The mistake in wording here is similar to that made by appellant in Steele v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 252 Ga. 58 ( 311 S.E.2d 470) (1984). There the Supreme Court adhered to the more liberal treatment of notices of appeal which it had adopted in light of the language of the Appellate Practice Act. It eschewed the exactitude which had been required in earlier cases such as Interstate Fire Ins. Co. v. Chattam, 222 Ga. 436 ( 150 S.E.2d 618) (1966), which had resulted in dismissals. Instead, it expressly chose to "follow the route . . . toward less technical and more expeditious handling of cases involving minor procedural errors."

To me this language is so plain and unambiguous as to admit of no construction, and, therefore, the mandate of Sec. 23 of the Act referred to in the majority opinion requiring that the Act be liberally construed cannot affect the decision of the question as to whether the appeal should be dismissed in this case. To carry the reasoning of the majority to its ultimate conclusion would mean that, no matter how loosely the appellant prepares his notice of appeal or to what extent he disregards the plain requirements of the law, we are forbidden by the mandate of Sec. 23 to dismiss it. Obviously, this is not so as evidenced by such cases as Interstate Fire Ins. Co. v. Chattam, 222 Ga. 436 ( 150 S.E.2d 618), and others which this court and the Supreme Court have dismissed under the so-called new Appellate Practice Act. As has been said on many occasions in other contexts, the law without form or technical requirements which must be complied with by the parties would be chaos and impossible for the courts to administer.

We must take what remains in the notice when it comes to this court as a correct statement of appellant's intention as to what the appellant directs his appeal. Interstate Fire Ins. Co. v. Chattam, 222 Ga. 436 ( 150 S.E.2d 618); Williams v. George, 104 Ga. 599, 601 ( 30 S.E. 751); West Lumber Co. v. Schnuck, 82 Ga. App. 799, 803 ( 62 S.E.2d 370). This court has no jurisdiction to hear evidence to explain, to sustain, or to impeach the correctness of the notice in the form here received.

The subsequent untimely filing of Fullwood's application in this Court did not satisfy the statutory requirements based on the concept of substantial compliance, because an appellate court, having no jurisdiction from the outset, cannot perfect an appellant's belated attempt to invest it with jurisdiction. Interstate Fire Ins. Co. v. Chattam, 222 Ga. 436 ( 150 S.E.2d 618) (1966). This Court has always refused to sanction a practice which requires that it ignore jurisdictional statutes and abandon its role as disinterested decision-maker.

This court has held that the verdict of a jury is not an appealable judgment under the Appellate Practice Act of 1965 (Ga. L. 1965, p. 18; 1968, pp. 1072, 1073; Code Ann. § 6-701). Gibson v. Hodges, 221 Ga. 779 ( 147 S.E.2d 329); Interstate Fire Ins. Co. v. Chattam, 222 Ga. 436 ( 150 S.E.2d 618); Williams v. Keebler, 222 Ga. 437 ( 150 S.E.2d 674). Whether the verdict resulted from direction, as here, or was by deliberation is of no decisive consequence.

As to (1) and (3), this court has held that an appeal may not be taken from a verdict. Interstate Fire Ins. Co. v. Chattam, 222 Ga. 436 ( 150 S.E.2d 618); Williams v. Keebler, 222 Ga. 437 ( 150 S.E.2d 674). As to (2), the ruling disallowing the plaintiff's amendment was not a final judgment and there is no certificate of immediate review by the trial judge. See Ga. L. 1968, pp. 1072, 1073; Goldberg v. Monroe, 224 Ga. 693.

A jury verdict is not an appealable judgment. Interstate Fire Ins. Co. v. Chattam, 222 Ga. 436 ( 150 S.E.2d 618). In the absence of an appealable judgment, this court has no jurisdiction and the appeal must be dismissed.

There can be no effective appeal from anything but a judgment — a final judgment without a certificate, or an interlocutory judgment with a certificate, reduced to writing and entered by filing with the clerk. Code Ann. § 6-701; Interstate Fire Ins. Co. v. Chattam, 222 Ga. 436 ( 150 S.E.2d 618); Williams v. Keebler, 222 Ga. 437 ( 150 S.E.2d 674); Davis v. Davis, 224 Ga. 740 ( 164 S.E.2d 816); Hurst v. Starr, 226 Ga. 42 ( 172 S.E.2d 604); Smith v. Sorrough, 226 Ga. 744 ( 177 S.E.2d 246); Herrington v. Herrington, 230 Ga. 94 ( 195 S.E.2d 654), and citations in Division 1. At the time the notice of appeal was entered there was no judgment from which there could be an appeal, and the appeal must be dismissed.

There can be no effective appeal from anything but a judgment — final judgment without a certificate, or an interlocutory judgment with a certificate. Section 1 of the Appellate Practice Act, as amended (Ga. L. 1965, p. 18; Ga. L. 1968, pp. 1072, and 1073; Code Ann. § 6-701); Interstate Fire Ins. Co. v. Chattam, 222 Ga. 436 ( 150 S.E.2d 618); Williams v. Keebler, 222 Ga. 437 ( 150 S.E.2d 674); Davis v. Davis, 224 Ga. 740 ( 164 S.E.2d 816); Hurst v. Starr, 226 Ga. 42 ( 172 S.E.2d 604); Smith v. Sorrough, 226 Ga. 744 ( 177 S.E.2d 246); Herrington v. Herrington, 230 Ga. 94 ( 195 S.E.2d 654). Appeal dismissed. Eberhardt, P. J., and Stolz, J., concur.

The appeal therefore is from a final judgment and does not come under the rule that the appeal must be from a judgment, not a verdict. See Interstate Fire Ins. Co. v. Chattam, 222 Ga. 436 ( 150 S.E.2d 618). The contention in the cross appeal is that the motion for new trial was from the verdict (not the judgment) and was not amended to show a plea to set aside the judgment until after 30 days had expired, which it is contended could not be done. The motion stresses that the enumeration of errors presents nothing for consideration for the reason that each of them were grounds contained in the amended motion for new trial and no appeal was taken from the order overruling the motion for new trial.