Opinion
No. 4001811
September 11, 2007
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The plaintiffs, Integrated Security Solutions, LLC, and Ronald Wadsworth, commenced this action against the defendants, Security Technology Systems, LLC, and Daniel Golodner, by service of process on December 4, 2004. In their revised complaint, filed on September 1, 2005, the plaintiffs allege the following facts. The plaintiffs and the defendants engage in the business of installing and maintaining alarm systems. On November 10, 2004, Golodner, a member of Security Technology Systems, LLC, made disparaging remarks about the plaintiffs to George Frankewicz and other employees of the city of New London Public Works Department. Particularly, Golodner falsely and maliciously accused Wadsworth of being a thief and distributing cocaine. As a result of the defamatory statements, the plaintiffs have suffered a loss of reputation, good will, contracts and expected income. The plaintiffs bring a claim of defamation and a claim of a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, General Statutes § 42-110a, et seq.
On April 5, 2007, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that there is no evidence that the alleged statements harmed the reputation of the plaintiffs. The defendants attached a memorandum in support of their motion and certified transcripts of the deposition testimonies of George Frankewicz and Tom Boude. On May 16, 2007, the plaintiffs filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs attached an affidavit of Wadsworth and portions of the deposition testimony of Frankewicz and Boude. The court heard the matter at short calendar on June 19, 2007.
The defendants' motion is not clear whether they are moving for summary judgment as to both the defamation claim and the CUTPA claim or only the defamation claim. However, the defendant raises no arguments in favor of summary judgment on the CUTPA claim. Therefore, the court deems the motion to request summary judgment on the defamation claim alone.
"Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . . The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that the party is, therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brown v. Soh, 280 Conn. 494, 500-01, 909 A.2d 43 (2006). Furthermore, "a party opposing summary judgment must substantiate its adverse claim by showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact together with the evidence disclosing the existence of such an issue . . . It is not enough . . . for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact . . . are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court [in support of a motion for summary judgment] ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Buell Industries, Inc. v. Greater New York Mutual Ins. Co., 259 Conn. 527, 550, 791 A.2d 489 (2002).
In their supporting memorandum of law, the defendants argue that a prima facie case of defamation requires the defendant to prove that the plaintiff's reputation suffered as a result of the statement. The defendant asserts that Frankewicz and Boude were the only persons present when the defendants allegedly made the statements, and they neither repeated the statements, nor believed them. Accordingly, the defendants argue that the plaintiffs' reputation was not harmed by the alleged statements, and the defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
In their memorandum of law, the plaintiffs argue that Golodner's comments intended to harm their reputation and to defer others from dealing with them. The plaintiffs also argue that, because Golodner's comments accused Wadsworth of criminal conduct, they amount to slander per se and require no evidence of special, actual or pecuniary damages. Injury to reputation, the plaintiffs argue, is conclusively presumed in cases of slander per se. Accordingly, the plaintiffs argue that the motion for summary judgment should be denied.
"A defamatory statement is defined as a communication that tends to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him . . . To establish a prima facie case of defamation, the plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the defendant published a defamatory statement; (2) the defamatory statement identified the plaintiff to a third person; (3) the defamatory statement was published to a third person; and (4) the plaintiff's reputation suffered injury as a result of the statement." Hopkins v. O'Connor, 282 Conn. 821, 838 (2007).
"Defamation is comprised of the torts of libel and slander. Defamation is that which tends to injure `reputation' in the popular sense; to diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in which the plaintiff is held, or to excite adverse, derogatory, or unpleasant feelings or opinions against him . . . Slander is oral defamation. This court has delineated specific categories of speech deemed actionable per se where the defamatory meaning of [the speech] is apparent on the face of the statement . . . It is a well established principle that an accusation of theft is slander per se . . .
"When the defamatory words are actionable per se, the law conclusively presumes the existence of injury to the plaintiff's reputation. He is required neither to plead nor to prove it . . . The individual plaintiff is entitled to recover, as general damages, for the injury to his reputation and for the humiliation and mental suffering which the [defamation] caused him. To recover special damages, however, the plaintiff must prove that he suffered economic loss that was legally caused by the defendant's defamatory statements, even where the defamation is per se . . . General and special damages together comprise compensatory damages." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Devito v. Schwartz, 66 Conn.App. 228, 234-35, 784 A.2d 376 (2001). "[I] f the defamatory material is defamation per se, the jury may award the plaintiff general damages without any further proof thereof, special damages if proven and punitive damages as a matter of discretion. Where defamation per se has been established, a plaintiff should receive at least nominal damages though not necessarily anything more." Id., 236.
The plaintiffs have alleged that Golodner accused Wadsworth of theft and dealing drugs. These defamatory comments, if proven, amount to slander per se. The plaintiffs, therefore, need not prove special damages. Proving that the defamatory comments about the plaintiffs were published to third parties entitles the plaintiffs to nominal damages at least. The defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiffs have not proven injury to their reputation must accordingly be denied.