)(6) "merely states that . . . each arbitrator must state his specific reasons and standards used in making his decision on each issue. It does not state that each must . . . reveal his thought process used in arriving at those reasons or to engage in redundant repetition."
The Town claims that assuming that the arbitrators failed to comply with their statutory obligation to set forth the reasons and standards for their decisions, the court should not conclude that the panel exceeded their powers because the Union has not demonstrated that the arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law.
"[A]n award that manifests an egregious or patently irrational application of the law is an award that should be set aside pursuant to 52-418(a)(4) because the arbitrator has exceeded [his] powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made. We emphasize, however, that the manifest disregard of the law ground for vacating an arbitration award is narrow and should be reserved for circumstances of an arbitrator's extraordinary lack of fidelity to established legal principles." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Garrity v. McCaskey, 223 Conn. 1, 10, 612 A.2d 742 (1992). The Union states in its supplemental memorandum filed on October 29, 2010 that it has not claimed that the award was rendered with manifest disregard of the law in violation of § 52-418(a)(4). The court agrees that the Union is not seeking to vacate the award on the ground that it manifestly disregards the law. Therefore, the court will not address the Town's claim raising that issue.
The Union claims, pursuant to § 52-418(a)(4), that the arbitration panel exceed their authority in issuing the award because on certain of the issues the Town failed to submit evidence in support of its last best offer. The Union specifically challenges the award on issues 3, 22B, 38, 40, 41B, 45A and 53B. The Town responds that a trial court cannot review an arbitration award to determine whether it is supported by evidence absent a showing of egregious error, which claim the Union has not made. Notwithstanding, the Town additionally claims that it submitted evidence in support of the issues with the exception of issue 40, which concerned a definitional issue. In a supplemental memorandum, the Town reviews the evidence submitted on each of the issues. The Union filed a memorandum in response in which it similarly addressed the lack of evidence supporting the panel's decision on each issue.
"[T]he trial court's review of an arbitral award is a far cry from a trial de novo . . . Indeed, judicial review of arbitration awards is even more restrictive than judicial review of a decision of an administrative agency under the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act, which has been interpreted as allowing a court to do no more on the factual questions presented, than to examine the record to determine whether the ultimate findings were supported . . . by substantial evidence . . . Only upon a showing of egregious error . . . does a court have authority to review the record to determine the sufficiency of the evidence in support of an arbitration award. O G/O'Connell Joint Venture v. Chase Family Ltd Part., 203 Conn. 133, 154-55, 523 A.2d 1271 (1987). The Union has failed to meet its burden of proving, and as demonstrated by the Town, the record does not substantiate, that the arbitration panel in the present action committed egregious error. Therefore, the court does not have the authority to review the record to determine the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the panel's award.
B
The Union moves to vacate the award claiming that it violates the public policy in General Statutes § 7-450(a) in that the award diminishes property rights of the Union members, and that it violates the public policy of the United States and Connecticut Constitutions by depriving the Union members of property without due process. The court will first address the Union's claim that the award contravenes § 7-450(a).
General Statutes § 7-450(a) provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]ny municipality . . . may, by ordinance, or with respect to a municipality not having the authority to make ordinances, by resolution adopted by a two-thirds vote of the members of its legislative body, establish pension, retirement, or other postemployment health and life benefit systems . . . or amend any special act concerning its pension, retirement, or other postemployment health and life benefit systems, toward the maintenance in sound condition of a pension, retirement, or other postemployment health and life benefit fund or funds, provided the rights or benefits granted to any individual under any municipal pension or retirement system shall not be diminished or eliminated." General Statutes § 7-450(a).
The Union claims that § 7-450(a) provides that a municipality can pass an ordinance establishing a pension system and post-employment benefits, and, without passing an ordinance, amend a special act concerning such benefits to the extent that the amendment does not reduce or eliminate any of the benefits. Based on its interpretation, the Union contends that the award results in a reduction or elimination of benefits by the Town in violation of the statute. The Town counters that § 7-450(a) is wholly inapplicable to the present action because the statute clearly and unambiguously applies only where a municipality acts by ordinance to either establish a pension and benefits system, or amend a special act relating to pension and benefits. In the present action, the Town did not act by ordinance but submitted to binding arbitration. Therefore, the Town claims that the statute is inapplicable. The court agrees with the Town's position.
