Moreover, establishing the availability of a sum certain is likely to distort a jury verdict. See generally International Co. v. Clark, 147 Md. 34, 42, 127 A. 647, 650 (1925). The jury's knowledge of the available policy limits can work to the disadvantage of either party depending on the circumstances of the case.

This Court has often recognized that when the reference to insurance is made by the defendant, he is in no position to move for a mistrial. International Co. v. Clark, 147 Md. 34, 127 A. 647 (1925); Note, 5 Md. L. Rev. 422 (1941). In the Takoma Park Bank case, supra, an action against a bank by the lessees of a safe deposit box for the loss of the contents of the box, the Court held that it was proper for the trial court to admit a statement made by the vice-president of the bank that the plaintiff had nothing to worry about since the bank was protected by insurance.

Specifically, the first, third and sixth exceptions were taken to the court's action in admitting in evidence the above statement of Mr. Turnage, the executive vice-president of appellant, while the fifth, sixth and eighth exceptions were reserved at the trial court's refusal to grant appellant's motions to withdraw a juror and declare a mistrial. This court has, in line with a majority of the courts throughout the country, recognized the impropriety of injecting into the trial of a case a suggestion that the defendant was covered by insurance, because to do so had a tendency to prejudice jurors and cause them to regard the insurer as the real defendant. Hall v. Trimble, 104 Md. 317; Kirsch v. Ford, 170 Md. 90; Gwynn Oak Park v. Becker, 177 Md. 528; Ice Machinery Corp. v. Sachs, 167 Md. 113; Yellow Cab Co. v. Bradin, 172 Md. 388; International Co. v. Clark, 147 Md. 34, 127 A. 647; 8 Couch on Insurance, sec. 2254. But this rule is not without its qualifications and limitations. For instance, it is rarely ever applied, even when insurance is improperly suggested, if the trial court admonishes jurors to disregard the statement relating to insurance.

Ryan v. Trenkle, 199 Iowa 636; Berridge v. Pray, 202 Iowa 663. Courts in many other jurisdictions have held that for counsel to willfully bring before the jury in a personal injury suit the fact that the defendant is protected by indemnity insurance is a ground for reversal. Simpson v. Foundation Co., 201 N.Y. 479 (95 N.E. 10); Carter v. Walker (Tex. Civ. App.), 165 S.W. 483; Martin v. Lilly, 188 Ind. 139 (121 N.E. 443); Cady v. Lang, 95 Vt. 287 (115 A. 140); St. Jean v. Lippitt Woolen Co. (R.I.), 69 A. 604; Moorefield v. Lewis, 96 W. Va. 112 ( 123 S.E. 564); Vasquez v. Pettit, 74 Or. 496 (145 P. 1066); Chybowski v. Bucyrus Co., 127 Wis. 332 (106 N.W. 833); Sherwood v. Babcock, 208 Mich. 536 (175 N.W. 470); O'Hara v. Lamb Const. Co. (Mo. App.), 197 S.W. 163; Standridge v. Martin, 203 Ala. 486 ( 84 So. 266); Burgess v. Germany-Roy-Brown Co., 120 S.C. 285 ( 113 S.E. 118); Blue Bar Taxicab Trans. Co. v. Hudspeth, 25 Ariz. 287 (216 P. 246); International Co. v. Clark, 147 Md. 34 ( 127 A. 647); Boals Planing Mill Co. v. Cleveland, C., C. St. L.R. Co., 211 Ill. App. 125; Kentucky Wagon Mfg. Co. v. Duganics (Ky.), 113 S.W. 128."

Those instances are exceptional, but they do arise. Waldron v. Waldron, 156 U.S. 361, 363; State v. Moran, 99 Conn. 115; Review of decisions in L.R.A., 1918D, 4; Balto. O.R. Co. v. Boyd, 67 Md. 32, 42; Garlitz v. State, 71 Md. 293, 305; International Co. v. Clark, 147 Md. 34, 42; Duffy v. State, 151 Md. 456; Thompson on Trials, secs. 960, 965. And this case in our opinion presents one of the exceptional instances.

