International Medical Group v. American Arbitration Assoc., (S.D.Ind. 2001)

Full title: INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL GROUP INC AN INDIANA CORPORATION, SIRIUS…

Court: United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division

Date published: Jul 26, 2001

Cause No. IP00-1020-C-B/S (S.D. Ind. Jul. 26, 2001)

Opinion

Cause No. IP00-1020-C-B/S.

July 26, 2001

F Jonathan Zusy, Attorney at Law, St. Indianapolis, IN.

Geoffrey Slaughter, Sommer Barnard, Indianapolis, IN.

William P Wooden, Wooden McLaughlin, Indianapolis, IN.

ENTRY GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

SARAH EVANS BARKER, District Judge

Procedural Background

Plaintiffs, International Medical Group, Inc. ("IMG") and Sirius International Insurance Corporation ("Sirius"), filed suit in Indiana state court requesting that the court issue an ex parte temporary restraining order ("TRO") with regard to an arbitration proceeding entitled Michael D. Ogdon, Claimant v. International Medical Group, Inc., Respondent; American Arbitration Association Case No. 32-193-00084-00 (the "Arbitration Proceeding"). Plaintiffs sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief to prevent the Defendants, American Arbitration Association ("AAA"), Janella Brown ("Brown"), John Germani ("Germani") (collectively the "AAA Defendants"), Juan J. Rodriguez ("Rodriguez"), Hilda Piloto ("Piloto"), Rodriguez Machado, P.A. ("RM"), and Michael Ogdon ("Ogdon") (collectively the "Non-AAA Defendants"), from proceeding with the Arbitration Proceeding, requested declaratory relief with respect to the Arbitration Proceeding and the insurance policy at issue herein, and alleged abuse of process, malicious prosecution and bad faith arbitration. After the state court granted Plaintiffs' requests for preliminary injunctive relief, the action was removed to federal court and Plaintiffs' motion to remand was denied. On May 25, 2001, we granted a motion to dismiss the claims of IMG against the AAA Defendants, thereby resolving all claims brought against the AAA Defendants.¹

1 All claims brought by Sirius against the AAA Defendants were dismissed with prejudice on July 18, 2000.

We now consider the remaining Defendants' (the "Non-AAA Defendants") motion to dismiss the complaint, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction as well as on forum non conviens grounds. For the reasons explicated below, we GRANT the Non-AAA Defendants' motion to dismiss in its entirety.

Factual Background

Defendant, Michael Ogdon ("Ogdon") (a citizen of Great Britain and an alien admitted to the United States for permanent residence, now residing in Florida), purchased a global health insurance policy on or about November 14, 1998, issued by Plaintiff, Sirius (a Swedish Corporation, with offices in Stockholm, Sweden, and London, England), which policy designated Plaintiff, IMG (an Indiana corporation, with offices in Indianapolis), as the plan administrator and general underwriter. See Compl. in Int'l Med. Group, Inc. v. American Arbitration Ass'n, No. 49D02-0005-CP-736, Marion Superior Court ("State Complaint") ¶¶ 13, 14; id., Exh. A, Global Medical Insurance contract, signed by Michael Ogdon, and dated Sept. 4, 1998 ("Ins. Policy"), and Exh. B, Declaration of Insurance for Michael D. Ogdon, effective Nov. 4, 1998, Certificate No. 1B98-70484 ("Ins. Dec.") at 1, ¶ A. The policy provides coverage for all services, supplies, treatments or conditions resulting from an illness or injury, except that it excludes from coverage any pre-existing medical conditions for the first two years and allows limited coverage of such conditions thereafter. Ins. Policy at 3; Ins. Dec. ¶ K(1); State Complaint ¶¶ 16, 17.