The claims of the parties concern the interpretation of § 7-450(a). The court concludes that the meaning of § 7-450(a) "is plain and unambiguous and does not" lead to "absurd or unworkable results." See General Statutes § 1-2z. The text of the statute clearly provides that it only applies where a municipality acts by ordinance, or alternatively by resolution, to establish a pension and benefits system or to amend a special act pertaining to such a system. To interpret the statute as the Union contends would be to twist the plain meaning of the words to create uncertainty in the language. "A statute should not be interpreted in any way to thwart its purpose." Evening Sentinel v. National Organization for Women, 168 Conn. 26, 31, 357 A.2d 498 (1975). "Furthermore, in construing the meaning of a statute, courts do not torture words to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves no room for it." Szczapa v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 56 Conn.App. 325, 330, 743 A.2d 622, cert. denied, 252 Conn. 951, 748 A.2d 299 (2000). In view of the foregoing, the court concludes that award does not violate public policy by diminishing property rights in contravention of § 7-450(a).
The Union additionally claims that the award violates public policy by depriving its members of property rights without the due process provided to them in the federal and state constitutions. For that reason, the Union claims that the award should be vacated.
The court has carefully reviewed the Union's memoranda. The Union has failed to articulate in its memoranda or at oral argument the particular due process that it was not provided. The Union generally claims that members were entitled to receive certain pension and other benefits "and as a result of the panel's award their pension benefits were diminished without due process." In support of this claim, the Union presents various examples where the property rights of its members were diminished as a result of the Town and neutral arbitrators' acceptance of the last best offer of the Town. As discussed, the arbitration process provided the Union with an abundance of procedural and substantive due process. The court, therefore, rejects the Union's contrary claim.
III
The remaining claims made by the Union can be characterized as the "kitchen sink" issues. The court will address each such issue presented.
The Union claims that the award violates public policy because it eliminated any reference to the pension agreement between the Town and the Union resulting in the destruction of the structure for the plan administration, thereby "preventing the proper exercise of due process regarding the granting and denial of benefits" and prohibiting a "mutual, final and definite award" from being rendered. "The public policy exception applies only when the award is clearly illegal or clearly violative of a strong public policy." Garrity v. McCaskey, 223 Conn. 1, 7, CT Page 5301 612 A.2d 742 (1992). The Union has wholly failed to identify the clear public policy that it claims the award violated. Additionally, the court has already addressed the Union's claims of lack of due process. Finally, as pointed out by the Union, the issue before the arbitration panel was whether language in the then current contract referring to "The Act Concerning Pension for Employees of the town of Stratford" should be eliminated. The majority of the panel agreed with the Town that the language should be eliminated so that all employees of the Town were operating under the same pension plan. The issue was not the structure of the plan administration. The panel issued a proper award on the issue. Therefore, the court rejects this claim.
The Town states in its memorandum that the Act was repealed by the Stratford Town Council in 1999, and refers to Stratford Code Art. V., § 25-22.
The Union claims that the arbitration panel exceeded their authority by accepting the Town's last best offer to eliminate Section 3 of the pension agreement that the Union purports guarantees to retired members for future benefits, and by eliminating Section 15 of the agreement that the Union contends means that the only changes that can be made are those that improve the pension plan. The court disagrees. The Union properly acted by accepting the Town's last best offer over the Union's last best offer.
The Union also challenged this provision, which was issue number 29 submitted to the arbitrators, in claiming that the arbitrator's decision on the issue failed to set forth the standards or reasons supporting their decision on accepting the Town's last best offer on the issue.
The Union contends that the award violates the public policy embodied in § 7-474(f). The court rejects the claim on the basis that the Union's argument on the issue is nonsensical and the statute is inapplicable.
IV
In view of the foregoing, the Union's application to vacate the arbitration award (101.00) issued on October 12, 2007 is denied.