Pending the trial a temporary injunction was granted and from this order an appeal was taken. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment and left the temporary injunction undisturbed, 109 S.W.2d 301, and the defendants have brought error to the Supreme Court. The case was referred to the Commission of Appeals, Section A, for their opinion thereon and the Supreme Court adopted same and ordered judgment entered in accordance therewith.
The granting of a temporary injunction is within the sound discretion of the trial court and its action will not be disturbed on appeal unless it clearly appears from the record that there has been an abuse of discretion. Suburban Club, Inc. v. State, Tex.Civ.App., 222 S.W.2d 321; Dallas General Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers Local Union No. 745 v. Oak Cliff Baking Co., Tex.Civ.App., 203 S.W.2d 586; International Ass'n of Machinists Union, Local No. 1488 v. Federated Ass'n of Accessory Workers, Tex.Civ.App., 109 S.W.2d 301; Harris County v. Bassett, Tex.Civ.App., 139 S.W.2d 180. We believe the trial court was not guilty of abusing its discretion in granting the temporary injunction.
Dallas General Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers Local Union No. 745 v. Oak Cliff Baking Co., Tex.Civ.App., 203 S.W.2d 586. The granting or refusing of a temporary injunction is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its action will not be disturbed on appeal unless it clearly appears from the record that there has been an abuse of discretion. Suburban Club, Inc., v. State, Tex.Civ.App., 222 S.W.2d 321; Dallas General Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers Local Union No. 745 v. Oak Cliff Baking Co., Tex.Civ.App., 203 S.W.2d 586; International Ass'n of Machinists Union, Local No. 1488 v. Federated Ass'n of Accessory Workers, Tex.Civ.App., 109 S.W.2d 301; Harris County v. Bassett, Tex.Civ.App., 139 S.W.2d 180. Evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to appellee in determining whether trial court abused its discretion in issuing a temporary injunction.
Just how, therefore, the appellants could be legally aggrieved because the trial court found, on evidence they did not controvert and which this court deems to have been a sufficient support, that the Railroads did, in recognition of the appellee's long service with them, both recognize and underwrite him as a conductor and as entitled to prior claims upon service as such with them, does not readily occur. To the contrary, on such uncontroverted findings below, it seems clear to this court that if the appellants did in fact so interfere with the appellee's exercise of his established standing and opportunities for employment at the hands of the Railroad he had so long to its satisfaction served, they were enjoinable — at least, under the showing here made, on temporary order; these authorities are thought to fully support that conclusion: Blaser v. Linen Service Corp., Tex. Civ. App. 135 S.W.2d 509; International Ass'n v. Federated Ass'n., Tex. Civ. App. 109 S.W.2d 301; Id., 133 Tex. 624, 130 S.W.2d 282; Nagy v. Bennett, Tex. Civ. App. 24 S.W.2d 778, writ refused; Rosenfield v. Seifert, Tex. Civ. App. 270 S.W. 220; Southwestern Greyhound Lines v. Railroad Commission of Texas, 128 Tex. 560, 99 S.W.2d 263, 109 A.L.R. 1235; Sutherland v. Winnsboro, Tex. Civ. App. 225 S.W. 63; Union Transfer Storage Co. v. Greve, Tex. Civ. App. 131 S.W.2d 796; Corpus Juris, Vol. 63, Trade Unions, § 90; Tex.Jur., Vol. 3, Appeal and Error, Civil cases, Sec. 728; Tex.Jur. Vol. 24, Injunctions, Secs. 136, 250, and 253. Further discussion is deemed unnecessary, since these conclusions determine the merits of the appeal; they require an affirmance of the appealed-from order in toto; it will be so ordered.
challenged order is measured by the facts so found, it becomes plain that no abuse of discretion appears — on the contrary, that the quoted conclusions of law are each correct, and should be affirmed. Indeed, under the declaration of this State's public policy with reference to "Labor Organizations", as expressed in R. S. Articles 5152-5154, inclusive, and the interpretation and construction thereof given by our courts, that the questions so sought to be raised by appellants have, upon states of fact not in legal effect different from those embodied in these findings, already been determined adversely to the appellants in these, among other holdings: Webb v. Cooks Union, Tex. Civ. App. 205 S.W. 465; Cooks', Waiters' and Waitresses' Union v. Papageorge, Tex. Civ. App. 230 S.W. 1086, 1087; Sheehan v. Levy, Tex. Civ. App. 215 S.W. 229; Culinary Workers' Union v. Fuller, Tex. Civ. App. 105 S.W.2d 295; International Association v. Federated Association (Beard Stone case), Tex. Civ. App. 109 S.W.2d 301; Id., Tex.Com.App., 130 S.W.2d 282; Henke Pillot v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Tex. Civ. App. 109 S.W.2d 1083, error dismissed; Texas Motion Picture case, Texas Motion Picture Vitaphone Operators, Union No. 56,880, v. Galveston Motion Picture Operators, Tex. Civ. App. 132 S.W.2d 299. In other words, that these decisions in Texas, authoritatively construing this state's law with reference to the same subject-matter this controversy has to do with, have evolved two principles that control the disposition of this appeal, to wit: (1) That picketing by a labor organization or union, or its members (which was unlawful at common law), has been legalized by our cited statutes, with the rather limited objective of allowing striking employees who have a bona fide dispute with their employer over wages, hours, or working conditions, to persuade other employees to leave him, or dissuade third persons from becoming his employees; (2) that our courts of equity will, in proper cases affecting labo
ff and intervenor for a temporary injunction should be in all things denied." Upon the appeal it becomes manifest that the quoted recitation merely meant to reflect a finding that there was then a dispute and controversy only between the Henke-Pillot Company and the appellee, Union, Local No. 408, over the discharge of four of the former's employees who had joined, or at least filed application for membership in, the latter, not that there had been any three-cornered dispute between all the parties hereto; indeed, all the parties to the appeal so treat the matter, none of them contending that the intervener before this trial had been, or then was, in any such dispute either with the Henke-Pillot Company or with the appellee, Union, Local No. 408; wherefore this court, after careful consideration of the record, aided as it has been by the able briefs and arguments of counsel for all three parties, has concluded that, consonant with the principle applied in the somewhat similar case of International Association v. Federated Association, 109 S.W.2d 301, decided by this court July 22 of 1937, the learned trial court's order should be affirmed as affects the Henke-Pillot Company, but reversed as concerns the intervener, in the main upon these considerations: First.