On or about January 18, 1999, Ogdon received "emergency medical treatment" at a Florida hospital and, pursuant to the terms of his policy, submitted bills approximating $10,000 to Sirius, through IMG as plan administrator, requesting payment. State Compl. ¶¶ 18-19. After conducting an investigation and examining Ogdon's medical bills, IMG, acting for and on behalf of Sirius, denied the claim and refused to issue any payment, contending that all bills related to his treatment resulted from a pre-existing condition. Id. ¶ 20.

On or about January 31, 1999, Ogdon, by his attorneys (Defendants, RM, through Rodriguez and Piloto), filed a complaint with the Indiana Department of Insurance, Consumer Services Division, in Indianapolis (the "Administrative Complaint"), alleging in relevant part that the January 1999, illness was not a pre-existing condition at the time of entering into the Insurance Policy contract, and further that Plaintiffs' denial of said claim was improper, pretextual, and in bad faith. State Compl. ¶ 21, Exh. C. IMG replied to this charge on February 17, 2000, denying it in full. Id. ¶ 23. Neither Sirius nor IMG ever admitted any liability under the Insurance Policy for these claims. Id. ¶ 20.

On February 25, 2000, Ogdon requested both verbally and in writing that IMG (acting for Sirius) cancel the Insurance Policy and that the prorated premium be refunded. Id. ¶ 25, Exh. D. The policy provided that cancellation occurred at the option of Sirius; IMG exercised this option on Sirius' behalf on March 12, 2000, effective February 25, 2000, credited Ogdon's credit card account in the amount of $602.57, and informed Ogdon in writing that "[a]ll rights under this Certificate have been forfeited." Id. ¶ 26, Exhs. E, F; Ins. Dec. ¶ (B)(11).

After notifying Plaintiffs of his desire to cancel the policy, but before Plaintiffs consented to its cancellation, on or about March 6, 2000, Ogdon's attorneys prepared a Statement of Claim and a Demand for Arbitration which were filed with Defendant, the American Arbitration Association ("AAA"). State Compl. ¶ 27, Exh. G. Ogdon and his attorneys contended that this claim and demand were authorized by the arbitration provision contained in Section B(16) of the Insurance Declaration, which states that "[i]f any dispute shall arise as to the amount to be paid under this insurance (liability being otherwise admitted), such dispute shall be referred to arbitration in accordance with procedures of the American Arbitration Association." Ins. Dec. ¶ B(16).

Thereafter, the parties exchanged a series of correspondence related to the arbitration proceeding. As it relates to the Non-AAA Defendants, this correspondence consisted of the following:

1. A January 28, 2000, letter from attorney Rodriguez, of RM, on behalf of their client, Ogdon, to Jon Ross, Claims Specialist for IMG, in Indiana, advising IMG of Ogdon's position on the denied claims and threatening to pursue arbitration if IMG did not make immediate payment of those claims.

2. A March 8, 2000, letter from attorney Piloto, of RM, on behalf of Ogdon, to Thomas Dawson of the law firm of LeBoeuf, Lamb Greene MacRae, L.L.P. in New York, New York (whom paragraph B(6) of the Insurance Policy designated as Sirius' agent for purposes of service), advising him that Ogdon had commenced arbitration proceedings purportedly under the terms of the policy.

3. An April 20, 2000, letter from attorney Piloto, of RM, on behalf of Ogdon, to Brown, the case manager assigned by the AAA to Ogdon's request for arbitration, which letter was copied to F. Jonathan Zusy, Vice President and General Counsel for IMG.

4. A May 12, 2000, letter from attorney Piloto, of RM, on behalf of Ogdon, to Brown indicating Ogdon's preferred arbitration panel, which letter was copied to Zusy.

Pls.' In Camera Submission in Support of Their Supplemental Resp. and Objection to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, Exh. 1, Indiana Dept. of Ins. Problem Report, Exh. A; State Complaint, Exhs. G, Q, T.

