Insurance Co. v. Neal

2 Citing cases

  1. Steed v. Crossland

    252 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952)   Cited 11 times

    Because of this statute it is necessarily held that a deed takes effect between the parties when delivered to the grantee, not when it is recorded. See: Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Neal, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 427, 56 S.W. 91 at page 93; Dutton v. Cloar, 26 Tex. Civ. App. 547, 65 S.W. 70, 72 ('The undisputed evidence shows that the deed from W. B. Cloar was executed and delivered on January 12, 1899. It took effect at the time, and this is true notwithstanding it was not filed for record for some months thereafter'); W. T. Carter Bro. v. Davis, Tex.Civ.App., 88 S.W.2d 596 at page 601 ('The deeds from Helen B. Hardin, Mrs. Cynthia A. Skinner, and her husband, J. F. Skinner, and W. F. Hardin, to Wirt Davis reserved the minerals and so did effect a severance of the minerals from the surface estate, and the fact that said deeds were never recorded did not affect their validity').

  2. Kansas City, M. O. Ry. Co. v. Estes

    203 S.W. 1155 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918)   Cited 10 times

    It has been held that a requested charge, even though otherwise proper, may be refused where some language therein requires definition or explanation. Railway v. Taylor, 79 Tex. 104, 14 S.W. 918, 23 Am.St.Rep. 316; Phoenix, etc., v. Neal, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 427, 56 S.W. 91. If the charge had asked whether the injury happened from an accident that could not have been reasonably foreseen by the use of ordinary care, it would not have been so objectionable. The jury might feel that under a certain state of facts there was or was not fault upon a particular person, yet when they are asked to find whether a particular act is negligence, or whether it could have been reasonably foreseen, and these terms have been defined by the charge of the court, so that the jury cannot misunderstand them, then they are not allowed to exercise their opinion of whether a person was at fault, but are required to find whether, under the evidence, a certain fact within the meaning of the court's charge has taken place.