Opinion
Case No. 03-4222-SAC.
August 5, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This case comes before the court on plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, by which plaintiff seeks to enforce an arbitration award made by a joint Labor-Management Committee. The Committee found defendant to be in violation of the applicable collective bargaining agreement as to three grievants, and assessed what amounts to a total award against defendant of $4,833.60.
Jurisdiction
The court is satisfied that it has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) ("Suits for violation of contracts as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.") The fact that the dispute settlement steps are not denominated as "arbitration proceedings" is not of particular consequence and does not prevent the court's giving effect to them just as it would to proceedings labeled 'arbitration.' Local Freight Drivers, Local No. 208 v. Braswell Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 422 F.2d 109, 113 (9th Cir. 1970).
The grievance committee's decision was final. The parties' agreement does not provide a right of appeal to another body except in cases in which the Labor-Management Committee failed to agree. See Dk. 16, Exh. A, p. 2; Local Union 24, Intern. Broth. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO v. Wm. C. Bloom Co., 242 F. Supp. 421, 424-425 (D. Md. 1965) (examining CBA language nearly identical to this one); General Drivers Union No. 89 v. Riss Company, Inc., 372 U.S. 517, 519 (1963) (holding that 'if the award at bar is the parties' chosen instrument for the definitive settlement of grievances under the Agreement, it is enforceable under § 301.') Here, the Labor-Management Committee did not fail to agree, see Dk. 16, Exh. B, thus their decision was final.
The remedy sought from this court is authorized. According to § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, parties look to the district court to enforce money judgments. See 29 U.S.C. § 185(b).
When defendant filed no response to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, the court, in an abundance of caution, ordered defendant to show cause why plaintiff's motion should not be considered and decided as uncontested. Defendant filed no response to the show cause order. Accordingly, the court shall decide defendant's summary judgment motion as an uncontested motion.
Summary Judgment Standards
A court grants a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if a genuine issue of material fact does not exist and if the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court is to determine "whether there is the need for a trial — whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will . . . preclude summary judgment." Id. There are no genuine issues for trial if the record taken as a whole would not persuade a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indust. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
More than a "disfavored procedural shortcut," summary judgment is an important procedure "designed 'to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.' Fed.R.Civ.P. 1." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986). At the same time, a summary judgment motion does not empower a court to act as the jury and determine witness credibility, weigh the evidence, or choose between competing inferences. Windon Third Oil and Gas v. Federal Deposit Ins., 805 F.2d 342, 346 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947 (1987).
The rule in this district regarding a party's failure to file and serve motion papers provides: "If a respondent fails to file a response within the time required by [the rules of this court], the motion will be considered and decided as an uncontested motion, and ordinarily will be granted without further notice." D.Kan. Rule 7.4. The rules of this court further specifically state that "all material facts set forth in the statement of the movant shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the statement of the opposing party." D.Kan. Rule 56.1(a).
Facts
Plaintiff Local 226 is a labor organization representing employees in the electrical industry in the area of Topeka, Kansas. Plaintiff is party to a collective bargaining agreement with defendant O.K. Johnson. The terms and conditions of this agreement are binding upon defendant.
Under the agreement, plaintiff and the Union have agreed to a grievance and arbitration procedure to govern disputes that may arise between them. Under the relevant grievance/arbitration provision, grievances or questions in dispute are to be decided by a Committee ("Committee") consisting of three Union representatives and three employer representatives. All matters are to be decided by a majority vote.
In July of 2003, the Union notified defendant of several grievances involving defendant's failure to abide by the procedure for layoffs set forth in the parties' agreement. These grievances involved bargaining unit members Anita Lambert, Chris Cooper and William Holladay. The grievances submitted by the Union were not resolved by the parties' duly authorized representatives. The grievances are matters that are subject to arbitration before the Committee pursuant to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement; accordingly, they were voluntarily submitted for resolution to the Committee as provided for in the parties' agreement.
By notice dated July 10, 2003, the Committee informed defendant of the time, date and place at which it would hear plaintiff's grievances, and encouraged defendant to send a representative to speak on its behalf or, at the very least, fax all relevant information to the Committee.