On May 22, 2000, Plaintiffs filed a complaint in Indiana state court, requesting a temporary restraining order as well as preliminary and permanent injunctive relief directed at stopping the arbitration proceedings, seeking a declaratory judgment clarifying the rights and obligations contained in the insurance policy, and claiming damages resulting from the Defendants' alleged abuse of process, malicious prosecution and bad faith arbitration. See State Compl. That same day, Plaintiffs' ex parte request for a temporary restraining order was granted and on May 31, 2000, the Marion Superior Court granted Plaintiffs' request for preliminary injunctive relief and certain of Plaintiffs' requests for declaratory relief with respect to the Arbitration Proceedings and the subject insurance policy.

Prior to the state court's granting certain of Plaintiffs' requests for injunctive and declaratory relief, Defendants had filed a motion to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens; however, the case was removed to us before the state court had an opportunity to rule on Defendants' motion. The Non-AAA Defendants now reassert this motion, contending that Indiana courts may not constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over the remaining defendants due to their lack the contacts with the state of Indiana.²

2 In the alternative, Defendants contend that the Plaintiffs chose an "inconvenient forum and therefore the matter should be dismissed." Since we shall dismiss all of the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction, we do not address their alternative contention that dismissal under theforum non conveniens doctrine is appropriate.

Discussion A. Standard of Review A. Rule 12(b) Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) permits the dismissal of a claim for "lack of jurisdiction over the person." FED. R. CIV. P. ("RULE") 12(b)(2). When considering a motion under Rule 12(b), the Court must examine the sufficiency of the plaintiff's complaint, not the merits of the lawsuit. See Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520-21 (7th Cir. 1990); Triad Assocs., Inc. v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 892 F.2d 583, 585 (7th Cir. 1989), abrogated on other grounds by Bd. of County Comm'rs, v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996). Dismissal is appropriate only if it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff cannot establish any set of facts which would entitle her to the relief sought. See Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Mosley v. Klincar, 947 F.2d 1338, 1339 (7th Cir. 1991). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain either "direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory . . . . But such allegations need only state a possible claim, not a winning claim." Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 369 (7th Cir. 1998),rev'd on other grounds, 530 U.S. 211 (2000).

We accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Dawson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 369, 372 (7th Cir. 1992); Rule 8(a). However, "a complaint which consists of conclusory allegations unsupported by factual assertions fails even the liberal standard of Rule 12(b)." Panaras v. Liquid Carbonic Indus. Corp., 74 F.3d 786, 792 (7th Cir. 1996) (quotingPalda v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 47 F.3d 872, 875 (7th Cir. 1995)). In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2), we may also consider affidavits and other documentary evidence which have been filed, so long as any factual disputes are resolved in favor of the non-movant. McIlwee v. ADM Indus., Inc., 17 F.3d 222, 223 (7th Cir. 1994); Nelson v. Park Indus., Inc., 717 F.2d 1120, 1122 (7th Cir. 1983).

B. Personal Jurisdiction 1. State and Constitutional Standards

The Non-AAA Defendants first contend that we may not exercise personal jurisdiction over them. As federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, the plaintiff must prove that personal jurisdiction exists, if there is a challenge to it, by establishing a prima facie case that jurisdiction is proper. E.g., RAR, Inc. v. Turner Diesel, Ltd., 107 F.3d 1272, 1276 (7th Cir. 1997); Neiman v. Rudolph Wolff Co., 619 F.2d 1189, 1190 (7th Cir. 1980); Reliable Tool Mach. Co. v. U-Haul Int'l, Inc., 837 F. Supp. 274, 278 (N.D.Ind. 1993); Intermatic, Inc. v. Taymac Corp., 815 F. Supp. 290, 292 (S.D.Ind. 1993).

