Numerous decisions make clear that a variety of costs and payments to agents of the insurer are included within the definition of gross premiums used to tax all insurers not in the business of writing policies of title insurance. (See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1982) 32 Cal.3d 649, 186 Cal.Rptr. 578, 652 P.2d 426 [funds paid to insured by agent instead of insurer]; U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. State Bd. of Equal. (1956) 47 Cal.2d 384, 303 P.2d 1034 [bail bond surcharge retained by insurer's agent]; Groves v. City of Los Angeles (1953) 40 Cal.2d 751, 256 P.2d 309 [same]; Ind. Indem. Exch. v. State Bd. Equalization (1945) 26 Cal.2d 772, 161 P.2d 222 [portion of premiums returned by insurer to attorney in fact]; Interinsurance Exchange v. State Bd. of Equalization (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 606, 203 Cal.Rptr. 74 [service fees collected and retained by insurer's agent]; Allstate Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equal. (1959) 169 Cal.App.2d 165, 336 P.2d 961 [installment payment fees].) Like the federal authorities this state looks beyond the labels the parties have given to the transactions to determine the true economic substance of the arrangement and whether it inures to the economic benefit of the insurer.
Also, as in Auto Club, we do not rely on the taxation cases cited by Troyk and relied on by the trial court. (See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, supra, 32 Cal.3d 649; Allstate Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equal. (1959) 169 Cal.App.2d 165 [ 336 P.2d 961]; Interinsurance Exchange v. State Bd. of Equalization (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 606 [ 203 Cal.Rptr. 74].) Because those cases involve the interpretation of the term "gross premiums" for purposes of insurance company taxation and are otherwise factually inapposite, we do not rely on those taxation cases in interpreting the meaning of the term "premium," as used in section 381, subdivision (f).
Also, as in Auto Club we do not rely on the taxation cases cited by Troyk and relied on by the trial court. (See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, supra 32 Cal.3d 649; Allstate Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equal. (1959) 169 Cal.App.2d 165 [ 336 P.2d 961]; Interinsurance Exchange v. State Bd. of Equalization (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 606 [ 203 Cal.Rptr. 74].) Because those cases involve the interpretation of the term "gross premiums" for purposes of insurance company taxation and are otherwise factually inapposite, we do not rely on those taxation cases in interpreting the meaning of the term "premium," as used in section 381, subdivision (f).
Therefore, to the extent other cases cited by Williams approved or followed Allstate, those cases are also inapposite. (See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1982) 32 Cal.3d 649, 660 [ 186 Cal.Rptr. 578, 652 P.2d 426]; Interinsurance Exchange v. State Bd. of Equalization (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 606, 614 [ 203 Cal.Rptr. 74].) As supporting evidence for that statement of undisputed material fact, Exchange cites the declaration of John Boyle, executive vice-president of ACSC Management Services, Inc., which is Exchange's attorney-in-fact.
Plaintiffs cite several California cases (Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1982) 32 Cal.3d 649, 186 Cal.Rptr. 578, 652 P.2d 426; Allstate Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equalization (1959) 169 Cal.App.2d 165, 336 P.2d 961; Interinsurance Exchange v. State Board of Equalization (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 606, 203 Cal.Rptr. 74), two Attorney General opinions (9 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 257 (1947); 58 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 768 (1975)), and an Insurance Commissioner's opinion letter issued by the California Department of Insurance (DOI) in 2006 supporting their position that installment payment fees charged by insurance companies are premium. Following Auto Club and Troyk, we do not rely on these authorities in deciding whether the installment fees at issue in this case are premium within the meaning of section 381, subdivision (f).
Finally, the city argues that the hotels benefit from the value of the OTCs' sales and marketing on their behalf. Citing Interinsurance Exchange v. State Bd. of Equalization (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 606, 614 (Interinsurance), the city argues that such service fees should be taxable even though the hotel does not receive them. In Interinsurance, the Court of Appeal considered whether a $1 service fee charged for an installment plan of insurance, which was collected and retained by the Automobile Club of Southern California as agent for the Interinsurance Exchange, was taxable as part of the Interinsurance Exchange's "gross premiums."
As Plaintiff asserts, a number of state court decisions have held that installment fees are considered "gross premiums" for tax purposes. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 32 Cal.3d 649, 186 Cal.Rptr. 578, 652 P.2d 426, 432 (1982) (in bank); Interinsurance Exch. of Auto. Club of S. Cal. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 156 Cal.App.3d 606, 203 Cal. Rptr. 74, 77 (Ct.App. 1984); Allstate Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 169 Cal.App.2d 165, 336 P.2d 961, 967 (1959); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 365 Mass. 411, 312 N.E.2d 559, 562 (1974); State ex rel. Ins. Comm'r v. Allstate Ins. Co., 221 Or. 371, 351 P.2d 433, 437-38 (1960), overruled on other grounds by Parr v. Dep't of Revenue, 276 Or. 113, 553 P.2d 1051, 1052-53 (1976) (en banc). We agree with the district court that these cases are not applicable.