Opinion
01 cv 9668 (HB)
February 13, 2002
OPINION ORDER
Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration is granted and my prior decision on the motion adhered to.
Plaintiff International Top Sports S.A. ("ITS") moves for reconsideration pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59 ("FRCP") and Local Civil Rule 6.3 of a denial of its summary judgment motion. On January 16, 2002, I denied ITS's summary judgment claim for (1) $625,000 under the parties' January 2000 contract for the concluded 2001 season, and (2) a declaratory judgment that defendant Pan American Sports Network International ("PSN") is liable for contract damages for the 2002 through 2007 seasons. Int'l Top Sports S.A. v. Pan Am. Sports Network Int'l, No. 01 CV 9668 (HB), 2002 WL 72935, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2002). I denied ITS's first motion on the ground that a genuine issue of material fact remained as to the adequacy of ITS's performance, specifically, the issue of whether ITS achieved a "first class signal" pursuant to the parties' January 2000 contract. In addition, I found that a factual issue remained as to the alleged exclusivity of the contract's notice-and-cure provision. Finally, I denied ITS's motion for a declaratory judgment on the ground that factual issues remained as to whether ITS substantially performed on the contract and to whether PSN duly terminated the contract as a result of ITS's failure to produce a first class signal. Oral argument on ITS's motion for reconsideration was heard on February 11, 2002. For the reasons discussed below, my underlying decision is adhered to.
Discussion
1. Standard
In a motion for reconsideration brought pursuant to Local Rule 6.3 or FRCP 59, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the court overlooked controlling decisions or factual matters that were put before it on the underlying motion. Wiesner v. 321 West 16th St. Assoc., No. 00 Civ. 1423 (RWS), 2000 WL 1585680, at *2 (Oct. 25, 2000 S.D.N.Y.). "The standard for granting such a motion is strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked — matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court." Shader v. CSX Trans., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995). Although a party seeking reconsideration may advert to controlling decisions or factual matters that were before the court on the underlying motion, the party may neither put forth new facts, issues or arguments that were not presented to the court on that motion, see Wiesner, 2000 WL 1585680, at *3, nor revisit issues that the court has already fully considered such that the motion becomes "a substitute for appealing from a final judgment." Id.
2. Summary Judgment on Claim for $625,000
On January 16, I denied ITS's motion for summary judgment on its claim for $625,000 on the ground that PSN raised a factual issue as to whether ITS achieved a first class signal pursuant to the parties' January 2000 contract. Int'l Top Sports S.A. v. Pan Am. Sports Network Int'l, No. 01 CV 9668 (HB), 2002 WL 72935, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2002). In addition, I rejected ITS's argument that summary judgment on the claim for $625,000 should be granted despite its alleged failure to achieve a first class signal since the contract included a notice-and-cure provision to which PSN allegedly did not adhere. 2002 WL 72935, at *2. As with the factual issue of the first class signal, summary judgment was denied because factual issues remained as to the exclusivity of the notice-and-cure provision.
After reading the parties' motions and hearing oral argument on this issue, I must still deny ITS's motion for summary judgment on its claim for $625,000. ITS has failed to satisfy the standard for reconsideration set forth by the Second Circuit in Shrader, I do not find that any of the three cases on which ITS primarily relies are "controlling decisions." For instance, in Filmline (Cross Country) Prods., Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 865 F.2d 513 (2d Cir. 1989) and Karabu v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., No. 96 Civ. 4960 (BSJ), 1997 WL 759462 (S.D.N Y Dec. 10, 1997), the court had before it a full factual record on which to base its decision. Moreover, Hansen v. Capital District Sports, 218 A.D.2d 909, 630 N.Y.S.2d 429 (3d Dep't 1995), involved an employment contract that was unambiguous with respect to the notice that was required prior to discharging an employee for cause. 218 A.D.2d at 910, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 430. By contrast, the factual record in this case is relatively slight and the contractual language is ambiguous. In its opposition papers to both ITS's underlying motion as well as its motion for reconsideration, PSN has not only cited cases that come out differently than those on which ITS relies, but has also pointed to what seems to me to be an ambiguity in the notice-and-cure provision that raises an issue of fact. Specifically, PSN cites to Lanvin Inc. v. Colonia, 739 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), which held that a non-breaching party need not adhere to a contract's notice-and-cure provision if the alleged breach is "material or . . . goes to the root or essence of the contract" unless the contract makes it clear that the notice provision is exclusive. 739 F. Supp. at 195-96 (citing In re Best Film Video Corp., 46 B.R. 861 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)). In this case, not only was the alleged breach — ITS's failure to achieve a first class signal — material to the parties' January 2000 contract, but the parties have also disagreed over whether the notice-and-cure provision is exclusive. Similarly, the parties have disagreed over the meaning and interpretation of the notice-and-cure provision's final sentence, which states that "[t]he provisions of this clause do not limit the right of PSN to claim damages arising out of the cause for rescission" (Pl. Doc. 5, at § 10) — specifically, whether the $625,000 to which ITS lays claim constitutes PSN's setoff "damages" resulting from ITS's breach of contract. Last, the parties have disagreed over whether the notice-and-cure provision contains language of exclusivity.
In short, ITS has failed to demonstrate that I overlooked "controlling decisions" or data that would have led me to come out differently on the underlying motion.
3. Declaratory Judgment Regarding the 2002 Through 2007 Seasons
Upon reconsideration, I also deny that aspect of ITS's motion with respect to a declaratory judgment. According to my January 16 decision, ITS's motion for declaratory judgment was denied on the ground that "the facts necessary to determine (1) whether ITS substantially performed on the contract and (2) whether PSN duly terminated the contract as a result of ITS's failure to produce a first class signal [were] in dispute." 2002 WL 72935, at *2. In its reconsideration motion, ITS has not pointed to a single controlling decision that might change my decision. Specifically, as mentioned, ITS has failed to demonstrate that I would, or, for that matter, should now reach a different conclusion regarding the contract's notice provision. Furthermore, ITS has failed to cite any "controlling decisions" regarding a breaching party's duty to mitigate that would compel me to come out differently on this issue. For these reasons, I find that ITS has failed to satisfy the strict standard for reconsideration of its declaratory judgment motion under Local Rule 6.3 or FRCP 59.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, ITS's motion for reconsideration of my January 16, 2002 Opinion Order is granted and my underlying decision adhered to.