To determine whether personal jurisdiction exists, we look first to Indiana's long-arm statute. Wallace v. Herron, 778 F.2d 391, 393 (7th Cir. 1985); Reliable Tool Mach. Co., 837 F. Supp. at 278. Courts have traditionally interpreted Indiana's long-arm statute as extending personal jurisdiction of courts in Indiana, including federal courts, to the limits permitted under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. E.g., Wallace, 778 F.2d at 392; Intermatic, Inc., 815 F. Supp. at 292. However, the Indiana Supreme Court recently explained that the statute is more properly considered as an "enumerated acts" statute which requires the court to engage in a two-step process in order to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the parties to the case: first, the court must determine whether the defendant's contacts with the forum fall under the listed acts found in the long-arm statute; and secondly, if they do, the court must determine whether the defendant's contacts satisfy federal due process standards. Anthem Ins. Cos. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 730 N.E.2d 1227, 1232 (Ind. 2000).

Indiana Trial Rule 4.4(A) provides in relevant part that:

Any person or organization that is a nonresident of this state . . . submits to jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any action arising from the following acts committed by him or her or his or her agent:

(1) doing any business in this state:

(2) causing personal injury or property damage by an act or omission done within this state;

(3) causing personal injury or property damage in this state by an occurrence, act, or omission done outside this state if he regularly does or solicits business or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue or benefit from goods, materials, or services used, consumed, or rendered in this state;

. . .; or

(8) abusing, harassing, or disturbing the peace of, . . . any person within the state by an act or omission done in this state, or outside this state if the act or omission is part of a continuing course of conduct having an effect in this state.

Id. If a person's or organization's contacts fall into any of the categories listed above, Indiana's long-arm statute is satisfied and Indiana courts may exercise jurisdiction to the extent allowed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Anthem Ins. Cos., 730 N.E.2d at 1232-33.

Due process requires that a defendant have "certain minimum contacts with the forum such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend `traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Wallace, 778 F.2d at 393 (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). A court may obtain in personam jurisdiction over a defendant based upon the defendant's specific contacts with the forum, where the controversy itself "`is related to or arises out of the defendants' contacts with the forum.'" Id. (citing Perkins v. Benguet Consol Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) and Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted)).³

3 Alternatively, a state may exercise "general" personal jurisdiction over a defendant if it has "sufficient continuous and systematic general . . . contacts" with the state. Wallace, 778 F.2d at 393 (quotations and citations omitted). Plaintiffs make no attempt to invoke general jurisdiction in this case so we do not address it herein.

The question of whether minimum contacts exist sufficient to establish specific personal jurisdiction is one we must answer by looking at the particular facts of each case. Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 92-93 (1978); Anthem Ins. Cos., 730 N.E.2d at 1235. While a single contact with a forum state may be enough to establish specific personal jurisdiction over the defendant, the contacts still must be such that they "create a `substantial connection' with the forum state and the suit is based on [those] connections." Anthem Ins. Cos., 730 N.E.2d at 1235 (quoting McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957)). "The defendants' conduct and connection with Indiana must be such that they should reasonably anticipate being subject to the jurisdiction of an Indiana court." Wallace, 778 F.2d at 393-94 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)). To establish such a "reasonable anticipation" the "defendant must have purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Cent. States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Reimer Express World Corp., 230 F.3d 934, 942 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 1406 (2001) (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474-75; RAR, 107 F.3d at 1277). When assessing whether specific jurisdiction exists, the court must examine "the quality and nature of the activities taking place within the state to determine if they are related to the basis of the lawsuit and the result of deliberate conduct by the defendant." Anthem Ins. Cos., 730 N.E.2d at 1236.

Indiana courts have enumerated five factors to be considered in determining whether fair play and substantial justice would be served by a finding that jurisdiction is proper in a given case:

(1) the nature and quality of the contacts with the forum state; (2) the quantity of contacts with the state; (3) the relationship between those contacts and the cause of action; (4) the interest of the forum state in providing a forum for its residents; and (5) the convenience of the parties. . . . The first three are the primary factors in determining whether the International Shoe standards are met.

