ATT Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America, 106 S.Ct. 1415, 1418 (1986) (quoting United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960)). Accord, International Longshoremen's Association v. New York Shipping Association, 403 F.2d 807, 809 (2 Cir. 1968) (Feinberg, J.). Second, "the question of arbitrability — whether a collective-bargaining agreement creates a duty for the parties to arbitrate the particular grievance — is undeniably an issue for judicial determination."

The language authorizes arbitration of "any" violation of the Settlement Agreement; it is more than arguable that a claim of fraud in the inducement of the Settlement Agreement is embraced within that language. See, e.g., Cooper v. Computer Credit Systems, Inc., 40 A.D.2d 692, 336 N.Y.S.2d 380 (2d Dep't 1972); Aerojet-General Corp. v. Non-Ferrous Metal Refining, Ltd., 37 A.D.2d 531, 322 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1st Dep't 1971); cf. ILA v. New York Shipping Association, 403 F.2d 807, 810 (2d Cir. 1968). Further, "there is no exclusion where a clause is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which would exclude arbitration, the other of which would not."

We are familiar with those cases — indeed, we doubt if there is a federal judge who is not — and we have fully accepted their implications in the past. E.g., International Longshoremen's Association v. New York Shipping Association, 403 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1968). But the Supreme Court itself, quoting the statutory language above, has pointed out that "the relationship of the Board to the arbitration process is of a quite different order" from "the relationship of courts to arbitrators when an arbitration award is under review."

On this theory, the Company's decision to shut down the plant cannot be questioned in arbitration, but the consequences of the Company's action can be; e.g., did it violate other sections of the contract? To resolve the issue of arbitrability, there is no need to rehearse the applicable law here at length; we have done so in the recent past. See, e.g., IUE v. General Electric Co., 407 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1968); ILA v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 403 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1968). It is enough to say that the authorities there quoted teach us that it is "national policy" to encourage arbitration of labor disputes, that doubts as to arbitrability should be "resolved in favor of coverage," that language excluding certain disputes from arbitration must be "clear and unambiguous" or "unmistakably clear," and that arbitration should be ordered "unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute." This is an imposing litany for the Company to overcome.

American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 567-568, 80 S.Ct. at 1346. Cf. International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 403 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1968). The claim here, regardless of its merits, is on its face governed by the language of section 5(c) (4).

United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior Gulf Navigation Co., supra, 363 U.S. at 582-83, 80 S.Ct. at 1353 (footnote omitted). See also Nolde Brothers, Inc. v. Local No. 358, Bakery Confectionery Workers Union, AFL-CIO, supra, 430 U.S. at 255, 97 S.Ct. 1067; Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 414 U.S. 368, 377-80, 94 S.Ct. 629, 38 L.Ed.2d 583 (1974); John Wiley Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, supra, 376 U.S. at 549-50, 84 S.Ct. 909; ITT World Communications, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, 422 F.2d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1970); International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO v. New York Shipping Association, 403 F.2d 807, 809 (2d Cir. 1968). The Company advances various arguments in support of its request for a stay of arbitration.

While the two specified exceptions have been expressly discussed in the cases cited above, implicit therein is a third exception: namely, that no one can be compelled to arbitrate a dispute unless he (or his representatives) have agreed to do so. See, e.g., Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n v. N.Y. Shipping Ass'n, Inc., 403 F.2d 807, 809 (2 Cir. 1968). The question upon which decision of defendant's motion to dismiss turns is whether or not the parties to the collective bargaining agreement intended that supervisory personnel claiming residual benefits from their former status as members of the bargaining unit must (or even may) utilize the grievance machinery as a prerequisite to judicial relief. Although the Court disagrees with plaintiff's argument that the agreement "clearly" excludes him from coverage, and recognizes the anomaly in permitting him to seek substantive benefits under the agreement without adhering to its procedural formalities, the Court also has difficulty in accepting defendant's theory that upon his termination as a supervisory employee plaintiff reverted to a status within the bargaining unit, since it is defendant that apparently is opposing the substantive benefits incidental to the status it seeks to impose on plaintiff.