Ryan v. Trenkle, 199 Iowa 636; Berridge v. Pray, 202 Iowa 663. Courts in many other jurisdictions have held that for counsel to willfully bring before the jury in a personal injury suit the fact that the defendant is protected by indemnity insurance is a ground for reversal. Simpson v. Foundation Co., 201 N.Y. 479 (95 N.E. 10); Carter v. Walker (Tex. Civ. App.), 165 S.W. 483; Martin v. Lilly, 188 Ind. 139 (121 N.E. 443); Cady v. Lang, 95 Vt. 287 (115 A. 140); St. Jean v. Lippitt Woolen Co. (R.I.), 69 A. 604; Moorefield v. Lewis, 96 W. Va. 112 ( 123 S.E. 564); Vasquez v. Pettit, 74 Or. 496 (145 P. 1066); Chybowski v. Bucyrus Co., 127 Wis. 332 (106 N.W. 833); Sherwood v. Babcock, 208 Mich. 536 (175 N.W. 470); O'Hara v. Lamb Const. Co. (Mo. App.), 197 S.W. 163; Standridge v. Martin, 203 Ala. 486 ( 84 So. 266); Burgess v. Germany-Roy-Brown Co., 120 S.C. 285 ( 113 S.E. 118); Blue Bar Taxicab Trans. Co. v. Hudspeth, 25 Ariz. 287 (216 P. 246); International Co. v. Clark, 147 Md. 34 ( 127 A. 647); Boals Planing Mill Co. v. Cleveland, C., C. St. L.R. Co., 211 Ill. App. 125; Kentucky Wagon Mfg. Co. v. Duganics (Ky.), 113 S.W. 128. While we do not mean to restrict the right of proper cross-examination for the purpose of showing the interest of the witness, we are convinced that, under the doctrine of the cited cases, the cross-examination in this case went beyond this purpose, and was, therefore, prejudicial to the appellant.

The suit is not one on a policy and the possession of a policy by the defendants could not affect the disposition of this case. International Co. v. Clark, 147 Md. 34, 42, 127 A. 647. And see Lord v. Veazie, 8 How. 251, 12 L.Ed. 1067."

This partial remand is also supported by the Maryland rule against the injection into a tort case of the fact that the defendant is insured. International Co. v. Clark, 147 Md. 34, 42, 127 A. 647. B. Before ruling on the motion to dismiss the third-party complaint, I will require the Casualty Company, pursuant to sec. 1447(b), to file with the clerk of this court copies of all records and proceedings in the Circuit Court for Carroll County, including a copy of the insurance policy and all endorsements thereon.

One ground is that, in jury trials, it is prejudicial to the defendant to permit the jury to have information that the defendant is insured. International Co. v. Clark, 147 Md. 34, 42, 127 A. 647; Stewart Co. v. Newby, 4 Cir., 266 F. 287, 295. While there have been many judicial decisions to this effect, beginning many years ago when automobile insurance was much less customary, it may be doubted whether now, in view of the fact that automobile liability insurance is so general, the rule should be so rigidly applied; at least where the practice, as in the federal courts, permits definite legal instructions to the jury with respect to the legal effect of insurance in these negligence cases. A more persuasive argument for the dismissal of the insurer is that it is not directly but only secondarily liable to the plaintiff, in the event of the non-payment of a judgment against the defendant insured.

Respondents then argue that this Court has a longstanding rule against a party claiming relief on the basis of insurance having been mentioned if that party was the sole source of it having been mentioned. See Ass'n of Indep. Taxi Operators, Inc. v. Kern, 178 Md. 252, 260, 13 A.2d 374, 377 (1940) ; York Ice Mach. Corp. v. Sachs, 167 Md. 113, 127, 173 A. 240, 246 (1934) ; Int'l Co. v. Clark, 147 Md. 34, 43–44, 127 A. 647, 650–51 (1925). We find Keller's argument unavailing.