Baseball Card World, Inc. v. Pannette, 583 N.E.2d 753, 755 (Ind.Ct.App. 1991) (quoting Tietloff v. Lift-A-Loft Corp., 441 N.E.2d 986, 989 (Ind.Ct.App. 1982)); accord D'Iorio v. D'Iorio, 694 N.E.2d 775, 778 (Ind.Ct.App. 1998). In this analysis, each defendant's contacts with Indiana must be assessed separately. E.g., Mullen v. Cogdell, 643 N.E.2d 390, 398 (Ind.Ct.App. 1994) (citing Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980)).

General rules of vicarious liability apply in jurisdictional determinations, so the contacts of a principal's agents may be aggregated to determine the propriety of jurisdiction over the principal. See 16 MOORE'S FED. PRAC. § 108.42[3][b][ii] (Matthew Bender 3d ed.). However, an individual (or agent) is not shielded from the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction simply because his or her actions were taken on behalf of or at the direction of a principal. Cf. Intermatic, Inc., 815 F. Supp. at 296 (concluding that Indiana would decline to adopt the fiduciary shield doctrine in personal jurisdiction) accord Clark v. Integrity Fin. Group, Inc., 2000 WL 943863, No. TH 00-028-C-T/H, at *4 n. 9 (S.D.Ind. June 23, 2000); Health Mgmt. Prof'ls, Inc. v. Diversified Bus. Enters., Inc., 882 F. Supp. 795, 799 (S.D.Ind. 1995); but see Ryan v. Chayes Va., Inc., 553 N.E.2d 1237 (Ind.Ct.App. 1990) (adopting fiduciary shield doctrine).

2. Jurisdiction Under the Indiana Long-Arm Statute

Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants have taken actions that bring them within Trial Rule 4.4(A)(1), (2), (3), and/or (8). Pls.' Supplemental Resp. and Objection to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss ("Pls.' Supplemental Resp.") at 10-11. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that their claims arise out of: (1) Ogdon's having done direct business in this state with respect to the application for, issuance of, and cancellation of the insurance certificate which is the subject of this action; (2) Ogdon's application to and acceptance of membership in the Indiana Insurance Trust; (3) Ogdon's submission of medical claims to IMG in Indiana; (4) Ogdon's payment of premiums in this state and receipt of the refunded premiums of this state; (5) Rodriguez's and RM's January 28, 2000, demand for payment and threat to pursue arbitration; (6) Piloto's and RM's complaint to the Indiana Department of Insurance on behalf of Ogdon; (7) "Defendants' jointly having caused injury and/or property damage in this state by their abuse of process, malicious prosecution, and/or bad faith arbitration committed within this state, and/or based upon acts and omissions done outside of this state which are part of and/or constitute a persistent and/or continuing course of conduct having an effect in this state[; and (8)] Ogdon's fraud committed in this state." Pls.' Supplemental Resp. at 11.

Looking first at the contacts of Ogdon, there is no dispute that each of the contacts made by his attorneys was done as agent for Ogdon and on his behalf and are therefore properly aggregated when assessing jurisdiction over him. Defendants contend that the only contact Ogdon has with the state of Indiana is that his lawyers filed a complaint on his behalf with the Indiana Department of Insurance.

They highlight that the insurance policy at issue was purchased outside of Indiana and that the medical treatment involved herein was rendered in Florida. In addition, the arbitration proceeding instituted on his behalf was attempted in Miami, Florida, not in Indiana, and the notification of it was sent to New York.

The threshold question we must decide is whether the actions taken with respect to the insurance policy underwritten by IMG amount to "doing business" within this state. On the one hand, the agreement is between Ogdon (at the time residing in Canada) and Sirius, a foreign corporation. On the other hand, Ogdon's correspondence with respect to his claims and cancellation of the policy was directed to IMG, the Indiana corporation identified by the policy as its underwriter.