On July 24, 2003, the Committee convened to address this dispute. James Mlynek, President of O.K. Johnson, was present before the hearing officially commenced. He interrupted the Committee's meeting regarding pre-hearing matters several times to demand that the hearing begin at once, and was told to wait each time. By the time the hearing commenced, Mlynek had left the premises.
By unanimous decision dated August 25, 2003, the Committee determined that defendant O.K. Johnson was in violation of the parties' agreement, Article IV, section 4.20. It accordingly directed defendant to pay Anita Lambert forty-eight (48) hours pay plus benefits at straight time rate of pay; Chris Cooper forty-eight (48) hours pay plus benefits at straight time rate of pay; and William Holladay fifty-six (56) hours pay plus benefits at straight time rate of pay. Straight time rate of pay, plus benefits for each of the above-listed O.K. Johnson employees equals $31.80 per hour. As such, the Committee's award equals $1,526.40 for Anita Lambert; $1,526.40 for Chris Cooper; and $1,780.80 for William Holladay.
Defendant received notice of the Committee's decision on or around August 25, 2003. By letter dated August 28, 2003, Mlynek acknowledged receipt of Committee's notice of the resolution of the above-mentioned grievances, and advised the Committee that O.K. Johnson did not intend to comply with the award.
By letter dated September 29, 2003, Lloyd Lavin, Business Manager for Local 226, informed defendant that if it did not make efforts to comply with the decision of the Committee, the Union would have no alternative but to pursue enforcement in a court of law. By letter dated October 3, 2003, O.K. Johnson, through Mlynek, informed the Committee he "welcome[d] any court proceedings, or other legal actions from the Committee, or the Local Union #226."
On December 16, 2003, Plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas to enforce the award rendered by the Committee on July 24, 2003. On January 15, 2004, defendant filed its answer and a counterclaim seeking to vacate the decision of the Committee. Despite having received notice of the Committee's decision on or around August 25, 2003, defendant did not file suit in any court to vacate that decision before the filing of its counterclaim on January 15, 2004.
Analysis
Plaintiff has complied with its duty under the relevant rules of practice to submit its summary judgment motion and memoranda, containing a concise statement of material facts as to which it contends no genuine issue exists. The facts set forth by the plaintiff refer with particularity to the portion of the record upon which it relies, and are supported by affidavits, and/or relevant portions of pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and responses to requests for admission. In short, the plaintiff has complied with its burden to show that summary judgment is warranted. Defendant has done nothing to show that it is not.
The court has reviewed the parties' agreement, the relevant law, and the undisputed facts. The scope of this court's review is very narrow, limited to determining (1) whether the Committee acted within the contractual scope of its authority; and (2) if so, whether it was even arguably construing or applying the Agreement, thus drawing the essence of his award from the Agreement. IBEW Local No. 611 v. Public Service Co. of New Mexico, 980 F.2d 616, 618 (10th Cir. 1992).
The court finds that the Committee acted within the scope of its contractual authority in making the decision as the Committee was, among other things, authorized by the parties to interpret the agreement in order to determine the proper method for layoffs. See Dk. 16, Exh. B, p 2. Further, the Committee's decision "drew its essence from the Agreement, and was not an attempt to dispense his own sense of industrial justice." See IBEW Local No. 611, 980 F.2d at 618. Because judicial review of labor-arbitration awards is so narrow, whether the decision of the Committee is correct or incorrect is not a matter properly before this court. Local No. 7 v. King Soopers, Inc., 222 F.3d 1223, 1226 (10th Cir. 2000) ("courts are not authorized to consider the merits of any award even though the parties may allege that the award rests on errors of fact or on misinterpretation of the contract) (quoting United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987); Champion Boxed Beef v. Local No. 7, 24 F.3d 86, 87 (10th Cir. 1994) (finding court's review of such awards to be "among the narrowest known to the law.")
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Dk. 15) is granted, that the Committee's award is enforced, and that defendant shall abide by that award in all respects, including the payment of all backwages and benefits, for a total award of $4,833.60 within 40 days of this order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this court shall retain jurisdiction to enforce the arbitration award and take any further action necessary in support of that enforcement.