Ogdon did not choose to contract with IMG; rather he chose to enter into an agreement with Sirius. In fact, IMG has previously argued that it is not properly subject to arbitration because it is not a party to the contract. Sirius enlisted IMG's presence in this dispute when it assigned IMG to be the policy's underwriter and plan administrator and required Ogdon to direct all communications intended for Sirius to IMG.⁴ As such, it appears that Indiana's connection with this dispute is entirely fortuitous in that it is only by Sirius' and IMG's agreement that IMG would provide underwriting for the policy that the state became involved at all. Though we question whether these communications properly constitute "doing business" in Indiana,⁵ we acknowledge that the long-arm statute should be liberally construed and will assume that these actions constitute doing business under Rule 4.4(A)(1).⁶

4 Under the terms of the policy "[a]ll communications, notices and payments required under this Agreement shall be transmitted through [IMG]. Receipt by [IMG] shall be considered receipt by [Sirius]." Ins. Dec. at 1.

5 Moreover, Ogdon initiated contact with the state in filing the complaint with the Indiana Department of Insurance over IMG's decision to deny him coverage.

6 Due to our conclusion that jurisdiction is appropriate under sub-section (1), we need not address IMG's contention that jurisdiction is also appropriate under sub-sections (2), (3) and/or (8). We note that the only act or omission taken by any of the defendants in this state was filing a complaint with the Indiana Department of Insurance. To the extent that Plaintiffs' claims rely on this action as a source of injury in Count I, it would appear that sub-section (2) would also be implicated, at least vis-a-vis those defendants involved in filing that complaint. However, we have our doubts as to whether the actions alleged by Plaintiffs comprise a consistent or persistent course of conduct necessary to also invoke either sub-sections (3) or (8).

Turning next to the application of the long-arm statute to the law firm of Rodriguez Machado and the individual attorneys, we again note that Piloto and Rodriguez acted in their representative capacity for RM, and their contacts should be aggregated in assessing jurisdiction over it. Many of the contacts discussed above were made by RM attorneys on Ogdon's behalf. Pilato submitted the complaint to the Indiana Department of Insurance, and Rodriguez demanded that IMG pay for the submitted medical treatment or face the threat of arbitration as well as submitted Ogdon's demand for arbitration to the AAA. Although we have the same doubts referenced above with respect to Ogdon's contacts, under a liberal construction of the long-arm statute, the choice to file a complaint with the Indiana Department of Insurance and the resultant correspondence demanding payment and threatening arbitration involved the attorneys in "doing . . . business" in Indiana under Rule 4.4(A)(1). Thus, we conclude that the Indiana long-arm statute also provides for personal jurisdiction over RM, Rodriguez and Piloto under Rule 4.4(A)(1).

3. Application of Constitutional Standards to Defendants' Contacts

Having determined that the defendants' actions fall within one of the long-arm statute's enumerated sections, we turn to the question of whether exercising personal jurisdiction over them comports with Due Process. Looking first at defendant attorney Rodriguez, who among all the defendants had the fewest contacts with Indiana, it is clear that the only contact that he had was in writing to IMG to inform it that Ogdon would submit his claim to arbitration if IMG did not cover it. On the basis of this single contact IMG contends that Rodriguez "purposefully availed" himself of the privileges and protections of the state of Indiana. We view this contact as too attenuated, however, to permit the constitutional assertion of jurisdiction over Rodriguez.

The facts of this case are analogous to those which the Seventh Circuit confronted in Wallace v. Herron, supra. In Wallace, the plaintiffs sued three California attorneys and a California law firm for malicious prosecution arising out of a prior lawsuit in California in which the attorneys represented a couple who sued a number of parties including the plaintiff. The Seventh Circuit held that the attorneys' actions of serving interrogatories, requesting the production of documents, and causing the plaintiffs to respond to five complaints in the California lawsuit were insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over the attorneys. Id. at 394. "The fact of the matter . . . is that the defendants filed these motions on behalf of their clients in a California court pursuant to a California lawsuit, and it would be unreasonable to require the defendants to appear in Indiana to defend this suit on the basis of such attenuated contacts." Id.

Like the Wallace defendants, Rodriguez's actions in creating the correspondence on behalf of Ogdon were taken with respect to a proceeding that was not expected to occur in Indiana. While the Wallace defendants' contacts with the state were limited to those required to pursue the California litigation, Rodriguez's contact was even less purposefully directed toward the protections and privileges afforded by Indiana. The single act of a single letter written by an attorney in anticipation of either the settlement of a foreign claim or in anticipation of a foreign quasi-legal proceeding is simply not enough to allow an Indiana court to constitutionally assert in personam jurisdiction over Rodriguez. Thus, the claims asserted against Rodriguez must be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Since the remainder of the actions undertaken by attorneys on Ogdon's behalf involved Piloto, acting on behalf of his law firm, RM, we will examine Piloto's and RM's contacts together. These contacts may be separated into two parts: those related to the Florida arbitration (filing the arbitration and copying IMG on correspondence filed with the AAA in connection to that arbitration) and those related to the initiation of the complaint with the Indiana Department of Insurance. Clearly the first set of contacts suffers the same constitutional shortcomings as the contact by Rodriguez and for those same reasons cannot serve to confer jurisdiction over Piloto or RM. Cf. Wallace, 778 F.2d at 394.⁷

7 RM might also be subject to personal jurisdiction for the actions of Rodriguez were it not for the inconsequential nature of Rodriguez's single contact. Since it is the qualitative nature, and not the quantity, of these contacts that makes it unconstitutional to subject the defendant to in personam jurisdiction, the additional letter written by Rodriguez does not change the nature of the analysis with respect to R M.

The latter contact is distinguishable because it involves the filing of a complaint with an Indiana administrative body. IMG contends that initiating this complaint was done "with the singular and sole purpose of attempting to invoke the privileges and benefits of the laws and insurance regulations of the State of Indiana. . . . The Defendants . . . expressly communicated with and sought out the assistance and jurisdiction of an Indiana State regulatory authority, obviously with the intent that IMG and Sirius be likewise subjected thereto." Pls.' Supplemental Resp. at 12-13. Defendants do not directly respond to this contention, focusing instead on the allegations related to the arbitration.

We view the single act of filing this complaint with the Indiana Department of Insurance also as insufficient to establish on the part of either RM or Piloto a substantial contact with the state of Indiana. First, the defendants' action of filing the administrative complaint does not relate to the causes of action asserted by the plaintiffs. The bulk of Plaintiffs' allegations correspond with the arbitration proceedings initiated by RM on Ogdon's behalf in Florida. In fact, Counts II and III of the Complaint in this action request injunctive relief designed to prevent the arbitration from proceeding and to secure declaratory relief as to the propriety of arbitration against IMG and Sirius under the terms of the insurance policy. The complaint filed with the Indiana Department of Insurance is plainly irrelevant to those counts.

Likewise, the alleged torts delineated in Count I stem from the arbitration proceedings themselves. The rhetorical paragraphs set out in Count I all specifically discuss the arbitration and actions undertaken in furtherance of that arbitration as the basis of the tortious actions. The Department of Insurance administrative complaint is linked to Count I only by the general allegation that plaintiffs "have suffered and continue to suffer injuries, losses, and damages as a direct and proximate result of the acts and omissions of the Defendants" detailed in paragraphs 31 and 37, which incorporate all of the complaint's prior allegations into Count I, including the prior paragraphs describing the administrative complaint. The fact that the claims brought in Count I focus primarily on the arbitration and not on the administrative complaint leads us to conclude that any allegations relating to the administrative complaint simply do not relate to Count I.

Even if we were to give Count I a broader reading allowing us to conclude that instituting the administrative complaint was part of the defendants' tortious conduct, this single contact still would not be enough to subject the attorneys to in personam jurisdiction in Indiana. Considering this contact together with the other contacts between Ogdon's attorneys and the forum, combined they still amount to no more than a relatively few contacts with the state of Indiana, most of which, as we have noted previously, involving rather inconsequential correspondence relating to the arbitration proceeding itself, and in any event that correspondence is not a sufficient contact to confer personal jurisdiction over a defendant. See Hotmix Bituminous Equip., Inc. v. Hadrock Equip. Corp., 719 N.E.2d 824, 829-30 (Ind.Ct.App. 1999) (holding that Indiana courts may not constitutionally assert jurisdiction over a defendant who never physically entered Indiana and whose only contacts with the state consisted of engaging in numerous phone calls, letters, and facsimile transmissions with the forum state); accord Rosowsky v. Univ. of Colo., 653 N.E.2d 146, 149 (Ind.Ct.App. 1995); Baseball Card World, Inc., 583 N.E.2d at 755-56; see also Wallace, 778 F.2d at 394 (holding that Indiana courts had no jurisdiction over California defendant-attorneys whose only contacts with the state were made in furtherance of a California lawsuit). In light of the minimal quantity of contacts with Indiana and the qualitative insignificance of those contacts, we are firmly of the view that an assertion of in personam jurisdiction over either Piloto or RM would be unconstitutional. Accordingly, all claims against Pilato and RM must be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Finally, we turn to Plaintiffs' claims against Ogdon, and not a moment too soon since this dispute is primarily between Plaintiffs and Ogdon; the other defendants appear to have been joined as a make-weight to underscore the gravity of Plaintiffs' Complaint. Ogdon's contacts with Indiana consist of those discussed above with respect to his attorneys, as well as his direct actions undertaken to obtain, utilize and cancel the subject insurance policy. No one disputes that Ogdon was never physically present in Indiana or that he was not a resident of Indiana at the time he purchased the insurance policy or at any time subsequent. Moreover, it is undisputed that the coverage sought under the policy was for medical services rendered in Florida. Finally, it is clear from the face of the insurance policy that it is a contract between Ogdon and Sirius, not IMG, and that IMG was involved solely because Sirius had designated it as the Plan Administrator to receive and process all communications with the insured.⁸ IMG did underwrite the subject insurance policy and Ogdon communicated with IMG in Indiana, both in terms of submitting claims for coverage and in requesting that the policy be cancelled.

8 This conclusion does not address whether IMG can be properly bound by the terms of the contract as a third-party beneficiary of the contract.

As discussed above, IMG's involvement in this dispute is due to Sirius' purposeful action, not Ogdon's. Ogdon's decision to purchase insurance did not entail an agreement that it be underwritten by IMG, only that the insurance be issued by Sirius. Likewise, it was not Ogdon's decision to involve IMG in any activity relevant to this lawsuit; rather, it was Sirius who designated IMG as the underwriter and required Ogdon to direct all communications to IMG. Given that the policy in question was purchased while Ogdon was residing in Canada and that the medical coverage claimed was rendered in Florida, it is readily apparent that Indiana's connections to the subject matter of this lawsuit are at best tenuous. We therefore conclude that Ogdon's communications are not qualitatively such that Ogdon should be considered to have "purposefully availed" himself of Indiana's privileges and protections.

Even if we aggregate Ogdon's personal contacts with IMG with those contacts of his agents (Rodriguez, Piloto, and RM), we are left securely with the view that Ogdon could not have reasonably anticipated being haled into an Indiana court and that an exercise of in personam jurisdiction over him would not comport with due process. Therefore, all claims against Ogdon must also be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, we hold that the Non-AAA Defendants have not had sufficient contact with the state of Indiana to have purposefully availed themselves of the privileges and protections of the forum and it would be unconstitutional to assert personal jurisdiction over them. The motion to dismiss is therefore GRANTED and all remaining claims are hereby DISMISSED for lack of personal jurisdiction.⁹

9 In light of our ruling dismissing the remaining claims in this matter, IMG's motion to Withdraw Notice of Appeal, Without Prejudice is GRANTED and its motion for Entry of Final Judgment is DENIED AS MOOT.

It is so ORDERED this 26th day of July 2001.